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Abstract 
 
While intergroup peace is statistically far more common than is intergroup or 
inter-religious conflict, there has been a rise in recent years in conflict framed in religious 
terms.  Peace and development practitioners have, in response, become increasingly 
interested in engaging religion, in various ways, in peace and development work.  A 
theoretical field of religious peacebuilding has emerged simultaneous to this increased 
practitioner engagement of religion. Despite this increase in religious peacebuilding, at 
both practical and theoretical levels, we have not seen a measurable increase in social 
cohesion in contexts plagued by so-called religious conflict, as I show in my comparative 
examination of case studies in Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I argue that this is 
because the current theoretical approach to religious peacebuilding often views religion 
as solely ideological and uni-directional in how it relates to conflict and peace (as an 
independent, rather than a dependent variable in a given conflict setting).  This stems 
from a shallow application of Scott Appleby’s ambivalence thesis, which is in and of 
itself more robust than is often applied, in both theoretical and practical approaches.   
I demonstrate in this dissertation that by re-anchoring religious peacebuilding 
theory in a material theory of religion, both the fields of theory and practice benefit by 
looking at religion as a more holistic and dynamic conflict variable- one that is shaped by 
conflict as much as it affects the course or tone of a conflict itself.  I argue for an 
expansion of the ambivalence thesis, as I show that religion is not only ambivalent when 
 iii 
it comes to belief or ideology, but it is also ambivalent in the ways in which it seeks to 
challenge or uphold the status quo in a given situation. This added dimension of 
ambivalence helps peace and conflict practitioners to engage religion in ways that deal 
with root cause issues of justice and rights, rather than simply looking at religion through 
the lens of violence and peace. This theoretical shift thereby makes space for more 
fruitful approaches to actively engaging religion in peacebuilding practice in particular, 
intentional ways.  Beyond deepening the theoretical field of religious peacebuilding, this 
shift will also help to refine how international actors engage religion in peacebuilding for 
years to come, looking toward sustainable social cohesion rather than static peace 
agreements as the goal for societies in conflict.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“Surviving peace is a lot harder than surviving war. During war, you know your side- it’s 
easy. After that, it’s not so easy.”1 
In September of 2013, several rebel and militant groups, including both the Free 
Syrian Army and al-Nusra front, worked together to invade and take control of portions 
of Maaloula, a Syrian town outside of Damascus.  Some from the militant groups claimed 
that they were there to liberate the city- known for its ancient Christian heritage and 
character, and under the control of the Asad government - from Crusaders.2  This 
encounter took place 2 ½ years after the initial civilian pro-democracy uprisings in March 
2011 that were met with violent government crackdowns, leading to the conflict that 
remains active as of June 2017.  The town of Maaloula is home to a number of ancient 
churches and monasteries.  I wandered the streets there myself eight years prior, in the 
fall of 2005, visiting the Mar Takla Monastery and listening with fascination to the 
Aramaic language still spoken in this city.  At the time, it appeared quite tranquil, and 
while predominantly Christian, seemed to be a site for pilgrims from multiple faiths. 
In the September 2013 clashes, numerous townspeople- both Christian and 
Muslim- fled, intentional damage to churches and monasteries was reported, and at least 
                                                
1 Interview with respondent 4, Sarajevo, March 11, 2016.   
  
2 Sohaib Enjrainy, “Syrian Christian Village Besieged by Jihadists,” September 5, 2013, accessed June 1, 
2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/09/syria-christians-maaloula-jihadists-opposition-
army.html 
2 
10 Christians were murdered, with some residents reporting that Christians were shot for 
refusing to convert to Islam, as documented by Robert Fisk.3  Some Christians from the 
town reported that their neighbors- and former friends- turned against them in this fight.  
Fisk describes one woman’s account as follows:  
Hanna says that before the war reached Maaloula this month, both Christians and 
Muslims agreed that the town must remain a place of peace. “There was a kind of 
coexistence between us,” Georgios agrees. “We had excellent relations. It never 
occurred to us that Muslim neighbours would betray us. We all said ‘please let 
this town live in peace – we don’t have to kill each other’. But now there is bad 
blood. They brought in the Nusra to throw out the Christians and get rid of us 
forever. Some of the Muslims who lived with us are good people but I will never 
trust 90 per cent of them again.” 4 
 
 The final portion of this quote demonstrates that one of the pernicious effects of 
violence that is understood or labeled as religious in nature, is that it shifts the way 
civilians view one another. Neighbors who did not previously look at one another in 
primarily sectarian or religious terms begin to prioritize this identity marker in how they 
view and relate to one another.  
Other reports give additional, and sometimes alternative, narratives on the events, 
with some avowing that most Christian worship sites were unharmed, and others 
reporting that rebel groups went to great lengths to state that they were not intending 
harm to Christians:  
Some of the rebels, apparently aware of their public relations problem, said in 
interviews that they meant Christians no harm. They filmed themselves talking 
                                                
3 Robert Fisk, “Syria Crisis: In Sacred Maaloula, where they Speak the Language of Christ, War leads 
Neighbours into Betrayal,” Independent, September 25, 2013, accessed June 1, 2017, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-crisis-in-sacred-maaloula-where-
they-speak-the-language-of-christ-war-leads-neighbours-into-8839610.html 
 
4 Robert Fisk, “Syria Crisis: In Sacred Maaloula, where they Speak the Language of Christ, War leads 
Neighbours into Betrayal,” Independent, September 25, 2013, accessed June 1, 2017, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-crisis-in-sacred-maaloula-where-
they-speak-the-language-of-christ-war-leads-neighbours-into-8839610.html 
3 
politely with nuns, instructing fighters not to harm civilians or 
churches and touring a monastery that appeared mostly intact. They said they had 
withdrawn from most of the town, posted videos of shelling there by Mr. Assad’s 
forces and argued that the government had given the fight a sectarian cast by 
sending Christian militiamen from Damascus to join in.5 
 
As one analyst articulates, in describing the mixed sentiments and reactions of 
Syrian Christians in this case,  
Although many Christians do not trust the regime, the opposition too does not 
offer much promise. The opposition’s extremist elements have killed, kidnapped, 
and expelled Christians, burned churches, and destroyed early Christian 
monasteries. The prelate also complains that the opposition has denied Christians 
the ability to remain neutral in this conflict.6  
 
While some of the events themselves are unclear, one this is certain: there were 
numerous actors involved on both sides of the “battle lines” in Maaloula in September 
2013, working with a diversity of motivations and tactics.  Religious justifications and 
targeting are one thread of the narrative, and yet, there is far more to the story than a 
Christian vs. Muslim plotline. Most notably, Maaloula’s location along the Qalamun 
mountain range bordering Lebanon, combined with it being situated on the main road 
between Damascus and Homs, made it a strategic site for control in the Syrian war.7   
The Syrian conflict is the most well-known example today of a conflict that has 
taken on religious dimensions, in that numerous groups involved in the fighting frame 
                                                
5 Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, “Assault on Christian Town in Syria Adds to Fears Over Rebels,” The 
New York Times, September 10, 2013, accessed June 1, 2017, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/middleeast/assault-on-christian-town-complicates-crisis-in-
syria.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
6 Flavius Mihaies, “Syrian Christian Perspectives on the War,” SyriaSource, Atlantic Council, January 7, 
2016, accessed June 1, 2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/syrian-christian-
perspectives-on-the-war 
7 Peter Oborne, “Syria war: Maaloula’s monastery destroyed after Assad forces drive rebels out,” The 
Telegraph, April 15, 2014, accessed June 16, 2017, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10768900/Syria-war-Maaloulas-monastery-
destroyed-after-Assad-forces-drive-rebels-out.html 
4 
their own motives, dividing lines, and justifications for using violence in terms of 
religious identity or religious teachings.  The ripple effect has been strong, both in the 
region, as new forms of sectarianism have arisen in Lebanon and other neighboring 
countries, as well as in the US and Europe, where debates over refugee admissions have 
taken on the language of religious difference and division, scapegoating Muslim refugees 
for the violence that groups like ISIS have perpetrated using the banner of Islam. 
Moments like the Maaloula attack have contributed to shaping the narrative, as 
well as the course itself, of the Syrian conflict. This episode, and the way it was framed in 
international media, is part of the larger narrative being constructed and produced around 
the Syrian conflict more broadly,8 as complicated and shifting alliances have often been 
simplified into sectarian battles and Christian-Muslim conflicts. The Syrian government 
continues to frame it as a “war against terror,” 9 and ISIS militants continue to target 
Christians and Yazidis in particular in highly theatrical ways (while targeting the greater 
Muslim population of Syria unendingly, but typically with less theatrics).  How these 
                                                
8 See, for example, Jamal Halaby, “Syrian Rebels Seize Control of Christian Village,” USA Today, 
September 8, 2013, accessed June 1, 2017, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/09/08/syrian-rebels-take-christian-
village/2781763/; and “Battle for Syria Christian Town Continues,” BBC News, September 11, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24051440; Robert Fisk, “Syria Crisis: In Sacred 
Maaloula, where they Speak the Language of Christ, War leads Neighbours into Betrayal,” Independent, 
September 25, 2013, accessed June 1, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/syria-crisis-in-sacred-maaloula-where-they-speak-the-language-of-christ-war-leads-
neighbours-into-8839610.html; Sohaib Enjrainy, “Syrian Christian Village Besieged by Jihadists,” 
September 5, 2013, accessed June 1, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/09/syria-
christians-maaloula-jihadists-opposition-army.html; and Brian Dooley, “Ending Sectarianism in Syria: 
How to Secure a Lasting Peace,” Foreign Affairs, April 13, 2016, accessed June 16, 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-04-13/ending-sectarianism-syria.  
9 Robert Fisk, “Syria Crisis: In Sacred Maaloula, where they Speak the Language of Christ, War leads 
Neighbours into Betrayal,” Independent, September 25, 2013, accessed June 1, 2017, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-crisis-in-sacred-maaloula-where-
they-speak-the-language-of-christ-war-leads-neighbours-into-8839610.html.  
5 
stories get told impacts how they are understood on the ground, and sectarian faultlines 
are produced and reified through both events and narratives thereof.   
There is a persistent myth among journalists, civil society, and beyond, that 
religious conflict is primordial and inevitable, despite evidence demonstrating that inter-
group peace is far more common than is conflict involving religious or ethnic groups.10  
The “ancient hatreds” framework for understanding conflict is not only coming from the 
political right in the United States, although there are numerous examples of this 
narrative among conservative political platforms. The political left, along with those 
across the middle of the spectrum, also default to this way of framing; for example, 
Barack Obama’s 2013 speech on the Syrian conflict referred to “ancient sectarian 
differences” as the driving force behind the fighting.11 
While scholarly analysis indicates that peace prevails more than conflict, the 
primordialist thesis draws strength at a popular level, particularly in the United States and 
Western Europe, from the fact that in recent decades conflicts have been increasingly 
framed in religious terms, even if not technically religious in origin.12 This paradox raises 
a number of theoretical issues related to our understanding of religion itself, and the 
relationships between religious factors and episodes of violence or socio-political 
conflict. Regardless of whether a conflict can be rightly considered a “religious” one, the 
presence of religious discourse and symbolism in a conflict seems to add a distinct 
                                                
10 See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” 
International Organization 54.4 (2000): 865-68. 
11 B.C., “The Sects of Syria: Those Ancient Differences,” The Economist, September 1, 2013, accessed 
May 30, 2017, http://www.economist.com/blogs/erasmus/2013/09/sects-syria. 
12 Pew Research Center, “Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High.” January 2014, accessed May 30, 
2017, http://www.pewforum.org/2014/01/14/religious-hostilities-reach-six-year-high/ 
6 
element to conflict dynamics, creating conditions in which religion cannot be ignored 
when attempting to rebuild social trust and cohesion.  
Over the last two decades, there has been new energy in the fields of conflict 
mitigation, peacebuilding and development, around the explicit engagement of religion. 
By and large, foreign policy and development actors have become more interested in the 
role of religion in conflict and peace. While there are certainly multiple factors 
contributing to this increased attention to religion, one key dynamic at play is the fact that 
both conflict actors and observers have utilized religion and religious identity, 
rhetorically and symbolically, to frame a number of ongoing wars around the globe in the 
last two decades. A 2014 Pew Research Center report states that, “the share of countries 
with a high or very high level of social hostilities involving religion reached a six-year 
peak in 2012.”13 One only needs to call to mind the ongoing social and political conflicts 
in Myanmar, Syria, the Central African Republic, and Nigeria, to understand why the 
need to consider and engage religion is of urgent importance today.14 In each of these 
cases, as in the illustration in Syria at the beginning of this chapter, religion is invoked 
regularly to describe or determine the perpetrators and victims of particular acts of 
violence, or to justify actions, or to make sense of a violent event.  
                                                
13 Pew Research Center, “Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High.”  
14 For background on Myanmar and Nigeria, see Fletcher D. Cox, Catherine R. Orsborn, and Timothy D. 
Sisk, Religion, Peacebuilding, and Social Cohesion in Conflict-Affected Countries, Sie Cheou Kang Center 
for International Security at the University of Denver, 2014, accessed June 14, 2017, 
http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/sisk_religion_and_social_cohesion.html; for background on 
Syria, see Paulo Gabriel Hilu Pinto, “The Shattered Nation: The Sectarianization of the Syrian Conflict,” 
Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East, eds. Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 123-142; and on Central African Republic see Louisa Lombard, 
State of Rebellion: Violence and Intervention in the Central African Republic (London: Zed Books, 2016).    
7 
Post World War II, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, conflicts 
globally increasingly involve intra-state and non-state actors, rather than being between 
nation states.15  Indeed, the scale and death tolls of these conflicts tend to be lower that 
the inter-state or major international wars, as they are often waged by actors with access 
to smaller arms and weaponry. However, they entail higher levels of brutality against 
civilians.  Civil wars, and conflicts fought by non-state actors, are the predominant forms 
of conflict around the globe today.  
Additionally, Jonathan Fox’s 2004 empirical study of conflicts between 1945-
2001 points to another key development in conflict over the past half century in 
particular.  His study suggests that religious nationalist groups have been responsible for 
more conflict than non-religious groups since around 1980.16 Additionally, Fox’s data 
suggests that while religious conflict was less violence than non-religious conflict 
between 1955-1964, it has become more violent than non-religious conflict since 1965.17 
Monica Duffy Toft demonstrates that conflicts featuring religion have increased from 
accounting for 36% of civil wars in the 1970’s to 50% of the ongoing wars in 2010.18  
In this context, the UN Development Program and other UN agencies, along with 
USAID, the US Department of State, and numerous other major international and 
                                                
15 This is illustrated by data examined in Andrew Mack, “A More Secure World?” CATO Unbound, 
February 7, 2011, accessed April 19, 2017, https://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/07/andrew-
mack/more-secure-world. 
16 Jonathan Fox, “The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary 
Wars, 1945-2001,” Journal of Peace Research 41.6 (2004): 715-731. 
17 Fox, “The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict,” 726. 
18 Monica Duffy Toft, “Religion, Terrorism, and Civil Wars,” in Rethinking Religion and World Affairs, ed. 
Shah, Timothy Samuel, Alfred Stepan, and Monica Duffy Toft (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 136. 
8 
bilateral conflict mitigation and peacebuilding organizations have taken a strong interest 
in religion as an relevant conflict and peace dynamic, deserving of explicit attention.19 
Former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry launched the State Department’s Office of 
Faith-Based Community Initiatives, now called the office of Religion and Global Affairs, 
with a speech in August 2013 stating that, given the option now as a politician focused on 
foreign affairs, he would have majored in comparative religion.20 Finn Church Aid 
launched the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers in 2013, supported by 
multiple national and international organizations, including the Organization for Islamic 
Cooperation.21 This is a shift from the modern tendency within international peace and 
diplomacy to ignore or sideline religion entirely, as a “non-rational” factor.  This greater 
attention to religion, as a consideration to be taken seriously by actors working in 
international peace and diplomacy, has been accompanied by programs and offices 
committed to religious engagement, in various senses of the word.  
The broader field of peacebuilding operations has thus conceded that religion 
matters as a conflict dynamic and therefore as a consideration in designing sustainable 
peacebuilding interventions, particularly within the strategic peacebuilding and social 
cohesion frames. But how, exactly, does religion matter, and what is meant by religion, 
theoretically and operationally, within the peacebuilding frame? Peacebuilding 
                                                
19Karam, Azza, and Matthew Weiner, ed., “Religion and the United Nations,” Special Issue, CrossCurrents 
60.3 (2010).  
20 Secretary John Kerry, Remarks at the Launch of the Office of Faith-Based Community Initiatives, 7 
August 2013, accessed June 16, 2017, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/212781.htm 
21 “Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers,” Finn Church Aid, accessed June 16, 2017, 
https://www.kirkonulkomaanapu.fi/en/donors/international-networks/network-religious-traditional-
peacemakers/ 
9 
approaches attempt to engage religion in varying ways, including elite or community-
level dialogues, problem solving workshops, collaborative social action initiatives, 
educational programs, and the like. These forms of intervention are being increasingly 
used in current conflict settings, such as in the Central African Republic and Syria, and 
yet these approaches are largely understudied in any structured, theoretically-rooted way. 
Indeed, religious engagement has become a new norm, and yet, religious engagement 
efforts often employ a shallow understanding of religion in conflict and peace dynamics. 
There are disconnects between the fields of religious studies on the one hand, and conflict 
and peacebuilding studies on the other, in the way religion is treated theoretically and 
operationally. Subsequently, religion is often artificially isolated and extracted from 
questions about the root causes of conflict, and from other conflict dynamics more 
generally.  
Because religion and conflict are both context-specific categories, this project will 
examine them as such by looking at two distinct cases that have been fields of practice 
for various religious peacebuilding efforts: Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Each of 
these countries saw war come to an official resolution in the early 1990’s, but because 
conflict in each context was informed by particular socio-religious identity categories and 
rhetoric, peace accords left much work to be done to build (or re-build) cohesion, social 
trust, and a collective sense of national identity. This project offers the opportunity to 
assess not only religion and peacebuilding efforts during the period of active conflict, but 
also their ongoing impact and evolving efforts 25+ years on.  
It is important to acknowledge from the outset that religious engagement in 
peacebuilding is in no way new; rather, religious actors have long been engaged in 
10 
mitigating violence and conflict and building peace and justice in their contexts. The 
more novel development is that now bilateral and international organizations engaged in 
“official” peacebuilding processes are now taking the role of religion seriously, as a 
formal arena for official involvement, rather than seeing it as a sideshow or supplemental 
(and unofficial) form of engagement as was often the case in the past. Indeed, as argued 
above, religious engagement has now become a field of its own. 
 
Methodology  
This is primarily a comparative project, drawing on comparative methodologies 
from both social sciences and religious studies. I use both between and within-case 
comparative analysis in order to test and develop theory (in this case, “religious 
peacebuilding”) in cases that have some key similarities, but are also quite different from 
one another in particular ways. Additionally, I utilize Wendy Doniger’s methodological 
approach to comparative religion. As Doniger outlines in The Implied Spider, comparison 
does not attempt to seek out the essence of religious phenomena, but rather to examine 
what religious phenomena do and how they do it, in particular spaces. 22 Because religion 
is not a bounded variable in and of itself, the comparative religions approach is necessary 
for nuancing the case study analysis of how religion manifests in various conflict-affected 
settings.  
One cannot study religion without doing comparison in some sense. Religion only 
exists by defining itself in relation to and against an “other.”  As J.Z. Smith points out, 
                                                
22 Wendy Doniger, The Implied Spider: Politics and Theology in Myth (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1998), 5.  
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“otherness” is an ambiguous category, which only becomes meaningful in terms of 
interrelation.  Thus, to study religion inherently involves comparing and contrasting.  The 
question is whether or not individuals are actually capable of carrying out comparison in 
a manner that allows the objects under scrutiny to speak for themselves.  Pierre Bourdieu 
posits that there is no such thing as an objective observer.  Western observers in 
particular are constrained by the fact that World Religions, as a field of study, is steeped 
in Protestant Western theological frameworks; this permeates the comparative endeavor, 
as I will explicate more fully in the next chapter.23  
Despite the limitations and pitfalls of the comparative endeavor within religious 
studies, scholars such as Wendy Doniger and Peter Gottschalk, among others, have 
demonstrated ways in which one can “do comparison” without employing an 
ethnocentric, universalized understanding of religion. Doniger suggests that comparison 
allows us to take both microscopic and telescopic views of religious worlds:  “the 
individual text is the microscope that lets us see the trees; the comparison is the telescope 
that lets us see the forest.”  In doing so, we must be careful to avoid searching for 
equality between the objects of comparison, as she states, “[i]t is this perverse use of the 
doctrine of sameness, applied to both texts and people, that the comparatist most 
overcome in order to argue for the very different humanistic uses of the same 
doctrine.”  In letting go of a presupposition that one will find sameness, Doniger posits, 
                                                
23 On this point, see Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, Or, How European 
Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2005); J.Z. Smith, Map is not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993); Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and 
Ideology, trans. William Sayers (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); and Talal Asad, 
Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1993). 
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scholars can discover through comparison things that are not in one’s own culture, thus 
helping to test theories about one’s own culture in the process in a self-reflexive 
manner.   
The comparative endeavor offers much to scholars of religion.  While it is 
impossible to do comparison perfectly, without reifying boundaries or essentializing 
phenomena, we cannot truly approach religion as such without this necessary form of 
analysis.  Scholars who attempt to allow subjects to speak for themselves, with multiple 
voices and from specific locations, and who appreciate the fluidity of boundaries within 
and between religions, and between “the religious” and “the secular” will find the 
comparative endeavor ultimately rewarding, as I demonstrate in this dissertation.    
 The comparative enterprise within religious studies works well in tandem with a 
structured-focused comparison methodology drawn from the social sciences. A 
structured-focused comparison approach allows for comparison between two cases by 
focusing the inquiries on several specific points of comparison, distilled from the larger 
case contexts.24  For this, I developed and utilized an assessment guide (Appendix I) to 
help break down the various categories of analysis for examining religion and social 
cohesion in each context under consideration.  Additionally, this between-case 
comparison is paired with within-case comparison, as I examine a multiplicity of 
approaches and initiatives to engage religion in peacebuilding in both Lebanon and 
Bosnia.   
                                                
24 See chapter three of Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development 
in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).   
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I gathered my research data using three primary techniques: semi-structured 
interviews with those involved in religious peacebuilding initiatives, from project leads to 
funders to participants; content analysis of programs, including project descriptions, 
reports, monitoring and evaluation; and analysis of data from several surveys in both 
Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina. I supplemented my findings through a number of 
qualitative interviews in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon between March 2014 – 
February 2017. Most interviews were with nationals of the respective countries, although 
I also spoke with a handful of expatriates who worked on conflict mitigation and 
peacebuilding projects in each context. The respondents varied in their level of religious 
commitment and in their roles in each setting, including peacebuilding practitioners, 
religious leaders, and political officials. In each case, I reached out initially to individuals 
or organizations that I had identified as critical actors in the field of religious 
peacebuilding, and used snowball sampling from there to identify new respondents when 
in country.   
 
Case Selection  
I have selected two cases- Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Lebanon- that have had 
distinct experiences of the role of religion in their respective conflicts, though both are 
religiously plural societies. My case selection, in keeping with a strong structured focused 
comparative approach, allows for both similarity and variation between and within the 
two cases.  Both cases have suffered civil wars that were at times defined and interpreted 
as religious in some way, and both saw formal peace agreements at the beginning of the 
1990’s, providing over two decades of post-conflict peacebuilding work to study.  In both 
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cases, international, bilateral, and local peacebuilders have tested numerous religious 
peacebuilding approaches over the last two plus decades. 
Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina were historically part of the Ottoman Empire, 
though their immediate post-Ottoman experiences differed vastly. Like elsewhere 
throughout the Ottoman Empire, Abrahamic religions were dominant in Lebanon and 
Bosnia, particularly Christian and Muslim communities. Lebanon currently has 18 
recognized religious sects, and governing is divided primarily between Maronites, Sunnis 
and Shi’a. The 15-year long Lebanese civil war, which involved both inter- and intra-
sectarian tensions, officially ended in 1990. However, deeply embedded sectarianism 
continues to produce inequalities, friction, and violence, and while sectarianism and 
religion are not equivalent categories in Lebanon, sectarianism employs religion in 
particular ways. Bosnia-Herzegovina has three main religious populations, which are 
divided upon ethnic lines- Croatian Catholics, Bosniak Muslims, and Serbian Orthodox 
Christians. Religious identity played a critical role in the Bosnian War, from 1992-1995, 
and the country struggles to continue re-building social trust and cohesion.  
Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina certainly differ in numerous ways, as will 
become clear in this study, but their common experiences of neighbors turning against 
neighbors during bloody wars often framed in religious terms, and the subsequent 
engagement of religion in peacebuilding endeavors, deliver rich data for comparative 
research.   
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Thesis  
As I will show through my case study research, religious peacebuilding has, by 
and large, failed to increase social cohesion in societies that have experienced conflict 
that invokes religion.25 I argue that this is, in part, because the approaches to engaging 
religion in peacebuilding in the last two decades have relied on limited, belief-centric 
understandings of religion and uni-directional interpretations of how religion interacts 
with other socio-political realities. I propose revising the theoretical approach to religious 
peacebuilding to anchor it in a material theory of religion, articulated most cohesively by 
Manuel Vasquez. This revised frame of analysis helps us to more accurately describe the 
co-creative relationships between religion, conflict and social cohesion, and thereby 
makes space for more fruitful approaches to actively engaging inter-religious work in 
peacebuilding practice.  
This dissertation challenges what I see as two problematic theoretical assumptions 
for understanding and operationalizing religion in the realm of religion, conflict and 
peacebuilding. The first is viewing religion as primarily internalized, belief-centric, and 
textual; and the second is prioritizing bounded or reified religious group identities. These 
assumptions are born out in religious peacebuilding practice, as they lead to approaches 
that prioritize belief and internal dispositions, extracting religion and religious identity 
from the broader socio-political context.26 Additionally, the heavy focus on texts and 
                                                
25 For example, see the research report from a 2012-2014 study of seven conflict-affected countries 
conducted through the University of Denver’s Sie Cheou Kang Center for International Security and 
Diplomacy, funded by the Henry Luce Foundation’s Initiative on Religion and International Affairs: 
Fletcher D. Cox, Catherine R. Orsborn, and Timothy D. Sisk, Religion, Peacebuilding, and Social 
Cohesion in Conflict-Affected Countries.   
26 As I will discuss in more depth in Chapter Two, the religious peacebuilding field- anchored by Appleby 
in particular- has focused on ambiguity as a driving theoretical force. There is general agreement, both in 
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internal dispositions, and on whether religion is being interpreted in peaceful or violent 
results in a lack of attention to issues of justice, including structural violence and power 
dynamics. This focus also leads peacebuilding actors to attempt to “extract” religion in 
peacebuilding efforts, treating it as somehow separate from the socio-political context 
(and actions as deriving from beliefs, rather than being part of an interactive process).  
This project works to de-center these theoretical assumptions about religion and instead 
to assert into the religious peacebuilding space a material theory of religion.  
By looking at religion, conflict, and peacebuilding through the lens of a material 
theory of religion, we see religion as a dynamic, inter-connected conflict variable, being 
shaped by conflict as much as (or more than) it affects the way conflict is articulated or 
enacted. Religion itself becomes through various situations of conflict- thus, when we 
speak of religious groups after a 15-year war, we are not talking about the same groups or 
dynamics that entered the war, so to speak. Additionally, we see that religion is not only 
ambivalent when it comes to peaceful or violent interpretations of text and practice, but it 
is also ambivalent in its embodiment in forms that seek to uphold or to resist the status 
quo. In fact, it is more helpful to focus on how different actors draw upon religion to 
challenge or uphold the status quo in different ways at different junctures (not as a 
dichotomy, but a societal dynamic force), rather than simply focusing on whether textual 
and verbal interpretations of religion appear violent or peaceful. I argue that this second 
                                                                                                                                            
the theoretical field and in the areas of practice, that religion can contribute both negatively and positively 
to peaceful community relations. The central operating assumption is that religion can be violent or 
peaceful (or possibly, neutral). Thus, to engage religion in peacebuilding, one should enlist the peaceful 
actors to help create peace and to help the violent actors see the light (eliminate/suppress/reform the violent 
religious actors).  This is a highly ideological approach to understanding religion, seeing text and belief as 
derivative of action (peaceful or violent). While it is certainly true that religion is ambiguous, we need to 
build on this and deepen our understanding of how and why, and move beyond the ideological ambiguity 
of religion into how it manifests in, and is shaped by, historical and contextual material realities.  
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form of ambivalence (resisting vs. upholding the status quo) is as important as the first 
(peaceful vs. violent interpretations), and must be taken into account in conflict 
assessments and in the design of peacebuilding initiatives.  
 
Ethnicity & Conflict: Laying the Theoretical Groundwork  
  Research in religious peacebuilding relies upon several key intersecting 
disciplines, including that of conflict studies. The theoretical research on religion, conflict 
and peace is indebted to the broader field of ethnic studies and ethnic conflict, not in 
small part because the seminal text of that field, Donald Horowitz’ Ethnic Groups in 
Conflict, posits that ethnicity is a term that encompasses collective belonging based on a 
number of factors, including religion.27 Along with Horowitz, Ted Gurr, James Fearon 
and David Laitin, Ashutosh Varshney, Daniel Posner, and a number of others have laid 
much theoretical groundwork for anyone studying the role of ethnicity- or communal 
identities more broadly- in situations of conflict. This section considers some of this 
groundwork, drawing out the key theoretical approach I will utilize in this project.  
 Varshney outlines four main theoretical approaches to studying ethnic conflict 
(leaving a fifth- realism- to the side since this is only relevant, he argues, in situations of 
all-out civil war). The four approaches are essentialism, instrumentalism, constructivism, 
and institutionalism. While strict essentialism, arguing for the primordial nature of ethnic 
hostility, and strict instrumentalism, arguing for an elite-driven quest to mobilize 
ethnicity in the service of obtaining material goods or power, have largely been discarded 
                                                
27 Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict,” in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. 
Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 274-277. 
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by the field, theorists have continued to develop more nuanced forms of each. For 
example, James Fearon and David Laitin argue for a constructivist-instrumentalist fusion, 
arguing that elites construct and play up communal identities in order to justify non-
communal grievances.28  
A constructivist approach focuses on the ways that group identities are 
constructed, rhetorically or otherwise, to fit a particular narrative at a particular time. 
Varshney argues that “[c]onstructivism is the new conventional wisdom in the field of 
ethnicity and nationalism. Its central idea is that our ethnic and national identities are 
constructs of the modern epoch.”29 Lest we presume constructivism to be instrumentalism 
by another name, Varshney points out that the critical difference between these 
theoretical models has to do with time: “Constructivism is not about the radical short-run 
fluidity of identities. It is about the long-run formation, and the consequent stickiness, of 
identities.”30 Thus, these narratives of group identity are not only for the given time in 
which they are constructed, but rather, have life far beyond those time frames.  
However, he goes on to note that the constructivist approach, while doing a good 
job of accounting for the formation of identities, does not readily account for the lived 
reality of ethnic conflict. The predominant form of constructivism posits that each society 
has a historically constructed “master cleavage” (a group identity that emerges at some 
point, then becomes “sticky”) that is then mobilized by political entrepreneurs when 
useful. Given this theory, one would expect conflict to be equally spread throughout 
                                                
28James Fearon and David Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity.” 
29 Varshney, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict,” 285. 
30 Varshney, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict,” 288, emphasis in original.  
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societies, since the master narratives and widespread nature of political entrepreneurs 
would be the same throughout. This is not the case, however, as ethnic conflict tends to 
be locally or regionally concentrated.31 Thus, Varshney argues, a constructivism paired 
with institutionalism- the idea that particular institutional structures can allow or 
constrain violent conflict- is the most promising theoretical development in the study of 
ethnic conflict.32 I will draw upon this theoretical approach to group identity in conflict 
throughout the course of this dissertation.  
But does the research in ethnic conflict map squarely onto the study of conflict 
that is labeled “religious,” especially given Horowitz’s assumption that religion is 
something of a subset within the broader category of ethnicity? As Varshney summarizes, 
Following Horowitz (1985), ethnicity as a term designates a sense of collective 
belonging, which could be based on common descent, language, history, culture, 
race, or religion (or some combination of these). Some would like to separate 
religion from this list, letting ethnicity incorporate the other attributes. From the 
viewpoint of political identities and group solidarity, this separation is a semantic 
quibble. It becomes critical, however, when ethnicity and religion clash.33 
 
While it is true that religious identity at times can indeed act nearly identical to 
other forms of ethnic identity, I argue that, though often overlapping, religion and 
ethnicity are also distinctive categories of identity and mobilization. For the purpose of 
this dissertation, I argue for viewing religion as a unique, while interactive and 
intersectional, conflict variable. This project thus builds on, but is not constrained by, the 
                                                
31 Varshney, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict,” 287.  
32 This hybrid approach is, for example, employed by Daniel N. Posner in Institutions and Ethnic Politics in 
Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
33 Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict,” 277. 
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literature on ethnicity and ethnic conflict in putting forth an interdisciplinary approach, 
centered in the discipline of religious studies, which I will unpack further in chapter two.   
Additionally, Stuart Kaufman has argued that a symbolic politics theory helps to 
explain ethnic violence better than a rationalist or other social-psychological theoretical 
approach, as, 
the critical causes of extreme ethnic violence are group myths that justify 
hostility, fears of group extinction, and a symbolic politics of chauvinist 
mobilization.  The hostile myths, in this view, produce emotion-laden symbols 
that make mass hostility easy for chauvinist elites to provoke and make extremist 
policies popular.34  
 
Given the depth of symbolic politics within ethnic (and I would argue religiously-
defined) strife, it is no surprise that post-conflict peacebuilding must engage symbol and 
myth in the aftermath of a conflict if lasting social and political peace is to be achieved.   
 
Assessing Peace: Strategic Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion 
 How are we to articulate the concept of peace, for the sake of this project? First, it 
is critical to note that while both Lebanon and Bosnia and Herzegovina are post-war, 
neither are necessarily post-conflict, in that there is discernable unrest at societal and 
governmental levels. The concept of peace for the purposes of this dissertation is not the 
absence of active, ongoing battles, often referred to as “negative peace.” Ceasefires are 
peace treaties are critical, of course, for the termination of protracted violence, but in and 
of themselves, they do not bring peace, in the positive sense. Additionally, the absence of 
overt violence can obscure the structural and cultural violence that persists just below the 
                                                34 Stuart J. Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic 
Violence” International Security 30.4 (Spring, 2006): 47.   
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surface. This lack of sustainable, holistic peace in both contexts supports my thesis that 
peace might be more likely to come with successful religious engagements. 
 Recent research on strategic peacebuilding articulates a concept of positive peace 
(rather than simply the absence of overt violence). As Atalia Omer states, drawing on 
recent work by Scott Appleby and John Paul Lederach on the subject, strategic 
peacebuilding 
entails a comprehensive, multidimensional, multifocal, and multidisciplinary 
process, normatively guided by a pursuit of justice or justpeace. The normative 
and comprehensive compass that strategic peacebuilding affords, with its focus on 
the continuous striving toward this neologism of justpeace, viewing it as a 
contested and continuously debated framework rather than a fixed telos, is 
especially helpful in exploring how religion might relate to “peace” as the 
cessation of direct violence.35 
 
Justice, rather than the cessation of overt violence, must be part of the goal of a 
sustainable approach to peacebuilding. This approach requires managing direct violence, 
while simultaneously dismantling systems of injustice, socially and economically. Thus, 
root causes of violence are taken seriously and addressed in this approach to 
peacebuilding.  
This focus on justice as part of the way we assess peace in a given context paves 
the way for utilizing social cohesion as a tool for measuring the type of peace articulated 
above.  William Easterly, et al., define social cohesion as “the nature and extent of social 
and economic divisions within society.”36 Their data analysis confirms the hypothesis 
                                                
35 Omer, Atalia, “Religious Peacebuilding: The Exotic, the Good, and the Theatrical,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding, ed. Atalia Omer, et. al. (Oxford University Press, 
2015): 16. The article she refers to is John Paul Lederach and R. Scott Appleby, “Strategic Peacebuilding: 
An Overview”, in Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World, ed. Daniel Philpott and 
Gerard F. Powers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 19-44. 
36 William Easterly, et. al., “Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth,” Economics & Politics 18.2 (2006): 
105. 
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that social cohesion is correlated with better institutions and, subsequently, economic 
growth.37 How, then, can one foster social cohesion in a society? Easterly, et al., argue 
for an emphasis on creating a common identity and utilizing the education system to 
provide public knowledge about the social contracts within a given society.38 
 Regina Berger-Schmitt concurs with Easterly, et al., on the importance of social 
cohesion for promoting political stability and economic growth. He points to a few 
distinguishing characteristics of social cohesion, including the strength of social relations, 
a sense of belonging to the same community, equality of opportunities, and the extent to 
which there are low levels of disparities, social cleavages and social exclusion within a 
society. He thus identifies two key dimensions of social cohesion: the inequality 
dimension, which looks at disparities and social exclusion, and the social capital 
dimension, which looks at the level of social relations and common identity.39 
 Jane Jenson adds a third dimension to the two that Berger-Schmitt proposed: 
social cohesion’s relationship to institutions and governance.40 She defends the 
intentional vagueness of the concept of social cohesion, as she argues that, while the 
concept is based on data, this vagueness allows for malleability within specific contexts. 
Jenson proposes three sets of indicators that can be useful in measuring social cohesion 
                                                
37 Easterly, et al., “Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth,” 113. In testing their hypothesis, they 
specifically focus on wealth inequality, measured by the share of the middle class, which they argue can 
serve as a proxy for social divisions. 
38 Easterly, et al., “Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth,” 116-117. 
39 Regina Berger-Schmitt, “Considering Social Cohesion in Quality of Life Assessments: Concept and 
Measurement,” Assessing Quality of Life and Living Conditions to Guide National Policy (2002): 406. 
40 Jane Jenson, Defining and Measuring Social Cohesion, vol. 1 (Commonwealth Secretarial, 2010), 4.  
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within societies: those that measure social disparities, those that measure cultural and 
ethnic homogeneity, and those that measure participation and belonging.41 
 Joseph Chan, et al., argue in favor of a more narrow definition of social cohesion. 
They assert that both academic and policy discourses around the term lack a clear 
operational definition, and thereby limit its usefulness, particularly within the policy 
realm.42 A good definition, according to these authors, is both minimal in scope, meaning 
it includes only the essential constituent parts, and close to the ordinary usage of the 
term.43 They argue that the current approaches to defining social cohesion conflate its 
content with the conditions that facilitate it. Thus, they offer the following definition of 
the content of social cohesion: 
Social cohesion is a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and the horizontal 
interactions among members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and 
norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate 
and help, as well as their behavioral manifestation.44 
 
 Thus, they offer a mechanism (Table I) for analyzing social cohesion that includes 
the vertical and horizontal levels of society, as well as the objective (actual 
manifestations of social cooperation, participation, and so on) and subjective (feelings of 
belonging, trust, and willingness to help others) levels. These various levels of analysis 
include and interact with religious values and religious communities in important ways.  
 
                                                
41 Jenson, Defining and Measuring Social Cohesion, 21-23. 
42 Joseph Chan, et. al., “Reconsidering Social Cohesion: Developing a Definition and Analytical 
Framework for Empirical Research,” Social Indicators Research 75 (2006): 279. 
43 Chan, et al., “Reconsidering Social Cohesion,” 280. 
44 Chan, et al., “Reconsidering Social Cohesion,” 290. 
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Table 145 
 
This framework from Chan, et al., informs my case study assessment guide, as it 
provides a concrete and holistic way of framing social cohesion in relation to sustainable 
peace. Social cohesion is thus the way I will concretely assess and articulate peace 
throughout this project. While I will continue to use the terminology of peacebuilding, as 
it is the most common within the field of theory and practice, my analysis will use social 
cohesion as a key measure of peacebuilding success and sustainability.     
 
Situating Religious Peacebuilding: The Ambivalence Approach 
 The theoretical field of religious peacebuilding is still in its nascent stages, but it 
has indeed become a field of study in and of itself. A hallmark of this development is the 
                                                
45 Source: Chan, et al., “Reconsidering Social Cohesion,” 294. 
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publication of an Oxford Handbook dedicated to Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding, 
released in the spring of 2015.46  Two key framing texts emerged in the year 2000. Scott 
Appleby, the current Dean of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs and the 
former Director of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, received 
his doctoral training in the history department at the University of Chicago in 1985.47  He 
published important texts on the subject of religion and modernity throughout the 1990s, 
including, with Martin Marty, the multi-volume Fundamentalism Project. His book The 
Ambivalence of the Sacred, published in 2000, lays the groundwork for much of the 
theoretical scholarship in the field of religious peacebuilding.48  
Additionally, the same year Appleby published The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 
Marc Gopin released Between Eden and Armageddon, also asserting that religion has the 
malleable capacity to contribute to violence or to peace. Certainly studies had been 
written about the role of religion’s relationship to violence and peace prior to this (in 
particular, one should note David Little’s The Invention of Enmity, on the role of religion 
in Sri Lanka and more broadly), but these previous texts tended to be case studies rather 
than intentionally theory-building works. Religious peacebuilding as a theoretical field 
draws heavily upon Appleby, and to a lesser extent Gopin, to the present day. In this 
                                                
46 The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding, ed. Atalia Omer, R. Scott Appleby, and 
David Little (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
47See http://keough.nd.edu/profile/r-scott-appleby/, accessed June 17, 2017. It is worth noting that the 
scholarly conference in preparation for the Oxford handbook on Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding was 
convened at the Kroc Institute at Notre Dame, as noted in the preface to the volume. This demonstrates the 
importance of the Kroc School as a “hub” for the development of religious peacebuilding theory more 
broadly, and signifies the importance of Appleby, its director at the time, as a key founding theorist in this 
field of study.   
48 Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation, (New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000). 
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section, I will summarize the key arguments that Appleby and Gopin make in advancing 
an ambivalence approach to understanding 
The crux of Appleby’s ambivalence argument is that religious content can be 
purposed toward both peaceful and violent ends, depending on what texts or traditions are 
prioritized- by religious leaders in particular- in various contexts. Appleby asserts, in line 
with many key scholars of religion, that the ‘sacred’ is in and of itself ambivalent, in that 
it is not wholly peaceful or violent. He argues that there are many authentic reactions to 
the “experience of the radical mystery of the numinous,”49 which can be a powerful 
source for religious violence and for religious peacebuilding. Appleby and Gopin both 
observe that, in nearly every religious tradition, the spiritual life force has both creative 
and destructive capacities. In situations of so-called religious violence, co-religionists and 
commentators are often quick to emphasize that violent acts do not come from a place of 
genuine religious commitment. Appleby argues, however, that it is critical to view even 
certain acts of violence as genuine religious acts, as religion itself is not inherently 
peaceful, if viewed through historical and theological lenses.50  
Appleby puts pressure on common assumptions about religious fervency. He 
argues that “militant religion,” a phrase that typically used to describe violent expressions 
of religious extremism, can also be fervently committed to peacebuilding.51 Thus, he 
contends that the oft-drawn dichotomy between religious violence and religious 
                                                
49 Appleby, “Religious Violence: The Strong, the Weak, and the Pathological,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding, ed. Atalia Omer, R. Scott Appleby, and David Little (Oxford 
University Press, 2015): 36.  
50 Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 30. 
51 Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 7-10.  
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peacebuilding assumes too sharp a contrast between the deeply held commitments that 
lead religious people toward violence or peace. Religious ‘militants,’ he argues, can be 
deeply committed to the defense of human dignity, and this may at times lead to violence 
on behalf of the oppressed in efforts to create just societies.52 Religious violence, then, 
can emerge from an exclusivist “dark side” of religion, but it is critical to recognize that 
violence can also emerge from a deeply held sense of justice, as religious actors utilize 
violence at times to promote justice where it is lacking.   
 According to Appleby, the primary differences between a ‘militant’ religious 
peacemaker and a ‘militant’ religious extreme exclusivist are their attitudes toward 
violence and the understanding of one’s role in conflict. While a religious peacemaker 
ultimately aims at ending violence and reaching “reconciliation or peaceful coexistence 
with the enemy,” a religious violent extremist “is committed primarily to victory over the 
enemy, whether by gradual means or by the direct and frequent use of violence.”53 While 
the tactics may at times look similar, the goals for these different types of religious actors 
are distinct.  
Additionally, the different paths that religious actors can follow are not fixed for 
any individual or collective actors. Appleby states that,  
…the broad patterns of [inclusion, tolerance, and nonviolence; and exclusion, 
intolerance, and violence] recur as options confronting people caught in situations 
of economic deprivation, social inequality, and heightened racial, ethnic or 
religious tension.54  
                                                
52 Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 11-13. 
53 Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 13.  
54 Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 15. 
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These patterns do not necessarily exist as distinct dichotomies, but are negotiated 
within specific situations with which religious individuals and communities are 
confronted. Religious actors do not typically choose a single exclusivist or peace-seeking 
path to follow, but rather, negotiate these within different contexts that arise. 
The ambivalence of religions allows for malleability of what portions of text and 
history can be made sacred or brought into focus. For example, current ISIS leaders have 
popularized a portion of a Qur’anic text to justify beheadings, leaving out the second half 
of the verse.55 On the flip side, Islamic Relief- a global development organization that 
began in the 1980’s- prioritizes and works from Qur’anic teachings on social justice and 
compassion.56 Appleby cites John Henry Cardinal Newman in asserting that religions 
contain “leading ideas,” which are then interpreted within various historical and 
geographical contexts, interacting with a “multitude of opinions,” which shift and are 
shifted by their contact with the fabric of society.57 Appleby and others in the field have 
stressed the important role of religious leaders in navigating the terrain of religious 
ambivalence, as they are able to use their platforms to amplify and popularize certain 
ideas or ways of thinking about religious belief and practice. Appleby and David Little 
have identified four specific roles that religious leaders tend to play in conflict 
                                                
55 The portion of the verse used by ISIS is found in Surah 47, verse 4, translated by Yusuf Ali as 
“Therefore, when ye meet the Unbelievers (in fight), smite at their necks.”  However, the verse goes on to 
provide historical context for this, stating, “At length, when ye have thoroughly subdued them, bind a bond 
firmly (on them): thereafter (is the time for) either generosity or ransom: Until the war lays down its 
burdens.”  The verse goes on further, but it is key to note that ISIS leaders only pull out and amplify the 
single portion of the verse that seems to support brutal treatment of captives or enemies, broadly 
understood.  For the translation, see http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=47&verse=4; see also 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/isis-uses-half-quran-verse-justify-beheadings-see-whats-
half/ for an explanation of this interpretive tactic.   
56 See http://irusa.org/mission-vision-and-values/, accessed June 17, 2017.  
57 Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 32. 
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management, as heralds, advocates, peacekeepers and educators.58 The considerable role 
that leaders have played in generating conflict and soliciting participation in violence 
should give us some idea of how powerful religious elites can be in shaping what 
religious content gets prioritized and in mobilizing the masses. As Appleby notes, 
religious leaders play a key role in reconstructing narratives of the past.59  
In ethno-religious conflicts, Appleby argues that ethno-nationalist extremism 
combines with “weak religion” to produce religious violence, as weak religious 
communities are more easily manipulated and their symbols, which lack robust content, 
are something like vessels waiting to be filled with meaning.60 Appleby would argue, 
then, that often when religion is used to motivate violence in circumstances of ethno-
religious competition, religion actually “contains” less, rather than more. Religion is 
more malleable, or easily influenced, when it is not “strong.”  
Appleby thus argues that, “‘religious illiteracy’—the low level or virtual absence 
of second-order moral reflection and basic theological knowledge among religious actors, 
is a structural condition that increases the likelihood of collective violence in crisis 
situations.”61 This, of course, goes against the secularist assumption that by emptying 
religion of its strength within society, religious violence can be avoided. For Appleby, the 
strengthening of religion, or the building of, 
                                                
58 Scott Appleby and David Little, “A Moment of Opportunity? The Promise of Religious Peacebuildling in 
an Era of Religious and Ethnic Conflict,” in Religion and Peacebuilding, ed. Harold Coward and Gordon S. 
Smith (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 6.  
59 Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 170. 
60 Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 58. 
61 Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 69. 
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communities of faith in which the historical argument about the proper ethical 
interpretation of the sacred remains vigorous and is sustained through many 
formal and informal channels, moves its adherents away from narrowly conceived 
ethnic, nationalist, and tribal self-definitions and toward a more tolerant and 
nonviolence social presence.62 
 
Thus, the fostering of robust internal debates within religious communities 
provides the impetus for tolerant and peaceful approaches to crises. 
Appleby has made an important impact on the field of religious peacebuilding by 
centering the concepts of ambivalence and ambiguity, and by bringing a more robust 
understanding of religion into the field of conflict and peace studies. In many ways, he is 
seen as the father of the field of religious peacebuilding, and most scholarship in this 
young field of study cites him as a key founder of the theoretical approaches to thinking 
about the role of religion in promoting violence or peace. 
Marc Gopin is currently the Director of George Mason University’s Center for 
World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Revolution, and a professor at the School for 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason. He received his Ph.D. in Ethics from 
Brandeis University in 1993, and has since worked as a conflict resolution practitioner, 
professor, and theorist; Between Eden and Armageddon was his first major book 
project.63 Gopin argues that values such as justice and forgiveness can emerge from 
religious contexts and when they are rooted in religion, people are in certain situations 
more deeply committed to these values, even when they don’t fall into line with ‘rational 
                                                
62 Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 79. 
63 See https://crdc.gmu.edu/about/staff/marc-gopins-bio/ and http://www.marcgopin.com/about/, 
accessed June 17, 2017. 
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choice’ ideologies.64 As Gopin asserts, “people change when a new hermeneutic is 
inserted into the symbolic and ritual life of the community.”65 Whether peace-seeking 
religious ideas take root depends not solely on whether religious leaders promote them, 
but on their adoption by the grassroots.  
In creating peaceful pluralistic religious societies, Gopin argues that pro-social 
communal values (including religious ones), rather than secular universalism, must be the 
starting point.66 He asserts that, “the most effective way to enlist the guards in the cause 
of peacemaking is not to destroy what they need to protect but to hermeneutically engage 
their traditions in a way that enhances their sense of pride in what they guard so 
carefully.”67 Instead of excluding seemingly conservative religious forces, then, it is more 
fruitful to engage religions in the hermeneutics of peace and co-existence, pushing 
beyond the fleeting surface of pluralism into a deeper religious commitment to peaceful 
co-existence.68 Religions can help mitigate conflict, but also have an important role in 
capitalizing upon pro-social values to create sustainable and peaceable social cohesion 
within divided or diverse religious societies.  
                                                
64 This is not to say that religion is inherently or distinctively irrational, but rather that it can provide a 
moral impetus for people to act in ways that do not necessarily seem most fair or self-serving.  
65 Marc Gopin, Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence and 
Peacemaking, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 88. 
66 Gopin, Between Eden and Armageddon, 199. 
67 Gopin, Between Eden and Armageddon, 88. 
68 Gopin, Between Eden and Armageddon, 127. 
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Gopin asserts that when peace activists try to diminish religiosity in order to build 
peace, religious people are left with only “conflict-generating theology.”69  He thus 
argues for secular peacebuilding practitioners to center and celebrate pro-peace religious 
ideas and activism, rather than sidelining religion or diminishing its contributions.  In 
societies where a large portion of the population is religion, it is critical that secular 
peacebuilding efforts take religion seriously.   
Gopin cautions, however, against placing too much stock in the functions of 
religion, while acknowledging that religious communities and leaders can play important 
roles in many peacebuilding processes. Conflicts are never only about religion, and thus 
peacebuilding cannot rely entirely on religious actors or the importance of many other 
variables is discounted.70 Gopin points out that,  
[d]espite the fact that there are liberal elites in each religion who embrace 
tolerance and coexistence, if this is not embedded in the experience of the 
majority, then we must understand this and work with it, rather than pretend, as 
many liberal institutions do, that it is not there.71  
 
Thus, religious values themselves, which are often influenced by elites but are 
also configured in important ways at the grassroots level, can help to bolster 
peacebuilding efforts.  
 Gopin, like Appleby, points out that religious communities have a certain level of 
social capital within a society, making it possible for messages to be disseminated across 
large portions and different levels of society. However, the downside to social capital is 
                                                
69 Gopin, Between Eden and Armageddon, 16. 
70 Gopin, Between Eden and Armageddon, 29-30. 
71 Gopin, Between Eden and Armageddon, 88. 
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that it can create cohesion within fragments of society (bonding) without leading to 
holistic social cohesion (bridging). Social capital is thus a double-edged sword for 
religious peacebuilding efforts; it must be utilized and navigated cautiously if it is not 
going to impede these efforts in the long run.  
 Gopin writes as a practitioner more so than Appleby, whose background is more 
clearly situated within the academic realm, rather than the field of practice. Atalia Omer 
credits Gopin with bringing religion more squarely into the field of conflict resolution, in 
both theory and practice.72    
Appleby and Gopin have thus laid critical groundwork for this emerging field of 
study. Both argue that we must not write off those acting violently in the name of religion 
as “not really religious,” a common impetus for observers (and particularly for religious 
actors) who want to assert that “true religion” promotes peace. While from an adherent’s 
point of view, this case can certainly be made, the scholar of religion must recognize the 
multiplicity of religious expression and the complexity of naming authenticity in the 
realm of religious ideology and practice.  
 In sum, according to the ambivalence approach, religious content is malleable, 
ideas and the roles of religious leaders matter, and religious social capital is a critical 
component for any peacebuilding efforts in any society where people identity as 
religious. These factors contribute to the fact that religious actors can and do promote 
peace or foster violence in different contexts. Through these anchoring texts, Appleby 
and Gopin have both contributed to the underpinnings of the field of religious 
peacebuilding, particularly in popularizing the assertion that religions are internally plural 
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and malleable. This approach pushes back against a static view of religion and looks at 
the many ways in which religion can come into play to either further peace or stimulate 
violence.  
 
The Trouble with Religious Peacebuilding  
Atalia Omer, a colleague of Appleby’s at Notre Dame who received her Ph.D. in 
the Study of Religion from Harvard University in 2008,73 has recently offered a robust 
and thoughtful critique of the theoretical field of religious peacebuilding. One of her 
primarily arguments is that the field relies too heavily on a phenomenological approach 
to religious ambivalence, leaning on a narrow interpretation of Appleby. She notes that, 
“It is this insight [of religious ambivalence] that sparked the industry of religious 
peacebuilding and carved out space for a theological and hermeneutical focus on peace-
promoting motifs and resources within religious traditions.” However, the adoption and 
application of the ambivalence thesis subsequent to Appleby and Gopin has been fraught 
with problems, as much work in this field has relied heavily on a shallow reading of 
religious ambivalence.  
While the ambivalence thesis is effective in debunking essentialist accounts of 
religion, many who have drawn upon Appleby have inadvertently put forth another 
version of essentialist thought, by arguing that the role of the religious peacebuilder is to 
uncover and dust off “true religion,” which is a force for good (even though, as Omer 
notes, this is based on a problematic- and incomplete- reading of Appleby). Additionally, 
there is a related tendency to see the relationship between religion and conflict or peace 
                                                
73 See http://sociology.nd.edu/people/atalia-omer/, accessed June 17, 2017. 
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as unidirectional.74 Here, religion is still seen as static in the causal equation, even while 
acknowledging its internal plurality.  
Omer argues that the primary pitfall of religious peacebuilding as a field of study 
in not in too heavily centering religion, but rather in failing to see “the full spectrum of its 
potential contribution.”75 She goes on to argue that,  
[t]his is not merely a problem of scope; it also reflects deep theoretical blinders 
born out of the misapplication of the insights and potentialities of the 
“ambivalence of the sacred.” While construing the militancy of the nonviolent 
religious warrior as the inverse of the religiously motivated suicide bomber frees 
religion from material or ideal reductionism, it also generates conceptual and 
practical blind-spots that need to be deconstructed for scholarship in the field of 
religious peacebuilding to grow in a meaningful way.76  
 
Additionally, Omer points out that the field of religious peacebuilding, both in 
theory and in praxis, has accepted rather than challenged the secular frame in which 
peace and conflict studies have historically operated, assuming the stark division between 
the Religious and the Secular that a modern approach to religious studies entails.77 This 
has many implications for the way in which peacebuilding actors go about doing 
religious peacebuilding, and the way in which scholars approach the topic. Omer argues 
                                                
74 Omer, “Religious Peacebuilding,” 9.  
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77 Scholarly analysis of the emergence of the Secular, and the parsing of it from the realm of the “religious” 
is critical to a modern understanding of religion, and particularly the way religion is understood and 
employed in political science, international studies, and peace studies more broadly. I will examine how 
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that, “because religious peacebuilding operates within the secularist discourse, it focuses 
overwhelmingly on direct and obvious violence, overlooking how religion relates to 
structural and cultural violence.”78 Additionally, the acceptance of a clean distinction 
between the Secular and the Religious allows practitioners and scholars to isolate 
religious factors from the rest of the elements of a conflict, which are viewed as secular 
(read, rational) conflict factors. The delineation of the Secular from the Religious has its 
own history, as the concept of the Secular emerged from a particular religious frame; a 
reflective approach to this distinction, and to the Secular as a constructed rather than 
neutral category, helps to shed much light on the critical issues that arise when 
considering religious peacebuilding. Religion is not an isolated element of conflict, but 
rather is intertwined with, and has a dynamic relationship with, other dimensions of 
conflict.  
I would add to Omer’s critique that two other key operating assumptions in the 
current field of religious peacebuilding limit its depth, and therefore its efficacy. First, 
religion is treated primarily within the realm of the internal (beliefs, texts, etc.). Second, 
it is seen as uni-directional: as a source of violence or peace, rather than as part of a 
multi-directional process within a given context, shaping and being shaped by its socio-
political environment.  
The pitfalls of the current field of religious peacebuilding can be remedied by 
anchoring more fully in a strong comparative theory of religion. As noted previously, 
religious peacebuilding as a field of study has largely emerged apart from the theoretical 
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field of religious studies. A re-orientation toward religious studies gives more life and 
more potential to religious peacebuilding as a field of study and of practice.  
 
Chapter Structure 
Chapter two begins by tracing the history of religion as a category of analysis. 
Through this, I demonstrate the need to de-center the highly Western-Protestant priorities 
of belief and the internal experience of religion when studying religion in comparative 
context.  I then explain in depth the materialist theoretical approach to religion, 
demonstrating why this approach is relevant and beneficial to the study of religion, 
conflict and peacebuilding.   
Chapter three begins with a journey through the articulations and manifestations 
of religion in Lebanon from the end of the Ottoman Empire through the present.  I 
demonstrate the ways religious identity groups experienced “moments of groupness”79 
through particular socio-political events, and trace how these moments became 
organizing myths with some “stickiness” moving forward.  I examine the multiple 
conflict drivers of the Lebanese civil war(s) from 1975-1990, with particular attention to 
the ways in which religion and religious group identity was invoked in specific ways at 
various junctures.  
In Chapter four, I turn to the work that has been done since the Ta’if Agreement 
to engage religion (through leaders/institutions, identities, and symbols, especially) in 
social and political peacebuilding processes.  I examine how peacebuilding actors at 
various levels are articulating the role of religion in conflict and peace, and how 
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specifically they are attempting to engage (or not) religion in peacebuilding efforts.  I 
find that religion is instrumental in Lebanese socio-political conflict in that it happens to 
be the way that otherwise “typical” conflict drivers are framed, but religion/religious 
identity is in and of itself changed through the dynamics of socio-political conflict, and 
thus emerge constantly transformed by the context in which they are being formed. 
In Lebanon, I argue that there are two main strains of (intertwined) religious 
peacebuilding approaches: the elite-centered approaches tend to seek to uphold 
communal representation/boundedness and seek a peace that prioritizes consensus 
between communities; the grassroots actors tend to seek to dismantle communal identity 
politics more thoroughly, prioritizing individual human rights and justice to unity 
between communities as such.  Thus, the ways in which different religious peacebuilding 
actors articulate and operationalize both the role of religion and what peace looks like, 
differs vastly, as some mimic and reproduce the sectarian system while others seek to 
displace it.   
In Chapter five, I begin with a tour of some of the key “moments of groupness”  
for the religious communities in the area now known as Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
including an analysis of how some of these moments stuck.  This tour demonstrates that 
the religious tensions that showed up in the conflict of the early 1990’s does not stem 
from “ancient hatreds”, nor does it stem from religious ideology in and of itself, but 
rather the religious ideologies that were used to creating bonding cohesion and to justify 
violence during the war, were themselves shaped through a series of socio-political 
events.   
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Chapter six analyzes the approaches to engaging religion in peacebuilding since 
the war, and argues that religion itself was shaped through the war, and in turn shaped 
community approaches to social and political life.  Bosnia has been a lab for engaging 
religion in peacebuilding over the last 20 years.  It was the first place where, immediately 
post-conflict, a national inter-religious council was immediately formed to help facilitate 
the reconciliation process. In a country where group identity lines during conflict were 
clearly correlated with religion (as well as ethnicity), and where religious symbolism and 
language played heavily into the spectre of violence, this seemed like a clear case where 
involving the religious institutions, leaders, symbolism, and language in the 
peacebuilding processes would be absolutely necessary.  Just over 20 years after the 
Dayton Accords, where are we? How, specifically, was religion engaged in the 
peacebuilding processes over the last 20 years, and to what effect?  I argue here that 
religion is inherently political, and can serve to uphold or resist the status quo (spectrum).  
We see both strains of religious engagement in Bosnia, with the elite religious institutions 
serving to uphold a stagnant political system that grassroots actors (religious and 
otherwise) are working to change.   
Chapter seven integrates and analyzes key findings across the case studies, 
including both similarities and differences between the contexts.  In both Lebanon and 
Bosnia, people talk about the importance of extracting religion from politics, or of 
instrumentally engaging religious leaders to highlight and push out the good/peaceful 
religious interpretations.  In Lebanon in particular, there is a stark divide between people 
in the PB space who want to preserve the status quo through the consensus model, and 
those who want to resist the status quo and push for individual rights. Thus, the first 
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group right now is more focused on religious peacebuilding because, for the most part, it 
serves the consensus model. And we’re seeing a rise in extremisms in both contexts, as 
socio-political dynamics serve to reify bonded social cohesion at the expense of bridging 
cohesion, and for the purpose of consensus-based peace, rather than bonding cohesion.  
Embodied separation, by neighborhoods, schools, and the like, is a influential 
component of life in both Bosnia and Lebanon, with sectarian difference being more fully 
inscribed into the socio-political system in Lebanon than in Bosnia.  There are inter-
religious peacebuilding efforts that use an embodied and emplaced approach to religion 
in practice, and these are promising (teams rebuilding damaged houses of worship, etc.), 
but lack widespread engagement.  Conceptually, there are important attempts at inter-
religious understanding, but they are undermined by the embodied and emplaced 
separation/segregation.  The praxis, therefore, does not match the ontological approach. 
Overall, Religion emerges as a dynamic conflict variable.  I argue that religious 
identity politics often follow/emerge from other politics, but then they re-make the other 
politics. Consensus, or unity-seeking religious peacebuilding tends to prioritize elite 
representation of groups and reinscribe group boundedness, and it opens the space for 
rogue resistance groups that don’t feel represented here to express themselves, sometimes 
violently. 
Chapter eight, the concluding chapter, argues that by looking at religion, conflict, 
and peacebuilding through the lens of a materialist theory of religion, we see religion as a 
dynamic, inter-connected conflict variable, being shaped by conflict as much as (or more 
than) it affects the way conflict is articulated or enacted.  Religion itself becomes through 
various situations of conflict such that, when we speak of religious groups after a 15-year 
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war, we are not talking about the same groups or dynamics that entered the war, so to 
speak.  Additionally, we see that religion is not only ambivalent when it comes to 
peaceful or violent interpretations of text and practice, but it is also ambivalent in its 
embodiment in forms that seek to uphold or to resist the status quo.  In fact, it is more 
fruitful to focus on how different actors draw upon religion to challenge or uphold the 
status quo in different ways at different junctures (not as a dichotomy, but a societal 
dynamic force), rather than simply focusing on whether textual and verbal interpretations 
of religion appear violent or peaceful.  This dynamic is impacted by the state position 
toward religion, varying circumstances, etc. I argue that this second form of ambivalence 
(resisting vs. upholding the status quo) is as important as the first (peaceful vs. violent 
interpretations), and must be taken into account in conflict assessments and in the design 
of peacebuilding initiatives. This chapter provides suggestions for how to improve the 
field of religion and peacebuilding- in theory and practice- going forward.  
 
Significance 
The debates over how to think about religion in situations of conflict that invoke 
religious symbols and rhetoric, or that come to be defined as fights between religiously-
described groups, are not likely to end anytime soon. Additionally, when analyzing 
religion in conflict or violence, there is a tendency across both pop and media culture, 
and in international scholarship, to identify textual or creedal root causes of violence 
perpetrated in the name of religion, despite studies showing little link between belief and 
committing acts of violence. This dissertation offers an alternative approach to this 
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broader discussion, showing how, anchored in a materialist theory of religion, religion 
acts as a dynamic, mutually interactive conflict variable. 
What do we achieve by talking explicitly about religion in contexts of conflict and 
peacebuilding? In certain contexts, communities make and invoke religion as a powerful 
mobilizing force, particularly to define group boundaries in particular spaces and times. 
However, it is not just instrumental. This project approaches religion not as an essence, or 
a bounded conflict variable, but rather by observing and analyzing the processes through 
which religion impacts and is impacted by- indeed, itself becomes- in situations of socio-
political conflict. This finding helps to further develop the theory of religious 
peacebuilding, bringing it beyond a shallow ambivalence approach, which in turn impacts 
the way religion is engaged in peacebuilding in practice.  I argue for a shift toward 
prioritizing structural and systemic violence in considering religious engagement, which 
if followed, will allow for deeper, more sustainable engagement of religion in building 
peace in a given context.  This will deepen the analysis of religious peacebuilding theory, 
contributing to this burgeoning academic field.  Additionally, and perhaps more 
importantly, this shift will also help to refine how international actors engage religion in 
peacebuilding for years to come, looking toward sustainable social cohesion rather than 
static peace agreements as the goal for societies in conflict.    
 I now turn to the key theoretical approaches to understanding religion and offer a 
new theoretical frame to guide the research at hand.   
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Chapter 2: Religious Peacebuilding, in Theory 
20th century peacebuilding approaches often associated religion with non-
rationality, as was the case for twentieth-century international politics more generally. 
While in the 21st century, the interest in, and explicit engagement of, religion in 
peacebuilding has been rapidly growing, the theoretical field of study in this arena has 
developed at a slower pace than the field of practice. Religious peacebuilding, as a field 
of scholarly analysis and of practice, has heavily relied on textual and internalized 
approaches to understanding religion in examining the interplay of religious and violence, 
and in developing models for engaging religion in promoting peace. This trend shows up 
in the way peacebuilding practitioners think about and engage religion. Indeed, in my 
interviews for this project, many “secular” peacebuilding actors say their views have 
shifted on the importance of religion in recent years and they are more likely to 
consider/include religion in their approaches, but their comments reveal a tendency to 
treat religion in a somewhat essentialist and instrumentalist way. Additionally, despite the 
increased interest in engaging religion, my interviews with secular and religious 
peacebuilding actors alike reveal a predominant sense of the need to “rescue” religion 
from politics, seeing that interaction as unnatural and problematic.  
Religious peacebuilding, while certainly an interdisciplinary field of study, has 
predominantly situated itself in peace & conflict studies, rather than in religious studies. 
This has led to a fairly limited understanding of the category of religion within the field, 
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and has thus left much to be desired in religious peacebuilding theory and practice, as it 
has been confined primarily to a professional, rather than academic, field of study. My 
theoretical approach in this dissertation is to put this field of study into more robust 
conversation with the comparative study of religion in particular. By rooting religious 
peacebuilding theory in a more robust comparative theory of religion, we will be able to 
further develop religious peacebuilding theory in ways that will have important impacts 
on the field of practice.   
In the previous chapter, I argued that the theoretical field of religious 
peacebuilding is lacking in its attention to religion as such. This chapter offers a deeper 
analysis of what the comparative study of religion can bring to the table, focusing on how 
the emergence of a robust material theory of religion can help fill the gaps and pitfalls of 
the current approaches to religious peacebuilding in theory and in practice.  
 
A Shift Toward Religious Studies  
Grounding the field of religion, conflict and peacebuilding in a materialist theory 
of religion can help us address the key problems in the field of religious peacebuilding 
outlined above. Certainly, some scholars within this field have already begun to forge this 
more fully contextualized, embodied and dynamic approach. For example, as Omer 
points out, David Little’s recent work has exemplified a more contextual and 
theoretically nuanced approach to engaging religion in peacebuilding.80 Omer states that, 
                                                
80 Little is a retired Harvard Conflict Studies professor who spent much of his career as an in-house scholar 
at the US Institute of Peace, focusing on the intersections between religion, conflict and peace.  While he 
published numerous texts (primarily through articles, along with a handful of book projects) on religious 
peacebuilding prior to 2000, when Appleby and Gopin both released their major books in this field, Little’s 
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in Little’s work, “It is not about religions in abstraction as systems of meanings 
informing behavior but as interpreted and embodied in the complex interplay between 
social practices and institutional formations.”81 Thus, there is promising work happening 
in the field of religious peacebuilding, and the theoretical shift I propose here will help to 
further orient future research and practice. This section will first briefly outline the 
comparative study of religion, in order to then situate Manuel Vasquez’ material theory 
of religion within the broader conversation about how we think and talk about religion. 
 
Religion: What’s in a Word? 
There is a widespread assumption in popular culture that we all know what we are 
talking about when we use the word “religion.” However, when we interrogate the term, 
we find a vexed category. I will take us only briefly into the history of the emergence of 
religion as a category of analysis, in order to situate a material theory of religion in this 
broader context. Walter Capps states that, “little objective understanding of religion 
existed before inquirers learned how to make it intelligible.”82 And thus, this section 
examines how inquirers have made the concept of religion intelligible, and indeed, 
ubiquitous, thus revealing the constructed nature of religion as a category itself.   
                                                                                                                                            
work prior to 2000 tended to be based in case-studies, rather than focused on theory-building.  Thus, while 
he is a senior scholar in this field, much of his theoretical contribution to the theoretical field of religious 
peacebuilding as such came after the emergence of Appleby and Gopin’s more theoretical texts.  For 
Little’s biography, see https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/people/david-little, accessed May 30, 
2017.   
81 Omer, “Religious Peacebuilding,” 10.  
82 Walter H. Capps, Religious Studies: The Making of a Discipline (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), xi.  
 46 
 Theorists in the past several decades have offered critical perspectives on the 
history of the field of religious studies as a Euro-Christian discipline and have questioned 
the universal applicability of the term ‘religion.’ Daniel Dubuisson argues that,  
[a]s a field of knowledge, academic discipline, or branch of science, the history of 
religions is itself a historical phenomenon. This signifies, commonsensically, that 
it appeared at a precise time—the second half of the nineteenth century—and a 
precise place—western Europe.83  
 
While thinking about the various ideas and practices typically associated with 
religion has a long, and largely indiscernible, history, the study of religion as an academic 
field of inquiry emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Western Europe.  
 Thus, while there is a popular tendency to think of religion as something that has 
always been a key & comparable feature of most, if not all, civilizations, the history of 
the field shows that this is not the case. Indeed, Brent Nongbri argues that the modern 
terminology of religion does not correlate with ancient or pre-modern language or 
practice- there is no ancient language, in his analysis, that has a term that resonates with 
what the modern term “religion” typically entails, though it is common to (wrongly, he 
argues) translate a number of words from ancient languages as “religion.”84   
Tomoko Masuzawa argues that the idea of religion emerged alongside a discourse 
of secularization, and entailed a process of ‘othering’:  
The modern discourse on religion and religions was from the very beginning—
that is to say, inherently, if also ironically—a discourse of secularization; at the 
same time, it was clearly a discourse of othering. My suspicion, naturally, is that 
                                                
83 Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology, trans. 
William Sayers (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 2.  
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some deep symmetry and affinity obtain between these two wings of the religion 
discourse; that they conjointly enable this discourse to do the vital work of 
churning the stuff of Europe’s ever-expanding epistemic domain... 85 
 
 This parsing of that which is “religious” from that which is “secular” is a modern 
development.  This tendency to parse the religious from the secular heavily influences the 
way we now categorize, study and engage with religion, reflecting the Protestant 
emergence of the concept of religion itself as internal, belief-centric, and somehow 
separable from that in life which is “secular.” Nongbri argues that the Protestant 
Reformation in particular helped to shape this modern concept of religion as apolitical, as 
Locke and others worked to settle disputes about God in the context of the Protestant 
Reformation and Wars of Religion by confining religion to the personal and spiritual.86  
Nongbri goes on to point out that the ancient words that are often translated as “religion” 
(including the Arabic din) do not separate religion from the secular- in fact, the 
separation imagined in these concepts was absent entirely.   
David Chidester and Nongbri both trace the exportation of the Christian notion of 
religion through colonial and missionary conquests.87 This led to what Chidester calls a 
“multilayered discourse about otherness,”88 which intertwined with the fact that religion 
became a category in the field of Christian imperial conquests and Enlightenment 
institutionalism. Nongbri notes that “European Christians were beginning to recognize 
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themselves as a fractured, diverse group, and the ‘heathen’ were beginning to be seen as 
divisible into distinct groups.”89  Thus, the concept was projected on cultures across the 
globe, as well as projected back on ancient cultures (i.e., Roman and Greek) in order to 
validate the claim to conceptual universality.90  
Masuzawa, Dubuisson, Nongbri and Chidester demonstrate the invented and 
politically charged nature of the concept of religion. In light of this fraught history, how 
might we imagine a working definition of religion for discourse and research? J.Z. Smith 
offers a helpful lens through which to look toward defining religion. Definition is a 
natural human enterprise. It is about “discovering” and creating limits around a concept,91 
and these limits are necessarily contingent. As Smith poignantly articulates, map is not 
territory, but maps are all we possess.92 The early mapping of religion attempted to 
account for and explain the “religion” discovered in realms outside of Christian Europe, 
while utilizing a distinctly Christian framework for understanding.  
For some early theorists of religion, such as E.B. Tylor and James Frazer, religion 
was a pre-rational reaction to the inexplicable in the natural world. 93 For others, such as 
Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx, religion emerged as an illusion that served to distract 
people from their own psychological issues and alienation. 94 Mircea Eliade took religion 
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to be an autonomous reality that is “wholly other” and breaks into the world. The 
methodological tradition of phenomenology follows Eliade’s cues; in his approach, 
religion must be studied and taken seriously on its own terms.  
For Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, religion was a key part of the social fabric, 
helping to create and maintain societal ethics, and interacting with the other “interwoven 
strands” of social life. 95 Weber and Marx agreed that religion played a critical role in 
economic life, though Weber saw it as igniting a work ethic necessary for capitalism, 
while Marx, on the other hand, saw religion as complicit in alienating workers in the 
class struggle. Freud, Durkheim and Marx all saw religion as a product of non-religious 
causes, while Weber saw ideas and beliefs as causal in and of themselves.96 
Clifford Geertz argued for religion as part of the culture of symbolic meanings. 
He saw culture as “webs of significance” spun by man,97and religion as one part of this 
web. Geertz did not look for a large-scale theory on religion to tie everything together, 
but rather prioritized local knowledge and experiences, relying heavily on the cognitive 
and internalized significations of actions- essentially, reading them as texts.  
 While the theorists discussed above disagree sharply on how to understand the 
origin and function of religion, they are in agreement that religion has an essence of some 
kind; that we know what we are talking about when we utter the term “religion,” and they 
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demonstrate a general consensus that religion finds its proper territory is internal, in the 
realm of ideas and symbols. This assumption stems from the distinctively Christian 
origins of thinking about religion as such, and the emergence of the category of religion 
itself is indebted to these theoretical inquiries. As Talal Asad states, “there cannot be a 
universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and 
relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical 
product of discursive processes.”98 This realization- that religion as a category is itself 
historically constructed- has led scholars to debate whether or not the category of religion 
has lost its meaning altogether.  
 
Why Talk About Religion At All? 
If there cannot be a universal definition of religion because of the cultural 
baggage of the concept, can we still talk about religion? And what benefit does talking 
about religion add? Daniel Dubuisson argues that we should stop using the term 
“religion” altogether. He states that, while certainly the Western world is not alone in 
asking metaphysical questions, organizing rituals or developing theologies, “it made from 
this collection of attitudes and ideas an autonomous, singular complex, profoundly 
different from everything surrounding it.”99 The Western study of religious has thus 
applied its own “web of concepts” widely, affirming its own identity through this 
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imposition.100 For Dubuisson, the study of religion as such is a practice in Christian self-
affirmation, and to continue to use this terminology is to continue to promote Christian 
ascendancy. He calls for a shift to the phrase “cosmographic formations,” as this phrase 
does not carry with it the cultural and political baggage of “religions.” Dubuisson does 
not deny the widespread existence of many phenomena to which the term religion often 
refers, but rather takes issue with the ethnocentric, culturally specific terminology of 
religions.  
Dubuisson offers the alternative notion of cosmographic formations, 
demonstrating how this way of thinking about the phenomena we typically associate with 
religion allows space for variation and diversity. While Dubuisson’s suggestion is 
theoretically admirable in that he critiques the cultural and intellectual history of religion 
while offering a possible solution to this problem, his proposed solution does not fit the 
reality in which we reside. First, it would be impossible to diffuse the concept in any 
universal manner. Second, and more importantly, the terminology of religion no longer 
“belongs” to western academics; it is utilized and maintains meaning on the ground, and 
thus, I would argue, it is not up to academics to do away with the concept.  
David Chidester argues that we are stuck with the terminology of religion because 
it is historically embedded.101 This embeddedness of the term religion means that Euro-
Christian academics, while certainly complicit in creating the term, do not fully own it. It 
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is rhizomic,102 rooting itself in contexts outside of the one from which it arose, and has 
grown new parts of itself. Thus, while religion is not a natural category, it has become a 
meaningful category for many. We are stuck with the category of religion, and therefore 
the work of the scholar of religion is to study that meaning-making: where, why and how 
does the concept of religion become meaningful? 
The embeddedness of religion calls for a relational and process-oriented approach 
to its study, in acknowledging both particularity and universality simultaneously.  Tyler 
Roberts, building on the work of J.Z. Smith, calls for an embrace of incongruity and a 
resistance to the inclination to locate religion in a static way.  Locative approaches to the 
study of religion, Roberts argues, “cast religion as a uniquely stabilizing, ideological 
discourse of formation and ground the academic study of religion in a secularist 
opposition to religious discourse.” Drawing on an analogy from J.Z. Smith, he goes on to 
state that,  
Locativists take the theologian as the paradigmatic religious figure.  But thinking 
philosophy’s vigilance through religion demands thinking religion and the study 
of religion in terms of the pilgrim, who, as Smith has it, only obliquely and 
hesitantly approaches his object of concern and in the end is able only to make 
‘fleeting contact.’103  
 
The study of religion thus involves approaching the subject with an expectation 
and acceptance that one cannot “capture” religion in any meaningful way, but rather must 
study the processes and events through which it is perceivable, if only for a short time.  
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Roberts describes this location of religion as always a moment in a process, always 
slipping away.104  Thus, the need to fully categorize, locate, or understand religion is an 
impossible task, and not the task that the scholar of religion should pursue.   
J.Z. Smith argues that because religion is an “inextricably human phenomenon,” 
we must take an anthropological approach to its study. Religion, for Smith, is just one 
way in which humans communicate worlds of meaning.105 He goes on to state that,  
[w]e have not been attendant to the ordinary, recognizable features of religions as 
negotiation and application but have rather perceived it to be an extraordinary, 
exotic category of experience which escapes everyday modes of thought. But 
human life—or, perhaps more pointedly, humane life—is not a series of burning 
bushes.106  
 
Thus, I draw from Smith the notion that religion is integrated into the everyday, 
mundane life of humans, and is negotiated within this context. This is part of the basis for 
Manuel Vasquez’s materialist theory of religion, which serves as a theoretical anchor for 
this study. 
 
Religion in a Material World 
 Manuel Vasquez’s More Than Belief synthesizes and builds on a recent turn 
toward materialist approaches to religion within the field of religious studies. For 
Vasquez, as for Chidester, Smith, Robert Orsi and others, the study of religion must go 
beyond the examination of high doctrine, instead exploring the quotidian world in which 
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religion is made and operationalized. Vasquez argues for a non-reductive materialist 
framework:  
A scholar working within a non-reductive materialist framework, thus, begins 
with the acknowledgement that the practitioners’ appeals to the supernatural, 
god(s), the sacred, or the holy have powerful material consequences for how they 
build their identities, narratives, practices, and environments.107 
 
 Vasquez asserts that, in this particular interpretation of cultural realism, selves 
and culture are as real as the physical world, and, “although social facts are the emergent 
result of the practices of individuals, they precede and transcend specific subjectivities, 
enabling, shaping, and delimiting the latter’s activities.”108 He argues that social systems 
of symbol and meaning-making are inextricably embedded in physical and socio-political 
material contexts. They constrain behavior and possibility, while making room for human 
agency within- and sometimes pushing beyond- these boundaries.  
While much of the field of religious studies has relied heavily upon Western 
Protestant understandings of religion as a primarily internal matter of belief, lived 
publicly through symbols primarily in reference to (and as an outgrowth from) texts and 
creeds, a material approach to studying religion looks at the processes by which “the 
religious” comes to be understood as such in specific contexts, as both embodied and 
emplaced. Vasquez summarizes his particular materialist approach as follows:  
The sort of materialism I would like to advance approaches religion as the 
open-ended product of the discursive and nondiscursive practices of 
embodied individuals, that is, individuals who exist in particular times and 
spaces. These individuals are embedded in nature and culture, and drawing from 
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and conditioned by their ecological, biological, psychological, and sociocultural 
resources, they construct multiple identities and practices, some of which come to 
be designated, often through contestation, as religious at particular junctures. In 
other words, a materialist approach is interested in the processes behind the 
naming and articulation of religion as relatively stable and patterned reality 
recognized by both insiders and outsiders.109 
 
This approach to the study of religion is thus process-oriented and dynamic, in 
that a material approach to religion allows for a multi-directional, interactive relationship 
between the many ideological, socio-political and material factors that together comprise 
the concept we interpret as religion. He argues against a Geertzian view of religion as a 
network of cultural symbols- a popular way of conceptualizing religion in current social 
scientific approaches to religion- arguing that, 
[i]n the end, despite the focus on locality, everyday life, and cultural complexity, 
Geertz’s excessive symbolicism ultimately yields a one-dimensional view of 
religion. He sees religion primarily as a set of expressive texts to be enacted and 
decoded, not as shifting clusters of embodied practices emplaced in social and 
ecological fields.110  
 
Vasquez instead argues for a multi-dimensional and multi-directional 
understanding of how religious symbols are developed and understood.  
Vasquez traces 
a widespread tendency in religious studies to treat inner subjective states as 
autonomous and to see ‘external’ practices, institutions, and objects (including the 
body as both creative actor and constructed artifact) as derivative manifestations 
of those states.111  
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This points to a key theoretical shift essential to creating a more robust and 
holistic approach to the study of religion, conflict and peacebuilding: the shift from 
seeing religion as primarily internal (centered around belief), with social and political 
actions and realities deriving from belief, to a material approach to religion that allows 
for a back-and-forth relationship between the internal and the external and understands 
religious practice beyond just a physical demonstration of internal beliefs.   
Additionally, a materialist approach allows for religions to manifest in ways that, 
in Vasquez’s words, “impose hegemony and animate resistance, sometimes 
simultaneously.”112 This dimension of religion is critical for religious peacebuilding, as 
we look to nuance the ambivalence thesis by examining how religion is shaped through 
context and works to uphold or resist societal status quos, in tandem with varying 
interpretations of religion toward peaceful or violent action in so doing.  
The material approach does not discount that texts and ideas play a key role in 
understanding religion, but as Vasquez argues,  
what a practice-centered approach demands, rather, is that we always place texts 
in their contexts of production, circulation, and consumption...the appropriation of 
texts by situated actors, ranging from institutions invested in maintaining 
orthodoxy to individuals at the margins of society, contributes to the reproduction 
of sedimented practices and the creation of new ones.113  
Thus, while texts and ideas are relevant and important, we must study them in 
context in order to understand why and how certain concepts are developed, prioritized 
and mobilized.  
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Vasquez agrees with the constructivist approaches to religion in part, though 
criticizes strong constructivism for its lack of attention to the world beyond language and 
mental structures. Like constructivist approaches within the discipline of conflict studies 
laid out in the introductory chapter, a contructivist approach to religion emphasizes the 
power of discourse to generate and reify boundaries and identities. Additionally, Vasquez 
concurs with Russell McCutcheon’s criticism of the “private affair” approach to religious 
studies that often dominates the field (and, I would add, is the primary- and sometimes 
sole- mode of understanding religion in other disciplines). However, Vasquez asserts that 
there is indeed data for religion- it is not, in other words, un-observable by virtue of being 
a socio-political construction.  
 Another central feature of Vasquez’s materialist theory of religion is 
emplacement, defined as “the interplay between culture and nature in the diverse ways in 
which individuals and groups draw from religion to negotiate spaces and build places.”114 
By studying religion through bodies, places and spaces, and socio-political dynamics, we 
find a much more holistic approach to religion than a theoretical approach that limits 
religion to the space of cognitive belief, internal experiences, and bounded group 
identities.  
Invoking Bourdieu’s conception of the habitus, Vasquez asserts that,  
As embodied and historical agents, individuals act always embedded in socially 
structured situations, amid already-established power relations, which condition 
their needs and interests, provide them with specific resources, skills, and 
propensities, open and/or close possible courses of action, and delimit the 
horizons of the possible and the impossible.115  
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Agency and invention exist within certain limits that are contextually inscribed. 
This is where Vasquez’s theory diverges from Bourdieu. He argues, building upon 
Michel de Certeau, that part of Bourdieu’s shortcoming is his assumption that doxa is 
somehow fully realized in establishing the habitus wherein behavior and thought is 
permitted and constrained. In reality, there is always human agency apart from the seats 
of power, contesting and remaking doxa in their own unique ways.116 Citing Orsi, 
Vasquez argues that one must account for the fact that “religious ideas and impulses are 
of the moment, invented, taken, borrowed, and improvised at the intersections of life.”117 
From this perspective, one does not have to rely on major crises to prompt religious or 
social change, as change is always happening, even if at times on the peripheries. 
Vasquez also critiques Bourdieu’s assumption that the body is a blank slate that responds 
to cultural molding. He thus argues for a “more robust view of embodiment”, along with 
a more dynamic logic of practice.118  
Vasquez puts forward a theory of religion that prioritizes lived experience while 
acknowledging the socially constructed and maintained structures by which the religious 
is articulated as such. He reiterates that this is not meant to discredit or displace textual or 
ideological approaches to understanding religion:  
It is not that doctrines and personal beliefs, texts, and symbols do not matter or 
carry their own material density. Rather, I have argued that we can only 
appreciate their full materiality if we contextualize and historicize them, if we 
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approach them as phenomena produced, performed, circulated, contested, 
sacralized, and consumed by embodied and emplaced individuals. Only when we 
see these discourses, beliefs, symbols, and texts as mobile yet relatively stable 
artifacts operating among and interacting with other material objects within the 
times and spaces constructed by the practices of situated individuals and groups 
can we avoid the threat of textualism, the temptation to make semiotic systems 
purely self-referential.119 
 
Thus, “content” matters, but not as singularly derivative, and contextual/material 
factors are just as critical in thinking about how religion comes to be understood and 
enacted in varying contexts. If the role of the scholar of religion is to ask how particular 
situations and modes of being come to be defined as religious (by insiders and outsiders), 
a materialist theory of religion is necessary. The scholar must shift from thinking about 
religion as something that happens inside the heads of persons, to thinking about religion 
as something that is made through, and interactive with, the world beyond internal beliefs 
and experiences- seen both contextually and historically. Action derives from multiple 
sources, not simply from mental constructs, and is shaped by the socio-political-material-
spatial realities in which we live. 
Drawing on, while diverging in important ways from, Eliade’s sense of place, 
Durkheim’s social networks, Marx’s social construction, Bourdieu’s habitus, and Asad’s 
religious genealogies, among many others, Vasquez has offered a comprehensive 
materialist theory of religion that helps move us from internally-focused, text-centric 
approaches to understanding religion to a lens on religion that allows us to look 
holistically, while analytically, at the lived, embodied, emplaced, process-oriented reality 
of religion as it manifests in various ways in the world.  
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Additionally, in thinking about religion from a process-oriented perspective, 
Bruce Lincoln’s typology of religion is helpful for focusing on the how (process) rather 
than what (essence) of religion throughout this study. Lincoln articulates three dynamic 
strains of religion, which will prove helpful in providing a critical theoretical frame for 
this study. He identifies religions of the status quo, designed to maintain the current 
social situation; religions of resistance, which define themselves in opposition to the 
status quo religious ideology but are focused on self-preservation; and religions of 
revolution, which define themselves in active opposition to the dominant social 
fraction.120  
Status quo religions can be strong supporters of structural, and somewhat less 
overt, forms of violence, while religions of revolution can use violent and non-violent 
means to call for justice and recognition. I would add that these categories are always 
shifting- again, demonstrating a process over time, rather than being static facts of 
existence. The ambivalence of religion does not occur in a vacuum, and thus 
understanding the connections between religion, conflict, and peace, requires attention to 
questions of justice, inequalities and power in particular locales. This typology, paired 
with a materialist approach to religion, provides a more robust and fruitful theoretical 
basis for studying the roles (and processes) of religion in conflict and peace. 
Lincoln’s categorization, while perhaps in and of itself too stagnant a 
categorization, helps to deepen Appleby’s ambivalence thesis, connecting the various 
possibilities for religious violence or non-violence to context-specific questions of justice 
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and power. While Appleby, Gopin and Little all see religion as more than ideas, much of 
their theoretical work reveals an emphasis on ideas or beliefs as the core of religion, 
echoing some of the aforementioned problems with the World Religions approach to 
understanding religion.  Additionally, none of these authors spend much time in their 
own texts situating the concept of religion in and of itself.  While the authors themselves 
take a much more nuanced view of religion, the lack of religion theory in their key 
contributions to the field has contributed to a shallow approach to religion within the field 
of religious peacebuilding more broadly.  Thus, I argue that drawing on a material theory 
of religion will add much-needed depth to the way in which religion is conceptualized 
and analyzed within religious conflict and peacebuilding studies. 
A material theory of religion pushes us to examine process, not essence. It drives 
the scholar of religion away from seeing religion as internal and abstract. Additionally, 
from this perspective, we do not see religion as an improper incursion into politics- as 
many are apt to see it- but rather an interactive part of the socio-political environment. 
Thus, there is no need to “rescue” religion from politics to harness it for the good- rather, 
we can examine how it has emerged in particular contexts as part of the socio-political 
interactions therein. This is particularly helpful in examining the complex web of religion 
in situations of socio-political conflict, which is what this dissertation has set out to do.  
 
Understanding Groupness: Who’s in?  
How does a material religious framework help us to think about religious group 
identity, particularly within conflict-affected societies? Many tend to think of religious 
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identity as natural and stable, and as all-or-nothing: you’re a Christian, a Muslim, a 
Hindu, a Jew, or you’re not. But when it comes to group identity, who belongs, how, and 
what that belonging means, all shift across time and space. Vasquez, Chidester, and 
Rogers Brubaker, among others, argue for a networked approach to “groupness,” rather 
than attempting to discursively maintain clear bounds of identity and belonging. 
Chidester suggests utilizing open definitions of religious traditions as invented or 
imagined communities, steering clear of talking about religions as homogenous systems 
or groups. He argues that, “[r]ather than bounded cultural systems, religions are 
intrareligious and interreligious networks of cultural relations.”121 Religious identity, in 
this line of thinking, involves a network or web of interactions, rather than a bounded set 
of ideologies, practices or persons.  
Drawing on Dicken, et al., Vasquez argues that,  
Networks mark relatively stable but always contested differentials of power, of 
inclusion and exclusion, of cooperation and conflict, of boundary-crossing and 
boundary-making. Networks are socio-politically, culturally, and ecologically 
embedded relational processes that constrain and enable practices as diverse as 
place-making and identity construction.122 
 
Thus, for Vasquez, religious groups are better understood as processes rather than 
bounded entities. In a similar vein, Brubaker challenges what he calls the tradition of 
“groupism,” or thinking about groups of people as homogenous, clearly demarcated 
entities. He suggests, instead, that we utilize “a relational, processual, and dynamic 
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analytical language” when thinking and talking about groups.123 He speaks of groupness 
as an event, and encourages scholars to acknowledge moments of what he calls 
extraordinary cohesion at various points, without treating these levels of groupness as 
always present. Thus, for Brubaker, groupness is something that happens, rather than 
is.124  
Brubaker’s understanding of group identity as an event dovetails with Vasquez’s 
discussion, drawing on Victor Turner and others, of the “sacred’s potential to generate 
communitas.”125 Group identity and values are often reified through participation in 
spaces or group practices deemed sacred, such as when Serbian fighters gathered in 
monasteries to receive blessings before battle. An embodied and emplaced approach to 
religion makes space for understanding these “moments of groupness” in contextually 
and historically specific ways, rather than simply as mental constructs.  
There is much scholarly work demonstrating that religious identities (in all its 
malleability) are formed through friction. Notably, Daniel Boyarin’s work Border Lines: 
The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity shows the ways in which Christianity and Judaism 
came to be understood as separate categories of religious identity through mutually 
constitutive encounters. Neither would have emerged as a distinctive category of belief 
and practice without the other. This is but one example of studies demonstrating how 
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religious categories of identity emerge in interaction with another (also emerging) 
category of identity and through moments of socio-political pushes and pulls.126  
Additionally, religious group identity is often operating and interacting at two 
(and sometimes more) levels. While religion is formed and lived in locally specific ways, 
it is also often interacting with transnational networks of co-religionists and identity 
tropes that span across borders. This is becoming even more apparent in our 
technologically interconnected globalized world, but it was also true before the advent of 
the internet and transnational media, as we will see in the Lebanon and Bosnia case 
studies. Europeans, for example, felt a strong connection to the Maronites in Lebanon as 
co-religionists, though they quickly realized that European and Maronite lived religion 
was quite different.127 One interviewee called this transcendent tendency the “genius of 
religion”128 as imagined and real connections are forged with both human & thought 
networks across borders.  
This approach to groupness debunks an essentialist understanding of religious 
conflict. In applying it to the realm of conflict studies, however, we must also temper the 
pull toward strong constructivism. Yes, religious group identity is a socio-political 
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construction- it is an imagined community.129 And yet, it becomes meaningful and 
accumulates a certain “stickiness” (to draw on Varshney) even though the boundaries are 
often porous and the group’s Other is also not static, as the shifting opponents and 
alliances during the 1975-1900 Lebanese civil war and those during the Bosnian conflict 
in the early 1990’s illustrate. A material religion approach to understanding religious 
group identities works in tandem with the constructivist-institutionalist hybrid approach 
to understanding ethnicity laid out in chapter 1, orienting the research in the next chapters 
and providing the field of religious peacebuilding more generally with a sense of religion 
that is more robustly embedded in social and political life.   
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has outlined and reflected upon the current theoretical underpinnings 
of religious peacebuilding, demonstrating the current gaps in theory and practice. I 
argued for a material theory of religion as a more authentic and fruitful basis for the study 
of religious peacebuilding. The material approach moves us past essentialist and uni-
directional understandings of religion, and it also anchors our understanding of religious 
groupness as malleable and developed in interaction with socio-political realities.  These 
theoretical shifts will ultimately allow us to refine and revise religious peacebuilding 
theory.  In the following chapters, I will apply these theoretical approaches to conflict and 
religious peacebuilding in my examinations of efforts in Lebanon and Bosnia 
specifically.   
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Chapter 3: Tracing Religio-Politics in Lebanon 
No one wants to talk about religion in Lebanon.  
Sitting at a restaurant in Beirut’s busy Hamra district in March 2015, I tried to 
explain my dissertation topic to my server, who had asked about what I was working on 
in Beirut.  The first two things she said in response to my jumbled explanation of my 
research topic were remarks I heard over and over from Beirut residents, at coffee houses, 
in taxi cabs, and in shops, whenever the conversation took a turn from the price of a rug 
to religion and politics in Lebanon.  First, she said that religious leaders cannot have 
anything to do with creating peace because they own this country for themselves and are 
the ones who create divisions to sustain their economic and political power.  Second, she 
told me that religious difference isn’t really a problem here, and besides, from her 
perspective, all religions are the same at their core.130 
The simultaneous belief that religious leaders contribute to creating conflict and 
that religion isn’t really a problem is a paradox that persists across Lebanon.  Some 
explain it by saying that most Lebanese religious leaders have nothing to do with true 
religion.  These observers say that religion is split between sectarianism, which is a tribal 
identity category, and spirituality, which is the heart of religion and is something that is 
intensely personal and other-worldly.  But is the distinction this simple?  Can one neatly 
                                                
130 This view, of course, differs from how many Lebanese would see religions, and from how many 
exclusivist, monotheistic theologies have developed elsewhere in the world.   
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split religion into the categories of sectarianism and spirituality to solve the seeming 
paradox of religion having either everything or nothing to do with conflict in Lebanon?   
There has been a lot of religious peacebuilding- understood in varied ways- in 
Lebanon, in response to what has been widely framed as an intractable religious conflict. 
Many peacebuilding practitioners are engaging religion in various ways in peacebuilding 
processes in Lebanon, some out of a sense of necessity, and some operating under a 
belief that religious leaders and values have unique transformative power when it comes 
to social reconciliation.   
This case study, which is split into two chapters, explores the following questions: 
what do religious leaders, institutions, identities and beliefs have to do with conflict in 
Lebanon?  How, specifically, have peacebuilding actors engaged religion in 
peacebuilding processes.  And to what effect?  In order to answer these questions, we 
need to shift to interpreting religion and conflict in Lebanon within the materialist theory 
of religion laid out in chapter two of this project. Thus, another key question at the heart 
of this chapter is, how has religion become in Lebanon? The present chapter traces some 
of the key “moments of groupness” in Lebanese religious life and examines how certain 
moments of group identity had staying power. Chapter Four goes on to examine how 
peacebuilding attempts have interpreted, treated and drawn upon religion, and analyzes 
what we can say about how these efforts contribute to- or fail to contribute to- social 
cohesion in Lebanon. 
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Why, and How, Should We Talk about Religion in Lebanon? 
Popular narratives have imagined the war in Lebanon as a conflict between 
Christians and Muslims (as broadly defined religious categories), or between different 
religious sects (smaller groups that emerge from within the broader categories).  
However, who was fighting whom changed over time in Lebanon, with Palestinian 
militias fighting Christian militias at some points, while Christian militias fought one 
another at other times, demonstrating shifts between ethnic, sectarian, and intra-
community conflicts throughout the course of the war. Conflict in Lebanon has never 
been a constant series of clashes between two neatly defined, opposing groups, but rather 
different confrontations between a number of sub-groups that defined their own 
identities, allies, and their enemies differently at different times.131  The narrative of a 
religious war, then, is far too neat for what happened (and continues to happen) on the 
ground in Lebanon.  And yet, religious identities, symbols, institutions, leaders, and 
spaces have consistently come into play in important ways.  One interview respondent, a 
high-ranking commander during the civil war years, described the way in which he and 
his colleagues justified their attacks in religious terms:   
To be a leader of your community, you have to be the most prominent one to 
defend them.  So you cannot defend someone who is not afraid.  You defend 
someone by making him afraid of the other. Or nourishing this fear, not directly 
                                                
131 For example, within both Maronite and Shi’a sects, there were multiple leaders and parties vying to be 
representative of that particular sect. Michele Aoun and Samir Geagea in particular fought one another, 
while simultaneously fighting other sects or sub-groups. I will unpack these divisions in greater depth in the 
civil war section of this chapter.  
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maybe, but so many ways- many tools….To be number one you have to be the 
most extremist of the leaders of your community.132  
This reflection points to the way that religious boundaries, and the content of 
religious identities, were produced through the dynamics of war and conflict, as part of 
the socio-political processes at work in Lebanon, as I will examine in further depth in this 
chapter.   Through this chapter, we will walk through how religion came to look and act 
the way it does in Lebanon, but as a preface to that more in-depth analysis, it is worth a 
preliminary overview of some of the key elements of what it means to be religious in 
Lebanon.  While religiosity and piety are part of what religion means in Lebanon for 
some, more salient to everyday life are the ways that religious identity contains and 
delineates one’s social and political access.   
Historically, religion is deeply fused and intertwined with national identity in 
Lebanon. There are 18 recognized religious sects in Lebanon.  There has not been a 
census since 1932, when the political system was set up to reflect proportional 
representation- at all levels- for these recognized sects.  This set up reveals that two key 
elements of religious life in Lebanon.  First, religious identity exists within boundaries 
prescribed by the state- you must belong to one of the recognized sects in order to have 
access to voting and other expressions of citizenship, as well as having access to social, 
family and personal legal services.  The census determined the amount of representation 
each sect has in the Lebanese political system, revealing that individuals do not 
participate in the Lebanese system as individuals, but rather as members of their sect.  
                                                
132 Author interview with Respondent 1, July 2, 2015.  
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Religious affiliation is on the identity card of every Lebanese.  A Lebanese individual 
does not have access to the institution of marriage, for instance, as an individual, but only 
through membership in a religious community, as all marriages are conducted through 
the religious bodies, rather than through civic courts.  Second, the fact that the census 
numbers of 1932 are still the only existing metrics (though sectarian representation 
allotments did shift slightly through the Ta’if agreement) reveals a reliance on past 
realities and ideas of Lebanon for current modes of governance.  Demographics have 
certainly shifted dramatically since 1932, and this reality has led to much strife in the 
present day as now larger sects do not have the political access their numbers would 
prescribe, were there to be another census, as every Lebanese knows that the country is 
now majority Muslim.133 Suffice it to say, using the 1932 data serves the system itself, 
rather than the general populace, and there is generally political consensus on keeping the 
1932 census data in order to avoid opening Pandora’s box, so to speak.  
One’s ability to participate politically is also directly tied to one’s membership in 
a religious community.  The political system itself reserves specific roles for 
representatives from particular religious communities (i.e., the President must be a 
Maronite Christian, while the House Speaker must be Shi’a Muslim and so on; this 
carries through military leadership and the allocations of seats in the Parliament on down 
to a number of less glamorous public service positions).  Voting access is based on one’s 
sectarian affiliation, as well as one’s geographic affiliation (villages) and, for women in 
                                                
133 See, for example, analysis in “Census and Sensibility,” the Economist, November 5, 2016, accessed 
April 19, 2017, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21709535-new-data-
reveal-looming-crisis-lebanons-ruling-elite-exposing-fiction. 
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particular, one’s family ties. Media outlets are controlled by sects, and schools are, for the 
most part, homogenous when it comes to sectarian identity.134  Thus, religion in Lebanon 
is hardly limited to the internal beliefs of a person, or to the rituals and practices of a 
community.  It infuses many aspects of life, to the point that many no longer recognize it 
as “religion”, understood from a primarily Euro-modern perspective.   
The Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) data show that Lebanon and 
has a fairly low level of government regulation of religion (4.9/), although this number 
arguably fails to take into account the ways in which government does indeed exert 
control over religion through the control given to religious institutions themselves (thus, 
providing the state with somewhat indirect control that is not reflected in the ARDA 
number).  The state also determines what can and cannot be considered an official 
religion.  Additionally, ARDA data shows a very high level of social regulation of 
religion in Lebanon (referring to the ways in which societal forces restrict and constrain 
free religious practice), at 9.3/10, demonstrating that Lebanese society strongly restricts 
freedom of religion in a variety of ways.   
Does it make sense to talk about Lebanon’s civil unrest as religious in any way?  
Some scholars on Lebanon would say no, that it is clearly economic and socio-political, 
and that the narratives of religion are primarily laid upon the context by outsiders seeking 
to describe it in religious terms.  According to this perspective, the religious conflict 
                                                
134 For instance, over 50% of Lebanese students are enrolled in private schools, most of which are sectarian 
in nature. This percentage goes up in Beirut, where an estimated 68% of students were enrolled in private 
schools in 2012. Source: BankMed Special Report: Analysis of Lebanon’s Education Sector, June 2014, 9-
10, accessed April 19, 2017, https://www.scribd.com/document/334756961/Lebanon-Bankmed-
Education-Lebanon-Study. 
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narrative is a false one, though one that gets reified through the narratives we tell.135  
However, this view rests on a simplistic understanding of religion: religion as primarily a 
matter of internal belief, removed from the rest of life.  If we instead think of religion as 
material, interwoven with other aspects of life and actually itself made through those 
other aspects of life (the social, the political, the bodies interacting with other bodies in 
the real world), then we have a different way of thinking about what constitutes the 
“religious.”  
A material theory of religion, as I am utilizing here, immediately asks us to take a 
holistic approach to understanding what religion is and how it works in a given context.  
Religion in Lebanon is complex and multidimensional. Certainly the Lebanese conflict is 
not religious in the sense that it is not primarily driven by beliefs coming out to clash 
with one another in ideological battles.  But socio-political conflict in Lebanon has 
important religious elements in the material ways in which it has played out, thereby 
shaping (and re-shaping) what religion means in this context.  Religion is strategically 
bound up in the creation of boundaries, as the creation of social and political boundaries 
is part of what religion has meant historically. 
Labeling a conflict as religious in part should not be at the expense of other 
factors; on the contrary, it is always layered upon some other factor.  In the case of 
Lebanon, it is overlapped and intertwined with one’s socioeconomic, geographic, and 
political modes of being and belonging.  What it means to be Maronite in Lebanon, many 
would now say has very little to do with belief about the transcendent and is therefore not 
                                                
135 Author interview with Respondent 24, July 10, 2015.  
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a “real religious identity.”  A materialist theory of religion challenges us to rethink what 
we mean by religious identity.  When we shift from a purely ideological view of 
religion’s role in society, we can see how something can indeed be a “religious conflict”, 
in a certain sense, without the conflict having anything to do with a clash of ideological 
belief.   
One can scan any body of literature on Lebanon and see the terms 
“communalism,” “sectarianism” and “religious community/sect/group” used, sometimes 
interchangeably.  While these concepts are overlapping and intertwined, it is useful to 
unpack some of the differences, as this differentiation (as far as it is possible) will 
become more salient throughout this chapter.  Sectarianism and religion are not 
equivalent, but one cannot talk about one without the other.  When religious identity 
becomes mobilized in socio-political ways, and particularly when that is institutionalized 
in some way, we are dealing with sectarianism.  In cases of strong sectarianism, 
belonging is far more important than belief.   
In Lebanon, we see shifts over time from self-described religious communities 
mobilizing into sects with the hardening of boundaries, the politicization of religious 
belonging, and the differentiation of religious leaders from sectarian/political leaders.  
Additionally, my interviews revealed a tendency from Lebanese themselves, when asked 
about religious dynamics, to focus on the larger religious categories (Christian, Muslim) 
rather than the smaller sectarian categories (Armenian, Shi’a, and so on).  This is true of 
outside observers as well, to subsume sectarian groups into the broader religious 
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categories when commenting on how religion plays into Lebanese socio-political 
dynamics.   
Thus, throughout this chapter, I will explore the interwoven and complex notions 
of religion and sectarianism in Lebanon.  While most of the people I spoke with, through 
formal interviews as well as through informal conversations, asserted strongly that the 
sectarian system is not religious, there is no escaping the fact that religious institutions 
and leaders in Lebanon are inextricably tied into the sectarian system.  The sectarian 
system emerged from a pact between representatives of explicitly defined religious 
communities.  While this simplistic explanation does not capture the complexity of how 
the sectarian system came to be, and how it has morphed over the years since its 
inception, it is important to bear in mind when considering the present form and impact 
of sectarianism in Lebanon.  As one respondent noted, the challenge is “how to build a 
non-sectarian state on a sectarian basis,” given the long legacy of sectarianism in the 
country.136 
Nader Hashemi has observed that,  
[s]ectarian identities could not be politicized unless differences in beliefs, values, 
and historical memory compelled religious groups to collective action around 
particularistic identities. The critical question, however, that demands an answer 
in explaining sectarian conflict is: why now?  Why do sectarian conflicts erupt at 
particular moments in time and not at other moments?137  
 
                                                
136 Author interview with Respondent 16, July 8, 2015. 
137 Nader Hashemi, “Toward a Political Theory of Sectarianism in the Middle East: The Salience of 
Authoritarianism over Theology,” Middle East Institute essay series (2015), accessed February 9, 2017, 
http://www.mei.edu/content/map/toward-political-theory-sectarianism-middle-east-salience-
authoritarianism-over-theology. 
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 This is an important dimension of the study at hand, as sectarian meaning and 
mobilization is a response to very specific political and social dynamics, making it a 
more salient form of belonging for the general populace at certain times; it is not a 
constant in the Lebanese context or, arguably, in any context.   
 Hashemi, drawing on Vali Nasr, points to the important role of state actors, 
including the presence of a weak state, for cultivating and benefiting from sectarian 
mobilization.  This reveals, as Hashemi argues, the “salience of authoritarianism over 
theology in understanding the dynamics of Sunni-Shi‘i relations today,” an 
observation that carries into other Lebanese sectarian dynamics as well.  The role of the 
state in helping to curate sectarianism is a critical one, which I will explore later in this 
chapter.138    
Indeed, Hashemi and Postel argue elsewhere that, “A common tactic to preserve 
and perpetuate political rule in a weak state is to manipulate social and political cleavages 
via a divide-and-rule strategy.  This gives ruling elites greater room to maneuver in the 
short term, at the cost of social cohesion in the long term.”139  I will argue here that this 
prioritization of elite interests carries over from political leadership to religious 
leadership in Lebanon as well, precluding social cohesion in a similar fashion. 
Bassell Salloukh argues that “sectarianism was institutionalized in the form of 
multiple corporate consociational power-sharing arrangements,” most notably the 
                                                
138 Hashemi, “Toward a Political Theory of Sectarianism in the Middle East.”  
139 Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, ed., Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 9.  
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National Pact and the Ta’if Accord.140  This observation reveals two important features of 
sectarianism- one is that it is, indeed, institutional, meaning it is not simply a reflection of 
horizontal dynamics in society, but very much a feature of vertical state-society relations.  
The other is that it involves corporate politics, meaning the individual citizen is formally 
subsumed into the group to which s/he belongs.   
Religion doesn’t get replaced by the sect, but the sect becomes another dynamic 
that takes on a socio-political life of its own, still very much connected to its origins in 
religious identity, institutional infrastructure and social dynamics.  Thus Lebanon both is 
and isn’t a “religious conflict, ” particularly considering that what we often mean when 
we say “religious conflict” rests on theoretically limited assumptions about the nature of 
religion.  Religion is wrapped up in socio-political conflict in complex and dynamic 
ways.  It follows that trying to make peace (however defined) also involves religion in 
critical ways.  This is not because religion is an isolatable factor, coming from the outside 
to make conflict and/or peace, but because it is integrally intertwined with the nature of 
society and identity in a reciprocal way. 
Should one think of sectarianism as “religious” in any sense of the word? 
Religious identity in Lebanon is tied up with the seats of religious authority, and at 
various times, the rhetoric of religion is employed to reinforce sectarian group 
boundaries.  Those who would confine religion to the realm of the transcendent and 
ideological would say no, sectarianism isn’t about difference in belief or religious 
practice and therefore is not religious.  Indeed, some describe the relationship between 
                                                
140 Salloukh, et. al., The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon (London: Pluto Press, 2015), 2.  
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religion and sectarianism as a two-tiered system, with sectarianism being a layer added to 
religion, which is at its core neutral (or, according to some, nonviolent).141  However, 
when we expand what we mean by religion- beyond the realm of belief- it’s not such an 
easy answer.  A simple yes or no assumes a clean division between the religious and the 
secular.142   
 This is not simply a theoretical question.  To say that sectarianism “isn’t 
religious” can lead those engaged in religious peacebuilding to try to somehow extract 
religion from the ways it is intricately intertwined with sectarianism.  Sectarian and 
religious identities aren’t the same thing, but they are deeply interconnected in critical 
ways.   
While different religious communities have long existed in this space, the way 
communal boundaries were defined, and the importance of religious identity in social 
dynamics, have changed over time. Rather than being an “age old conflict” between 
groups in the Levant, the production of sectarianism in the nineteenth-century in fact 
reflects a “new historical imagination”- a new political order based on religious 
differentiation, legitimated through evocations of the past.143  This challenges the notion 
common in contemporary analyses of the Levant that sectarianism is an ancient, tribal 
mode of operation: age-old rivalries that are preventing real modernization.  Rather, it is 
modern ways of thinking about religion and group identity that produced sectarianism.   
                                                
141 Author interview with Respondent 12, July 1, 2015. 
142 The parsing of “the religious” from “the Secular” is another theoretical conversation entirely, which 
others have thoroughly discussed elsewhere. See, for instance, Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular, 
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, and Jose Casanova, “The Secular, Secularizations, Secularism.” 
143 Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism, 2.  
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A deeper understanding of how religion and sectarianism have manifested over 
time in Lebanese conflict history must precede any discussion of religion and socio-
politics in Lebanon.144  Anchoring in a material theory of religion helps us to situate 
religion in Lebanon as both intermingled with all other aspects of life, and as a malleable 
reality that has gone through many processes of becoming throughout Lebanese social 
and political history.  To understand religion in Lebanon through a materialist theoretical 
lens, one must trace the various moments of groupness that occurred throughout 
Lebanese history to understand how boundaries were negotiated and the ways religion 
was invoked (and created in certain ways) in these events and processes.  A better 
understanding of how religion functions in the Lebanese context lays the groundwork for 
a more fruitful conversation on how religion has been playing into efforts to build social 
cohesion, and why these have and have not been effective in different ways.   
 
The Social Cohesion Frame  
 As articulated in depth in chapter one of this dissertation, I find social cohesion to 
be a better litmus test for evaluating the progress of a society away from violent conflict 
than the more vague, and often less measureable, notion of peace.   While peace can be 
negative, in the sense that it can be measured by the absence of consistent armed conflict 
or acts of violence, social cohesion draws on a more positive assessment framework.  It 
looks at the horizontal (between people and groups) and vertical (between society and the 
state) dimensions of a context, and also looks at both the formal and informal ways these 
                                                
144 I say conflicts plural intentionally, as there have been a multiplicity of conflict fronts and actors prior to, 
throughout, and after the civil war.  
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relationships play out.  Additionally, a key component of social cohesion is how much 
social inequality persists.  A state can be “at peace” while maintaining deep social 
inequalities, and thus while there may not be overt violence, there is indeed system 
violence at work, which can lead to outbreaks of overt violence if these are not dealt with.    
 While social cohesion is my way of assessing the progress of peace work in 
Lebanon, it is not necessarily the way in which many involved in peacebuilding- and 
particularly in “religious peacebuilding” are articulating their own goals and objectives.  
This will become apparent through discussions of my interview data later in the chapter.  
 
Research Methodology  
I conducted semi-structured field interviews in Lebanon between March 2014-
July 2015.  I interviewed 24 individuals, concentrating my interviews primarily in Beirut 
and its suburbs, with a few interviews in the mountains north of the city and in Saida, 
though I interviewed a number of individuals who originate from and work in other 
areas.145 A small handful were expatriates (from Europe or from other Arab states) who 
lived in Lebanon working for international organizations.  I selected respondents from 
different sects in order to get a sampling of perspectives, and I spoke with persons who 
reported different levels of religious commitment- some were religious leaders, while 
others identified as people of faith but had varying levels of engagement with the 
                                                
145 Beyond logistical and safety considerations, I focused my research interviews on Beirut because 
metropolitan Beirut holds an estimated 1/3 of the country’s population.  
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institutions affiliated with their faith tradition.  Still others identified themselves as 
secular.146 
I spoke with peacebuilding actors, religious leaders, and political officials. 
Interviewees spoke from both individual and organizational perspectives on how they 
have engaged religion in peacebuilding work, and how they think about the impact of this 
work within the Lebanese socio-political context.  This included practitioners working for 
bilateral, international, and local organizations, including both governmental and non-
governmental entities.  Many were born and raised in Lebanon, and my respondents 
spanned several generations.  Some had been working in peacebuilding or doing inter-
religious work for decades, while others were newer to active engagement in this work.  
I selected my interview respondents through preliminary outreach to individuals 
or organizations that are key players in the field of religious peacebuilding, based on my 
initial desk research.  Once on site, I recruited new interviewees through snowball 
sampling, taking recommendations from those with whom I interacted on the ground in 
Lebanon.  These interviews allowed me to understand how those working in 
peacebuilding spaces, and in explicitly religious peacebuilding spaces, articulate and 
understand the work that they are doing. 
My analysis in this chapter combines the findings from these interviews with a 
study of, materials from a large sampling of peacebuilding organizations.  These 
materials included evaluations, internal planning documents, and public project and 
                                                
146 Though it is important to note that while a number of Lebanese consider themselves to be secular, 
through the eyes of the state and society, they must still be part of a sect in order to participate in the nation, 
and thus all Lebanese who identified as secular still also had a sectarian affiliation.  
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program descriptions and advertisements.   These materials help to supplement my 
interviews by demonstrating how practitioners involved in these approaches frame their 
objectives, goals, and scope of work for both internal purposes as well as for external 
audiences.   Additionally, I drew upon survey data, including the World Values Survey 
Wave 6 surveys, and desk studies of recent writings on the Lebanese socio-political 
situation.  
 
Scope and Structure 
This case study proceeds as follows: first, I outline the social and political history 
of religion and conflict in Lebanon, in three stages from the Ottoman era to the present.  
One could, of course, break down each of these periods of time much further, as each 
time period includes a number of different phases and events. However, my purpose in 
this division is not to exhaustively cover the details of Lebanon’s modern history, but to 
highlight several defining moments throughout Lebanese history that contributed to the 
development of the sectarian and religious identity politics seen in Lebanon today.  In the 
next chapter, I examine the various approaches to engaging religion in peacebuilding in 
Lebanon before analysing the success and shortcomings of these efforts, vis a vis social 
cohesion in Lebanon.  Through this, I will uncover for the reader key principles useful for 
better analyzing the relationships between religion and social cohesion beyond the 
Lebanese context, providing a refined theoretical basis for such research.   
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Locating Religion in Lebanon: Nation Building and Beyond  
Lebanon is a “community of communities,” meaning that it is not a country made 
up of individuals, but rather a country made up of distinctive sectarian communities that 
relate to the state and to one another as such.  Nearly every person I spoke with agreed 
upon this description.  This community of communities, for some, is what Lebanon is at 
its core- an interminable given.  For those who take this perspective, the challenge of 
peacebuilding in Lebanon involves navigating and balancing the needs and desires of 
communities as such.  Others, however, spoke of this as the problem that Lebanon must 
overcome in order to move forward.  For those in this camp, a country cannot have a 
cohesive national identity if it is a nation of community identities that are stronger than, 
or at least equal to, the national identity.  For these actors, overcoming the sub-group 
identities are the only way forward for a cohesive Lebanese nation that is inclusive, 
coherent, and just, given that at present, Lebanese individuals only have rights in so far as 
they are members of recognized sectarian communities, as well as through their 
membership in families and villages.   
 In understanding inter-communal violence, we must ask how Lebanese communal 
identities came to be defined as such, and how they came to assert socio-political 
meaning.  Religion is strategically tied up in the creation of boundaries.  Indeed, the 
naming of religions as such, and the identification of people with particular religious 
 83 
group identities, have always been part of a socio-political boundary-making process, as 
discussed in Chapter Two of this project.147    
To say national identity is inclusive of religious identities is Lebanon is a bit 
misleading:  as many interview subjects reiterated over and over, Communal belonging is 
central to national belonging in Lebanon. One has to be part of a religious community to 
have full access to citizenship and state services in many ways.  Communal belonging 
mediates access to and participation in politics (you must vote as a member of your 
community, which is indicated on your ID card, and the MP positions are allocated by 
sect), as well as access to personal and family legal services, such as marriage, 
inheritance, burial, and the like.     
To understand how communal and sectarian politics emerged as a key driving 
force in Lebanese society, we must first understand how religion manifested, and indeed 
became, in Lebanon during the socio-political conflicts marking its history.  Our ability 
to analyze peacebuilding efforts that invoke religion rests on the way in which we 
understand how religion shows up in Lebanon’s conflict history. How was religion or sect 
in Lebanon produced as a prioritized identity marker through its history?  This section 
traces the moments and processes that formed and, at times, crystallized communal and 
sectarian group identities (and the content or meaning thereof) throughout key phases of 
Lebanese history.  Indeed, it shows that what it meant to be religious in Lebanon changed 
over time, in response to socio-political dynamics and “moments of groupness,” and the 
                                                
147 See Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Asad, Formations of the Secular; and Masuzawa, The Invention of World 
Religions.   
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meaning of religion itself was often shaped through friction and conflict, as much as it 
contributed to the various historical conflict dynamics. 
 
Ottoman Era & the Creation of a Communal System 
 The Ottoman Empire existed as a multi-religious state.  While Sunni Islam was 
the official religion of the Empire, non-Muslim communities had their own courts, as part 
of the millet system, to deal with a wide range of personal matters, rather than being 
subjected to Shari’a, as was the case with Muslims living under Ottoman rule.148  In 
exchange for protection and autonomy, Christian and Jewish communities paid a personal 
tax (jizya), in part to demonstrate their loyalty to the Empire.149  Jews and Christians were 
thus integrated into the political and social life of the Ottoman Empire (including 
important roles in trade and finance), while also being treated as separate groups.   
 The Empire conferred authority to Jewish and Christian local religious leaders to 
run their courts and to collect the poll tax.150  In this way, religious leaders were treated as 
the representatives of their communities and were given a large degree of control over 
“their people.”  This was not, however, unique to the way Christian or Jewish 
communities were treated, as in general, the Ottoman Empire treated people not as 
individuals, but as members of communities or units, as Albert Hourani observes: 
In principle, Ottoman society was divided sharply into rulers (asker, literally 
soldiers) and subjects (reaya, literally the flock).” “The ruler and his asker looked 
                                                
148 Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1991), 220.  
149 Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, 217, 220.  
150 Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, 220.  
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at the reaya not as a collection of individuals to be dealt with directly, but rather 
as a number of groups.151   
 
Under Ottoman rule, then, groups were seen as distinct units, sometimes specified 
by religion and otherwise specified by other group organizing mechanisms (village, 
family, and so on).  However, Maria Couroucli notes that these group identities, while 
legally specified under the Ottomans, also had some fluidity that began to dissipate in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.   
The recent anthology Sharing Sacred Spaces in the Mediterranean provides 
extensive research on the shifts in the way religious communities in the Mediterranean 
interacted over shared religious spaces. Couroucli argues in the introduction to this 
volume that, while the Ottoman Empire constituted a multi-confessional political 
construct, the introduction of the nation-state model into the Middle East instigated a 
quest for homogeneity, resulting in religious division and, in some cases, outright 
animosity toward those of religions different from the homogenous body politic.152 
The division of groups into clear-cut categories of belonging, between and within 
nation-states, combined with colonial encounters within societies, spurred a quest for the 
clarification of what it means to belong, to a nation or to a sub-group within that nation.  
Couroucli argues that, “During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, within most 
circum-Mediterranean nation-states, Christians, Jews, and Muslims strived to achieve 
religious homogeneity within political territories, putting an end to a long history of 
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cohabitation.”153  Couroucli describes the multi-confessional nature of the Ottoman 
Empire, albeit with differing statuses for different religious communities, in comparison 
to the more homogenous nations emerging in Western Europe during the same era.  
Unlike in many Western European societies, religious minorities were officially 
recognized under the Ottomans.154  Intermarriage and mixed families were common in 
the Ottoman Empire, and interactions with the religious Other was an everyday reality for 
many. 
 Couroucli is quick to point out that this reality of cohabitation under the Ottomans 
should not be oversimplified, as communities living together does not necessarily mean 
that persons or communities treat one another as equals or with respect.155  Living 
together looks different in disparate spaces, and the bounds of religious identity are often 
complex and, at times, fluid.  Mixed families through intermarriage and the sharing of 
sacred spaces by individuals and communities were realities of life in much of the 
Ottoman Empire.  This challenges the notion of distinct boundaries between the religious 
communities of the Eastern Mediterranean, including those in Mount Lebanon, but the 
point that the state interpolates its citizens through the lens of religious community 
remains. 
While certainly Lebanon’s history does not begin with the Ottoman era, in order 
to tell the story of how sectarianism became a force to be reckoned with in Lebanon, one 
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must begin in the late modern era.  After all, sectarianism is arguably a modern story. The 
Ottoman era saw a number of critical changes in the Levant, particularly as European 
actors began to enter the geographical space.  Ussama Makdisi has convincingly argued 
that it was through the dynamic nineteenth century European-Ottoman encounters (both 
conflicting and collaborative) with the local population of Mount Lebanon, particularly 
between 1840-1860, that sectarianism was developed and took root, laying the foundation 
for the ways sectarianism now operates in Lebanese social and political life.156   
The Ottoman territories were divided into Vilayets, or administrative centers.  
Mount Lebanon was part of the Vilayet of Beirut, while portions of the territory that later 
became Greater Lebanon (the Bekaa Valley, Baalbeck, and elsewhere) were under the 
Vilayet of Damascus.157  Leila Fawaz has observed that “Ottoman control was hardly felt 
in Mount Lebanon, where no direct Ottoman authority existed before the nineteenth 
century.  The Ottomans kept an eye on it, but left it alone.”158  Prior to the 1800s, then, 
the area of Mount Lebanon was not a central focus of Ottoman governing elites.   
The two predominant groups residing there were Druze, who held most of the 
higher ranking administrative and military positions, and Maronite Christians, who 
worked in commerce and finance, as well as production roles, and were primarily 
commoners.159  Certainly, there were conflicts between individuals and communities 
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prior to the developments of the nineteenth-century in Mount Lebanon, and in the Levant 
more generally, but the centrality of religious identity as the mode of group organization 
was a modern innovation. Religion in Mount Lebanon had long been lived out in a highly 
fluid way, with Sunni Muslims and Maronite Christians both venerating Mary in shared 
sacred spaces,160 and religion was not the primary identity category for social 
organization.  Even if religion was one key identity category for social and political 
organization under the Ottoman Empire, that did not necessarily map directly onto the 
way life was organized on the ground, often beyond the firm grasp of Ottoman powers.  
Makdisi argues that social standing, primarily divided between elites and commoners, 
was much more important for social organization than was religious identity, as elites 
across sectarian lines had common interest in maintaining financial and social power.161  
In the 1840s, as an effort to maintain control in light of the encroaching European 
influence in the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire began restructuring social dynamics 
through the Tanzimat reforms.  These reforms used the language of revitalization of the 
Islamic tradition, maintaining a distinctness from European powers, while also giving 
citizenship and increased civil rights to Christians and other non-Muslim communities in 
Ottoman-controlled areas.  This was viewed as part of the modernization process, 
attempting to strengthen the Ottoman Empire in the model of other contemporary strong 
states, and also served to instill Ottoman affinity and ownership within these religious 
minorities.  Hourani points to the important merchant roles of Christians and Jews, prior 
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to and especially following Tanzimat, aiding in Ottoman negotiations with foreign 
bodies.162  Thus, certain religious minorities benefitted as elites within new Ottoman 
social and economic structures, and had the added benefit of easier access to European 
citizenship, which exempted them from numerous taxes and laws of the Empire. 
Additionally, the reforms came with a more explicit separation of religious groups, with 
Ottoman and European powers dividing Mount Lebanon into two districts, separating the 
Maronites from the Druze, in 1842.   
Makdisi argues that the new emancipation of Maronites through the Tanzimat 
reforms is what led to ethno-religious uprisings, as British, French and Ottomans vied for 
control of the Mount Lebanon region through the local inhabitants by attempting to win 
their loyalty.163 Tensions built on both inter- and intra-religious rivalries and led to 
Maronite peasant uprisings in 1858 and a bloody war in 1860.  These skirmishes reflected 
the newly constructed organizing structures, as neighbors who previously lived alongside 
one another in peace turned on one another.  Makdisi asserts that this violence was not 
only inter-communal, but also intra-communal for both communities, as part of each 
community’s own boundary-making process in the midst of social and political change.  
This intra-communal social violence, he points out, was “a fundamental part of broader 
religious violence across sectarian communities.”164  This tension, as part of the 
boundary-making processes that accompany social conflict, is an important but often 
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overlooked feature of conflict in Lebanon from the Tanzimat period to the present.  The 
Règlement Organique put a formal end to the strife in 1861, and in essence 
institutionalized communal representation, as communal leaders came to an agreement as 
representatives of their communities, building on the foundation of communal 
representativity under the Ottomans.165 
Leila Fawaz argues that the Lebanese civil war in 1860 was both a reflection of 
changing dynamics and loss of balance between local communities, combined with the 
incursions from regional and international actors, without which, she argues, “no war- 
and, hence, no peace—is feasible.”166 In this same vein, Makdisi has argued that the 
violent episodes between 1840-1860 were not  
symptomatic of the failure of a nation or nationalism but as an expression of a 
new form of local politics and knowledge that arose in a climate of transition and 
reform in the mid-nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire and that laid the 
foundations for a (later) discourse of nationalist secularism.167   
 
These local politics and knowledge reflect a shift in international and regional 
engagement and attention on Mount Lebanon, combined with a modern Euro-Christian 
approach to understanding religious identity.  
The dynamic process of shifting the meaning of religious identity in Mount 
Lebanon drew on a Christian-Islamic civilizational narrative that had become a popular 
explanatory frame in the nineteenth century.  In the nineteenth-century, Makdisi argues, 
Lebanese society was opened to “Ottoman and European discourses of reform that made 
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religion the site of a colonial encounter between a self-styled ‘Christian’ West and what it 
saw as its perennial adversary, an ‘Islamic’ Ottoman Empire.”168 This pervasive modern 
narrative shaped, and was shaped by, Ottoman and European encounters in Mount 
Lebanon.  Religion thus “became the site of the colonial encounter in the Ottoman 
Empire in that European officials defined the parameters of reform through a 
modernization discourse couched in terms of a religious civilizational clash,”169 thus 
enshrining religious difference through these internal-external socio-political interactions.  
Makdisi goes on to argue that, “This encounter profoundly altered the meaning of 
religion in the multiconfessional society of Mount Lebanon because it emphasized 
sectarian identity as the only viable marker of political reform and the only authentic 
basis for political claims.”170 Thus, the result of these nineteenth-century dynamic 
interactions in Mount Lebanon set a new course for religious identity as a socio-political 
organizing force for the local population.    
Part of the European interest in the Mount Lebanon region stemmed from the 
European narrative of Mount Lebanon as a Christian enclave.171  In early encounters 
between Europeans and the local residents of Mount Lebanon, Europeans viewed 
Maronites as their brothers and sisters in faith, as Catholics loyal to the Roman Catholic 
Church, but as “nominal” Christians.  This desire to save local Catholics from themselves 
and from Ottoman powers, was used to justify further European involvement in the 
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region.  As Makdisi argues, “European insistence on essential differences between 
Christianity and Islam provided one of the key legitimating factors to their intervention in 
the Middle East.”172  European powers relied on an understanding that “real religion” is a 
matter of right beliefs- beliefs that were not, in the opinion of European visitors, 
sufficiently reflected in the Maronites and other Christians of Mount Lebanon.  Religious 
identities in Mount Lebanon- as elsewhere outside of Europe- were understood in much 
more material, rather than belief-centric, ways.  Thus, a modern Euro-Christian 
conceptualization of religion173 heavily shaped the early modern European interactions 
with the Christians of Mount Lebanon.  While Sunni and Shi’a Muslims were not a 
strong presence in Mount Lebanon, both Maronite and Druze elites interacted with them 
elsewhere, often in exploitative ways.  This history plays into the ways that the 
communities interacted when they did come into greater contact through the process of 
creating the Lebanese state.   
Throughout the nineteenth century, following the Tanzimat reforms and the 
surrounding changes in Mount Lebanon’s social and political dynamics, both Maronite 
and Druze populations began to prioritize religious community and identity above and 
beyond other forms of kinship with their neighbors.  Thus, over time, the ta’ifa, or sect, 
became the prevailing loyalty and mode of social order.174  This led to popular 
mobilization, sometimes in contradiction with the project of the elites.  According to 
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Makdisi, “The elites tried to project a stable and ordered vision of the religious nation, 
while popular elements sought to appropriate religious discourse for social liberation.”175  
Ruling powers created new organizational structures as part of the interplay between 
European colonial encroachment and Ottoman pushback.  
 It would be a mistake to stop here, however, and accept that through the 
skirmishes of the mid-1800’s, sectarianism became a static organizing force in Lebanon.  
The nature, and the very meaning, of sectarianism is itself always changing.  In this way, 
we see religious identity shifting as well, as it intertwines with the emergence of the sect.  
What Makdisi refers to as sectarianism in 1860 laid the groundwork for, but is not the 
same as, the sectarianism in the founding of Lebanon as a nation-state, or the 
sectarianism in the civil war, or immediately post-Ta’if, or in the present day.  And yet, 
the foundation is critical, as an “expression of a new form of local politics and 
knowledge”176 upon which sectarianism was built, manifesting itself in multiple forms 
from the late modern period to the present.  The Ottoman period, including the increased 
interaction with European powers in its later years, laid critical groundwork for the 
current sectarian structures and modes of religious identity and expression we see in 
Lebanon today, through the key “moments of groupness” found in the tensions, 
interactions and clashes outlined above.   
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Transitions to Statehood: Codifying Sectarianism  
 By 1864, Mount Lebanon had stabilized and was governed by an administrative 
council comprised of representatives from the Maronite, Druze, Greek Orthodox, Greek 
Catholic, Sunni Muslim and Shi’a Muslim communities. The Ottomans had established 
much of Lebanon as a Mutasarrifiya, a subdivision of the Vilayet, and this Mutasarrifiya 
was further broken down into districts.  The Mutasarrifiya of Lebanon was ruled by a 
Christian administrator, demonstrating the agreement between the French and the 
Ottoman authorities.177  Under this arrangement, Lebanon experienced what many have 
called the “Long Peace,”178 without much conflict to note. 
By the early 1860s, Maronite Christians had become a clear majority in Mount 
Lebanon, and were also becoming increasingly wealthier than the Druze population.179  
The years between 1860 and 1914 were characterized by further reform and 
modernization, and specifically, by growth in commerce and industry in the Middle East, 
which came along with increased population movement. 180  In the case of Lebanon, there 
was a large outflow of people, with an estimated 300,000 people leaving Lebanon (often 
for the Americas) by 1914.181 Beirut, however, grew in industry and in population, and 
Mount Lebanon became economically tied both to Beirut and to the European market.182  
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The balance of social power shifted further away from cultivators, toward those who 
owned or controlled land, and stratification increased between the wealthy and the poor.  
European cultural influence also rose, and Christian and Jewish populations in particular 
took to European styles of dress, differentiating them in a more visible way from Muslim 
populations in many parts of the state.183   
The decline of the Ottomans, particularly in light of the Russian defeat of the 
Ottomans in the war of 1877, brought both economic depression and a renewed desire for 
independence in Mount Lebanon.184 The Sykes-Picot Accords of 1916 divided up the 
Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces between the British and the French, with Lebanon 
falling to the French.  Thus, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire brought about the birth 
of Grand Liban (Greater Lebanon) in 1920; this was a result, in part, of Maronites 
petitioning the French mandate authority for such an arrangement.185  The European 
powers, and in particular the French, collaborated with Lebanese elites to forcibly create 
the Lebanese republic, under the French Mandate, in 1926.186  
Violent outbreaks followed the imposition of the French Mandate, as Greater 
Lebanon’s Muslim population in particular (though joined by some Maronites, and by 
other Lebanese Christian sects) rejected the legitimacy of the French Mandate and called 
for an independent Arab state or for Greater Lebanon to join with Syria.187  The French 
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Mandate nurtured sectarianism through both politics and culture.  Under the mandate, the 
French worked to control not only political institutions, but also undertook a campaign of 
cultural diplomacy, which required collaboration with local political and religious elites.  
Indeed, Lebanese religious councils, in collaboration with French authorities, served as 
censorship bodies for cinema and other forms of entertainment and culture.188   
As Jennifer Dueck has observed, the French government aimed (often 
unsuccessfully) to keep their political and cultural entrees separate; thus, they “relied 
almost exclusively on nongovernmental intermediaries for cultural interaction with the 
local population. These intermediaries included both religious and secular associations, 
which had diverse objectives and served different target populations.”189  The role of 
French cultural influence under the mandate supplemented political control and gave 
power to religious bodies in particular to vet and distribute various cultural artifacts.   
The founding constitution, which gave Maronite elites the most power, was later 
supplemented by the 1943 National Pact (al-Mithaq al-Watani), adopted as part of the 
process of Lebanese independence from European powers and often referred to as the 
unwritten constitution of Lebanon.190 This Pact divided power among the religious 
communities, giving the Maronites the presidency, the Sunnis the prime minister 
position, and to the Shi’a, the speaker of the Parliament, and these divisions of power and 
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position reserved for members of specific sects continue through the upper military 
positions to numerous other public service jobs. The activities and rights of citizens were 
tied to their religious communities, from personal status laws to political participation. 
Lebanese citizenship was thus defined by membership in a religious community.191   
The Pact also attempted to settle, though quite vaguely, the dispute between 
Muslims and Christians living in Greater Lebanon about whether Lebanon should 
embrace a distinct Phoenician heritage or Christian identity, or join the pan-Arabist 
movement that was emerging. The Pact indulged both, by asserting a unique Lebanese 
identity and heritage with an “Arab face.”192 Salloukh, et. al, note that there is dissonance 
between the text of the 1926 constitution and the spirit of the National Pact. The 
constitution elevates the power of the president above the other offices, while the Pact 
spread power more evenly between the government offices, and thereby between 
confessional groups.193 
Khalidi asserts that two factors explain the survival of the Pact in its early period.  
First, Lebanon was in the pre-modernization stage.  Second, the Lebanese leaders 
belonged to the same “ruling elites” of other Arab nations.194  As internal pressures of 
modernization and external pressures of other Arab nations escalated, however, the 1943 
Pact lost its ability to contain and control the Lebanese population. 
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This period of transition from the Ottoman Empire to a Lebanese state was critical 
in shaping new meanings and expressions of religious identity, which was becoming 
more subsumed into the sect.  Increased European involvement precipitated a stronger 
emphasis on religious identity and difference, as non-Muslim religious communities in 
particular benefitted from capitalizing in numerous ways on religious affinity with 
European powers. The Pact, by dividing power among the religious communities, 
formalized the emergence of the sect as the primary form of national belonging and 
participation.  
This critical period of nation-building, or creating the “imagined community” of 
Lebanon, solidified the religious community as a key organizing mechanism for the state 
and instituted religious community representation as the means through which 
individuals, as members of communities, gain access to the state.  These ways of 
structuring and imagining religious identity vis a vis the state played in many ways into 
the civil war that broke out in the mid-1970s in Lebanon, calling the possibility of 
national cohesion into question.   
  
1975-1990: Civil War 
 The literature on the causes of the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war offers multiple, 
contested views on the most salient contributing factors.  While some argued that internal 
issues, including socio-economic inequalities and rising poverty rates were most 
important, others have argued that intervening external factors, including the influx of 
Palestinians into Lebanon and the impact of other regional powers, including Syria, were 
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the more important contributing factors.195  Suffice it to say, a number of both internal 
and external dynamics were at play in Lebanon in the 1960’s and 70’s, and dramatic and 
sustained conflict broke out in 1975 that continued- on different fronts and between 
different actors- until the Ta’if Accord, put into effect in 1990.   
Income inequality and increased levels of poverty were a key contributing factor 
to the social unrest in Lebanon in the latter part of the twentieth century.  Carolyn Gates 
has argued that the development of “peripheral capitalism” in Lebanon, beginning in the 
nineteenth century, paved the way for multiple levels of inequality and unrest by the 
middle of the twentieth century.  Peripheral capitalism, in the case of Lebanon, is 
characterized by an external orientation (a capital economy built to fulfill the needs of 
imperial powers, rather than national interests), dependence on external entities and 
forces, and underdevelopment of the economic infrastructures within the country itself.196 
Gates argues that this form of economic development benefitted a small political-
bureaucratic elite while disenfranchising much of the rest of the population, and 
eventually led to,  
long-term unemployment or underemployment of the growing labour force, 
increasing socio-economic, regional and sectarian inequalities, large-scale 
emigration, dependence on volatile foreign conditions, discord and 
upheaval, inter alia.197  
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These combined factors contributed to communal inequalities and polarization as 
well, as there was a wide-spread perception that Christians were benefitting from this 
arrangement far more than the Muslim population.198 
This drastic wealth inequality and poverty rates by the 1960’s led to popular 
unrest and mobilization, for worker’s rights in the early 1970’s, especially in 1972 with 
the Ghandour strike, and with the Protein Company in 1975.199  Additionally, popular 
sectarianism revealed itself through the elite politics of 1975-1990:  
Whereas compromises between the elites were meant to divide power among 
different communities, they in fact divided power among the elites of various 
communities at the expense of the divided and disenfranchised majority.  Whereas 
the elites compromised in the hope of containing sectarian conflicts, many of the 
citizens used sectarianism to express their discontent with the product of elitist 
compromises.200   
 
Thus, Makdisi asserts, the sectarian politics and mobilization during the civil war 
was both between sects, as well as within, with communities mobilizing against their 
representative elites. 
Additionally, Salloukh, et. al., point to both the failure to manage “the inherent 
contradictions of Lebanon’s confessional politics,” and the fact that the state failed to 
maintain a monopoly over the use of legitimate violence as important contributing 
factors.201  The disruptive regional changes, including the creation of the United Arab 
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Republic in 1958 and the establishment of the PLO in 1964, which brought an armed 
Palestinian contingent to Lebanon, were also key contributing factors to the outbreak of 
civil war.202 
The role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the mass displacement of 
Palestinians throughout the region and the political mobilization of Palestinian leaders, is 
a critical factor in the lead-up to and ongoing dynamics of the Lebanese civil war.  As 
Samir Khalaf articulates,  
Palestinians were likewise [like Christian communities] threatened by the fear of 
being liquidated.  Lebanon, by the mid-seventies, was their last abode so-to-
speak.  It had become at the least their most strategic stronghold.  After the loss of 
its Jordan base, the PLO was more entrenched in Lebanon.203   
 
The first serious clashes in Beirut in the 1970s were between Palestinians and 
Christian militias,204 demonstrating the tension that the presence and power of Palestinian 
refugees and political-military elites brought to the already-strained Lebanese nation.  
Meanwhile, the Ba’thists were gaining power in the 1960s in both Iraq and Syria, and 
Beirut became an oasis for dissenters fleeing these countries.205 
 Several events are often considered flashpoints for the break-out of full-fledged 
war, including rioting that broke out during a Fishermen’s strike in Saida (opposing 
foreign capitalistic tampering with the local fishing industry) and killed Marouf Saad, a 
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very popular leader in Sidon.206   Just a couple months later, Pierre Gemayyel (leader of 
the Kata’ib party) was attending a new Maronite Church in Ain al-Rummaneh, a 
Christian area in east Beirut when four men present there were killed in a drive-by 
shooting.  That afternoon, a bus full of Palestinian militiamen returning from a parade 
drove through the same area and Christian militiamen attacked the bus, killing all the 
passengers, operating under the assumption that the Palestinian commandos were 
implicated the morning attack and were coming back for more.207  These incidents, 
serving as triggers within the larger context of internal and regional change and unrest, 
led political parties and existing militias to increase mobilization and recruitment, and to 
establish paramilitaries where they did not yet exist.208    
Salloukh, et. al., assert that, during the civil war, what were once confessional 
distinctions turned decidedly into sectarian fault lines.209  Sectarian militias and mass 
communications served to harden sectarian boundaries and narratives.  Khalaf observes 
that,   
Precipitously many of the original nonsectarian sources of unrest receded and the 
conflict began to acquire a life of its own and was deflected into directions 
unrelated to the initial sources of hostility.  The fighting also became bloodier and 
more belligerent as it evolved into a struggle over the ‘indivisible’ and more 
contentious principles of communal identity, cultural heritage, national 
sovereignty, pluralism, and sectarian coexistence.210  
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Khalaf refers to the war as a “’revolving-door’ of relentless cycles of violence, 
quite often provoked by ‘unidentified assailants.’”211  There were at least 186 factions at 
war in Lebanon by 1984,212 some more prominent and involved in more high-profile 
confrontations, with others playing more peripheral roles, and sectarian in-fighting 
increasing the number of players.  Interviewees referred to Lebanon’s “27 wars” that took 
place both between and within sects, as well as between neighborhoods, showing that a 
clean analysis of the civil war as strictly (or reductively) sectarian is inaccurate.213 
Indeed, as Marie-Joelle Zahar articulates, “The two warring factions are often labeled 
Christian and Muslim, but it is more accurate to describe them as pro- and anti-status 
quo.”214 
  Alliances and collaborations were always shifting.  While in the early part of the 
war, Shi’a in the South showed solidarity with the Palestinian guerrilla movement, this 
started the shift in the late 1970’s.215  Infighting among Shi’ites broke down primarily 
along the faultline between Amal and Hizbullah, formed in 1982 in response to the Israeli 
invasion and backed by Iran.216  Khalaf calls the Maronite militia “turf wars” the most 
ruthless, particularly between Samir Ja’ja (Geagea) and Michele Awn (Aoun).   
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Additionally, new Arab parties (including Ba’athists, Socialist, Arab Nationalist, 
among others) had begun recruiting in the 1950s and 60s, leading to increased affiliations 
with these parties among portions of the Lebanese population.217  Additionally, the PLO 
and the Lebanese National Movement formed an early alliance (in what some refer to as 
the “Two Years’ War” between 1975-76) around common interests.  Traboulsi observes 
that, “During the ‘Two Years’ War’, the Palestinian faction had invested in the project to 
impose the reforms of the LNM.  In this new phase of the war, the roles were reversed, 
with Lebanese factions mainly serving a Palestinian agenda.”218  Dynamics shifted with 
the withdrawal of Palestinian leaders in 1983 and the subsequent decline of the Sunni 
community’s prominence in political and military representation.219 
  The war had many casualties, beyond the estimated 71,328 killed and 97,184 
injured.220  The spatial dimensions of Lebanon were drastically affected, with huge 
numbers of people displaced through “sectarian cleansing” of certain areas- Traboulsi 
cites 157,500 Muslims and 670,000 Christians displaced over the course of the war221- 
and the erosion of common spaces for people from different sects to gather.222  Khalaf 
remarks, “The war did not only destroy common spaces.  It also encouraged the 
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formation of separate, exclusive, and self-sufficient spaces.”223 The homogenization and 
decentralization of social geography has had lasting effects on Lebanese society and 
politics.   
 The effects of the war included extreme psycho-social impacts on the Lebanese 
people, for whom fear and uncertainty became a given part of life throughout and 
following the war.  A 1983 survey demonstrated some of these effects, with 66% of 
respondents reporting that they had been compelled to take refuge in a shelter at some 
point over the duration of the war thus far, and 74% reporting some form of 
deprivation.224 Additionally, the war created its own infrastructure for many services that 
should have been provided by the state, developing a “war system” that has been 
perpetuated long after the war came to a formal end.225  The lasting effects of the war 
have continued far beyond the fighting itself.   
 Additionally, religious and sectarian identity took on new shapes and meanings 
through the course of the war.  Khalaf’s 1983 survey showed that 85% of respondents did 
not report a change in their religious practices, but did report increased confessional or 
sectarian identities.226  While religion was not a “root cause” of the Lebanese wars 
between 1975-1990, religion certainly played into the violence in a variety of ways.  One 
interviewee articulated that religion was heavily employed to justify violent actions 
during the war.  According to this former general, leaders needed to use theology to 
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justify what was going on, to control one’s “troup”, and to be the most compelling (and 
often extreme) voice for his people.227  He noted the way in which communal histories 
played into justifications for acts of violence during the war: 
I was a Maronite in my head, if you like. I was a Phoenician, which became 
somehow French.  My father’s history book- and I still have it- says in the 
beginning, ‘our ancestors, the Gauls.’ So somehow in the beginning a part of us 
was French. ...Jesus came to Tyre and Saida- do you know he walked here in the 
Bible? The Bible speaks of Lebanon 70 times...I needed data to back my critical 
options or opinions.228 
 
This sentiment was echoed by many Lebanese Maronites with whom I spoke; 
they grew up with a sense that Christians had a special connection to the land in Lebanon.  
Communal histories and religious language were utilized across sects to justify acts of 
violence and what was heralded as self-defense during the war.  Through the course of 
the 1975-1990 conflict(s), what it meant to be religious changed in a number of ways, 
interacting with other conflict dynamics.  Sectarian identities were hardened at different 
junctures, through the many moments of crystallizing and mobilizing group identities as 
conflictive.  
Traboulsi observes that,  “The war, partially the result of sectarian conflicts, was 
to become the crucible in which those sects were reproduced.”229  He goes on to argue 
that, “When the militias finally ‘cleansed’ their territories and came to control ‘their own 
people’ and run their affairs, pressure on the individual to define himself/herself in terms 
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of a unique social and cultural sectarian identity reached its climax.”230  Thus, the 
geographic and demographic changes throughout the war also came with a stronger 
bonding cohesion within communities, with increasingly extreme identifications with 
one’s sect and only one’s sect.   
It is important to note here the particular ways in which Lebanese religious 
communities are structured, in order to better understand the meaning of these hierarchies 
being socially and politically institutionalized in Lebanon.  The Maronite Christian 
community is in full communion with the Roman Catholic Church, and is led by the 
Maronite patriarch.  Bishops and clergy are under the leadership of the patriarch.  The 
highest level leader of the Sunni community in Lebanon is the grand mufti of the 
Republic of Lebanon, with other clergy (including local scholars, imams and judges) 
exercising spiritual and legal leadership at the local levels. Leadership of the Shi’a 
community is a bit more complicated, although certainly the Maronite and Sunni 
hierarchical structures are not without their own complexities.  While the Higher Shi’a 
Council is officially (state recognized) the leader of the Shi’a hierarchy, Hizbullah in 
particular (under the clerical guidance of Shaykh Fadlallah until his death in 2010) has 
asserted its leadership over the Shi’a community, particularly since 2006, even though it 
was not recognized as the clerical leadership of the Shi’a community by the 
government.231  The Druze have a spiritual leader, along with a political leader like the 
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other communities (which often have several persons vying to be the political 
representatives of the sects), the Greek Orthodox have an Archdiocese in Beirut led by a 
Metropolitan bishop, and the other religious communities have their own hierarchical 
structures as well, which often act in cooperation with (and are represented in) the 
government in various ways.   
The strong communal identities that were formed and institutionalized through the 
creation of the Lebanese state played into the way that war dynamics were interpreted 
and carried out.  While socio-economic factors, combined with the pressures of regional 
crises, were arguably the key factors leading to unsustainable societal frustration, 
violence was often carried out and seen through the les of sectarian division and power.  
The war itself continued to shape and harden increasingly politicized and militarized 
sectarian identities, reinforcing this frame as the war went on.   
 
Ta’if and Beyond: Reconstructing Peace in Lebanon 
The Ta’if Accord, which formally ended the war, was drawn up in the fall of 1989 
when Lebanese members of parliament met in Saudi Arabia, along with a number of non-
parliamentarian religious and sectarian leaders, but remained in a limbo state until the fall 
of 1990, when it was implemented by force.232  It was, in some sense, a new National 
Pact.  While it didn’t ultimately change the style of leadership, it did change some key 
mechanisms of the nation state, as well as replacing certain individuals with new 
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leadership.233  Salloukh, et. al., argue that Ta’if reinforced the sectarian order, 
consecrating sects “as the main pillars of political identity and mobilization in postwar 
Lebanon.”234 Additionally, Zahar notes that the members of parliament who were key in 
drafting and agreeing to Ta’if were not active conflict actors, but rather had been 
spectators of the war, more or less.235   
Specifically, Ta’if shifted balance of executive power from presidency to the 
Council of Ministers.  It’s restructuring of power also reflected the rising importance of 
Shi’a community & the strong role of Syria as “the postwar umpire of Lebanese 
affairs.”236 The Ta’if split seats in Parliament evenly between Muslims and Christians, 
divided among the various sects. Additionally, the writers of the Ta’if employed sectarian 
and clientelist calculations in the distribution of all major public posts.237  As was true 
with the 1943 Pact, the Ta’if acknowledged the (Maronite) President, the (Sunni) Prime 
Minister and the (Shi’a) Speaker of the Parliament as the primary representatives of all 
major demands raised by their sectarian communities, making each the foremost 
negotiator for each sect.238  
Khalaf points to the Ta’if as an unfulfilled agreement, writing in 2002 that, 
“Foremost, Ta’if embraced the principle of abolishing religious affiliation for filling all 
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government positions, yet few practical steps have been taken thus far to accomplish 
it.”239  This is still the case to this day.  Khalaf goes on to assert that,  
Ta’if does not constitute a paradigm shift or a radical departure from earlier 
attempts at political reform or conflict resolution.  Indeed, it embraces some of the 
deeply ingrained traditions and defining elements that have long sustained its 
political culture: its consociative attributes, and the ethos of no victor and no 
vanquished.240 
 
The Ta’if, then, returned Lebanon to a former version of itself without dealing 
with the underlying causes that led to or perpetuated the war.  This observation comports 
with Salloukh’s assertion that the Ta’if reinforces, and indeed furthers, the sectarian logic 
of Lebanon.   Salloukh argues that the Ta’if was a pact between sects, rather than 
between communities.  This is an important shift from the National Pact, which imagined 
the agreement as one between religious communities, represented by religious 
leadership.241  This shows the way in which religious communal identity had shifted since 
the mid-1940’s.  By the end of the civil war, sectarian identity had emerged as something 
that built upon, but was also distinct from, religious communities, as sects now had 
political leaders, often working in concert with more explicitly religious leaders. The 
meaning of religious identity in Lebanon changed through the civil war period, emerging 
from it as decidedly sectarian.  The Ta’if was an agreement among sects (with its quotas 
for each sect, among other elements), while the Pact was an agreement among 
confessions.242  This again demonstrates the close intertwinement of religious identity 
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and the emergence of sectarian politics.  Additionally, it is worth noting that some groups 
(Maronites, Shi’a, etc.) were seen as distinctly Lebanese, even if they were competitive 
for political voice, while others, such as the Armenian Christians and the Palestinians, 
were viewed as foreign. These dynamics played into the battles throughout the civil war.   
In leaving the dismantling of the sectarian system as a vaguely described goal for 
an undefined time in the future, the Ta’if “created a structural dilemma: recognizing the 
sectarian/political elite as custodians of the sectarian order while expecting them to 
reform it.”243  Zahar notes that, 
As was the case with the 1926 Constitution and the 1943 National Pact before it, 
Ta’if emphasized confessional compromise and inter-communal cooperation as 
temporary measures to facilitate transition to an integrated, non-confessional 
democracy; however, no steps were taken in the direction of a non-confessional 
regime. Rather, confessionalism became deeply institutionalized once again.”244 
 
Zahar goes on to observe that, “Although the Lebanese Civil War prompted a 
reformulation of the power-sharing formula, it did not question its fundamental logic,” 
and also avoided casting blame on any of the war actors, allowing militias to transform 
themselves into political fronts without expressing responsibility or remorse for actions 
during the war.  Many have noted Lebanon’s resilience in the midst of political crisis, 
regionally and internally, over the years since Ta’if.  This resilience, Zahar and Joy Aoun 
have asserted, is a negative one, prioritizing elite consolidation of power and control over 
democratic transition.245  
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Thus, while the Ta’if promised transition from sectarianism eventually, the post-
conflict rebuilding processes did not include any major steps in that direction. Many 
interview respondents commented that there was no formal or widespread reconciliation 
process after Ta’if.  War memories and histories set in in highly sectarian ways, and no 
war actors made any public admission of fault.246  Sectarianism was reinscribed through 
post-war institutions, including schools in particular. The war narratives, taught 
differently in different schools based on communal affiliation, and most often taught 
informally, rather than from textbooks, reinforced the idea of historical injustices for 
one’s sect.   
 Additionally, the Ta’if established Pax Syriana, which lasted until 2005.  This 
arrangement gave Syria the latitude to use political and military power to help keep 
Lebanon calm, and included Syrian efforts to limit the power of certain political parties, 
including Michele Aoun’s faction along with the Lebanese Forces, both of which had 
fought Syrian intervention in the last days of the war (though the LF did agree to the 
Ta’if eventually).247   It articulated a “distinct relationship” between Beirut and 
Damascus, and subsequently, Syria played an important role in Lebanese politics.248  
Christian political movements in particular expressed frustration with Syrian control, and 
developed political narratives in accordance with this position.   
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After the Ta’if, religious and sectarian identity has continued to shift in Lebanon.  
The assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, and the subsequent withdraw of 
Syria from Lebanon, made way for new political alliances and mobilization.  A number 
of street mobilizations pushing for Syria to leave Lebanon permanently, led to 
concentrated mass protests on March 8 (pro-Syria) and 14 (marking the “Cedar 
Revolution,” the date of the formal expulsion of Syria from Lebanon) of 2006.  These 
consolidated into two primary political alliances, reflected new political divisions along 
Sunni-Shi’a lines, with Christian parties represented in both political alliances.249  Some 
referred to the ideological battle of the Shi’a dominated March 8 Alliance (which was 
pushing for political change) and the Sunni-dominated March 14 Alliance (which was 
pushing for maintenance of the status quo in Lebanon) as a façade for the new Sunni-
Shi’a dynamics in the sectarian system.250  This led to militias reorganizing along 
sectarian lines, and to the “sectarian ghettoization” of urban neighborhoods and 
gerrymandering for the benefit of sectarian political blocs.   
Additionally, all of this played out against the backdrop of challenges to the 
army’s power as a national force, as became evident in the 2006 war with Israel.  The 
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2006 war, fought primarily between Israel and Hizbullah (though most would argue on 
behalf, and with the support, of Lebanon more formally), led to new dynamics, with a 
large number of Shi’a leaving the South to escape the attacks. Hizbullah’s strong 
performance in this war emboldened it to demand greater representation and power in 
Lebanon’s Council of Ministers.  Additionally, the alignment of the March 8 and 14 
political blocs with external powers251 was exacerbated when the uprisings began in Syria 
during the Arab Spring.252 
Salloukh, et. al., argue throughout their analysis of sectarianism that it is a well-
orchestrated and well-maintained system of social and political control,  
an ever-expanding but holistic complex ensemble, one that operates at the 
structural, institutional, and individual levels, and aims at entrenching and 
reproducing sectarian modes of subjectification and mobilization, while 
sabotaging challenges to the material underpinnings and ideological hegemony of 
the sectarian system.253   
 
As Hashemi and Postel have argued, it is authoritarianism, rather than theology, 
that has contributed primarily to sectarianization.254  The Ta’if Agreement did not change 
this, and indeed, after Ta’if, sectarian politics were reinforced and extended, even as 
sectarian belonging and alliances shifted in interaction with socio-political events.  As 
through the war itself, sectarian identities were shaped through the peace agreement, 
which paved the way for the further entrenchment of the sectarian system in Lebanese 
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life, prescribing the mechanisms through which religious life would be filtered, informed 
and constrained.   
 
Conclusion 
 This review of Lebanese socio-political history demonstrates the ways in which 
religious and communal identities were shaped by socio-political dynamics, or moments 
of groupness, over time.  Sectarianism was never a given or intrinsic way of thinking 
about religious identity or organizing society, but rather was formed and hardened 
through the socio-politics of Lebanese history, including the ways in which the state has 
related to subjects (or citizens) through the filter of group identity. This, in turn, shaped 
the ways in which conflict and identity were articulated and the sticking power of 
communal identity politics.  Religion is instrumental in Lebanon in that it happens to be 
the way that otherwise “typical” conflict drivers are framed, but religious identity is in 
and of itself changed through these dynamics.  The group boundaries are fluid, but they 
still exist and are helping define particular groups in particular ways for particular times.  
These boundaries then extend beyond the course of active conflict- again, not in some 
static, consistent way—and remain part of the “problem” for peacebuilders, even if we 
concur that Lebanese conflict was not “about” religion.  Engaging religion in trying to 
build sustainable peace in Lebanon is deeply connected to the dynamics outlined thus far 
in this chapter, as the religion in Lebanon that peacebuilding actors are engaging today is 
a product of this particular socio-political history. 
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Chapter 4:  Engaging Religion in Lebanese Peacebuilding 
Lebanon’s civil war came to an end with the Ta’if Agreement, and yet, Lebanese 
society and politics remains in dysfunction in numerous ways.  The effects of the war 
have extended well beyond the end of the war itself, and many observers have attributed 
the divisions and dysfunction to Lebanon’s communalism.  Thus, there have been 
numerous peacebuilding approaches in the last several decades in Lebanon that draw 
upon religion in some way, whether explicitly or implicitly.   The goal of this chapter is 
not to evaluate the initiatives themselves, or even their net impact, but rather to identify 
and differentiate the approaches to religious peacebuilding in Lebanon, how they imagine 
the role of religion in conflict and peacebuilding in their work, and pull out trends to 
analyze how these approaches imagine religion and intersect with social cohesion in 
Lebanon more broadly.  
 
Mapping Religious Peacebuilding in Lebanon 
The field of peacebuilding initiatives that engage religion can be sub-divided in a 
number of ways: engaging elites vs. grassroots; seeking common citizenship vs. inter-
religious or inter-sectarian understanding; changing social perceptions vs. changing 
institutions.255  Of course, these categories are not mutually exclusive of one another.  
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Some are focused on harnessing the power and authority of religious elites to win hearts 
and minds for peace and unity.  These range from elite-level religious dialogues to NGO 
engagement of grass-tops religious leaders to further local and regional peacebuilding 
and development projects.   
Some initiatives, which will be more explicitly outlined below, focus on creating 
interactions between “regular people” (often with a focus on youth) that challenge or 
provide a counterpoint to sectarian segregation- this is seen in the programmatic work of 
Adyan and other similar programs.  These people-to-people initiatives include programs 
where individuals from different sects go together to a neutral environment for a given 
period of time, to get to know one another and to break stereotypes.  Some of these 
programs involve ongoing efforts to create opportunities for interaction in people’s 
everyday lives.   Some initiatives explicitly do not overtly name or discuss sectarian 
identities, but bring people from different backgrounds together to work together on 
projects for the common good.  
 Some, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), tend to engage 
religion as an instrumental good- engaged as a means to an end- while others see 
religious ideologies and practices as much more integrally intertwined with social 
conflict and therefore seek to engage religion on a deeper and more holistic level, as seen 
in the programmatic approaches of Hayya Bina, although these cross into the 
                                                                                                                                            
War, Peaceworks 55 (January 2006), accessed April 20, 2017, 
https://www.usip.org/publications/2006/01/religious-contributions-peacemaking-when-religion-brings-
peace-not-war; Katherine Marshall, “Interfaith Journeys: An Exploration of History, Ideas, and Future 
Directions,” Georgetown University: World Faiths Development Dialogue (February 2017), accessed April 
20, 2017, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/interfaith-journeys-an-exploration-of-history-
ideas-and-future-directions; and Omer, et. al, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and 
Peacebuilding. 
 118 
instrumental at times as well.  Some involved see it as a “sideshow.” In fact, many of the 
people deeply involved in long-term dialogue efforts see it as totally unconnected to 
impacting the actual conflict dynamics.  However, some argued that you have no choice 
but to work with religious actors in Lebanon, stating that trying to overlook this reality is 
a sort of “colorblindness.”  One respondent stated that, “if someone wants really to bring 
change in a society, namely here in the Lebanese society, he or she cannot overlook 
sometimes the overwhelming role played by be it religious institutions or from a more 
theological...by clerics...Religion is something that is too serious to be entrusted to 
clerics.”256 Thus, for some, religious engagement is not a choice but a necessity.  
Some actors are focused on changing individual and communal relationships (as 
seen in most of the dialogue groups) and some (such as Adyan) on identifying and 
building upon shared beliefs or common values, while others are more focused on 
changing institutions.  The numerous and varied efforts all aim to make a better Lebanon, 
but articulate different visions of what “better” looks like for Lebanon, and take different 
approaches to doing interfaith or religiously engaged peacebuilding work.  While 
respondents had different opinions on whether religion is simply instrumental or more 
integral to conflict dynamics in Lebanon, the vast majority agreed that one cannot do 
peacebuilding work in Lebanon without engaging with religious leaders in some way 
(which is not the same as, but often overlaps with, interfaith peacebuilding efforts): 
Religious people in this country are part of the social fabric so we want them 
present at the table when we’re talking about some of these things.  Now some 
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groups don’t like that- those groups want not to involve religious leaders, let’s 
keep them out of the realm of politics or whatever it is.  But the truth of the matter 
is that in this country, they have a very strong economic influence, they have a 
very strong moral influence, and they are at the heart of the social network and the 
social fabric.  And as long as the laws don’t change, they have a strong legal 
influence because they are in charge of the family courts.257   
 This reflection points to the important and intersectional ways religious leaders 
assert and maintain authority in Lebanon; their influence is not limited to spiritual matters 
or even to matters of personal and family status laws, but rather spans well beyond these 
into other social and political spaces as well as into the economic sector.  It is thus 
impossible to separate out religious life in Lebanon from other aspects of life, as the 
institutions and leaders themselves are so deeply entrenched throughout the social, 
political and economic ecosystem.   
A number of differences in methods, theories of change, and ultimate goals 
emerged through my interview conversations.  Some explained the key problem as the 
lack of knowledge of the religious other.  This interviewee stated that, “...in a country that 
has a number of religious identities, not knowing the other becomes obviously a 
hurdle.”258 For many, this includes knowing both the people who identify with that 
religious community, as well as the content (beliefs, practices, and so on) of the religions 
themselves.  Others identified the problem as the sectarian system itself, and the sectarian 
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identity categories maintained therein.  One practitioner working in inter-religious 
dialogue articulated the mission of their organization as working to  “protect the religion 
from politicians [and see to it] that religion is not being misused by others.”259  Many 
named corruption and the lack of a strong central government as the key problems, noting 
that elites utilize and play upon religious difference to distract from these root problems 
that Lebanon is facing.   
Within this context of diverse approaches to religion and peacebuilding in 
Lebanon, two key peacebuilding tracks emerged.  The elite-led (or, alternatively, elite-
stamped) approach, on the one hand, most often seeks to uphold communal 
representation/boundedness and articulates a concept of peace that prioritizes unity and 
cooperation between these distinct communities.  The grassroots approach, on the other 
hand, more often looks to dismantle communal identity politics, prioritizing individual 
human rights and justice over unity between communities as such.  This is not surprising, 
as elites across the board have more to gain, while ordinarily citizens have more to lose, 
through reforms of the sectarian system itself.  These approaches to peacebuilding often 
overlap and are intertwined with one another, but this difference in posture reveals some 
of the key challenges for those who want to leverage religion for peacebuilding in the 
Lebanese context.   
 Both approaches articulated above (elite- and grassroots-led) draw upon a similar 
toolbox of methods.  Many utilize dialogues between people from different groups, acting 
either as individuals or as representatives of their communities.  Additionally, several 
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initiatives work to explicitly engage religious leaders, at regional, national, and local 
levels, to help bolster projects/programs or to directly quell violence, through public 
speeches or publications.260  Others focus on history and war memories, working to create 
common understandings of what happened in the civil war across sectarian divides.   
 Among the elite inter-religious networks, one key player is the National 
Committee for Christian-Muslim Dialogue.  One interviewee who has been engaged as a 
communal leader in the national dialogue since during the civil war described to me what 
he called the first Lebanese Christian-Muslim religious summit, held in Kuwait in 1989, 
at the bequest of a committee of the Arab League.261  According to my respondent, all of 
the religious leaders were asked to go to Kuwait to meet with the Arab committee 
appointed to help negotiate an agreement on the war.  18 of the religious leaders went, all 
on the same flight and staying at the same conference center.  Some wanted to leave 
early, but this interviewee said that he then piped up, saying that if the religious leaders 
left now, it would be easy for the outside world to describe the Lebanese war as a 
religious war.  Instead, this interviewee agreed to draft a statement, to which all the 
leaders signed on the next day.  The statement condemned the civil war, said explicitly 
that it is not a religious war, and asserted that Christians and Muslims want to live 
together in peace and do not give “any sort of cover to any of the militias in Lebanon”, 
                                                
260 This is a common approach among peacebuilding and development actors because research has shown 
that religious leaders and institutional voices (through speeches, publications, and the like) have a strong 
impact on either inspiring or tamping down on expressions of violence. See, for instance, Timothy D. Sisk, 
ed., Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2011).  
261 “Arab League Panel Opens Talks on Lebanon Crisis,” Los Angeles Times, February 22, 1989, accessed 
May 31, 2017, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-02-22/local/me-253_1_arab-league 
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urging a political settlement from the Arab league.262  This, the interviewee claimed, was 
the first Christian-Muslim agreement in Lebanon, and it helped pave the way for the Ta’if 
agreement.  In 1993, after Ta’if, many of the same actors reconvened for the second 
Lebanese Christian-Muslim Summit and decided to form a national committee.  This was 
the birth of the National Committee for Christian-Muslim Dialogue.   
Another notable initiative is the Arab Group for Muslim-Christian Dialogue, 
which is involved in regional interfaith relationship building, in order to, according to one 
respondent, move “towards a better understanding of the religious other and [to 
strengthen] our interfaith dialogue and interfaith work.”263  Part of the work of this group 
is to equip religious communities with tools to, in the words of one of the leaders, 
“protect our communities from what happens outside,”264 demonstrating a sense of 
solidarity among those sects or political groups seen as Lebanese (rather than foreigners) 
to resisting external dynamics that would throw off the equilibrium within Lebanon.  This 
respondent went on to note that the events invoking or involving religion in the world 
beyond the Levant has a strong impact on internal religious self-identity and 
relationships.  For instance, the reactions to the Danish cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohammed rippled through Lebanon and Syria,265 and thus one of the dialogues this 
                                                
262 Author interview with Respondent 9, July 3, 2015. 
263 Author interview with Respondent 2, July 7, 2015.  
264 Author interview with Respondent 2, July 7, 2015.  
265 Though the “ripple” was much more complex than portrayed in Western media, with clerics in Lebanon 
working to quell the violence, and some protests were not necessarily organic, as many have argued that the 
Syrian government played an important role in fostering the violent protests in Damascus. See Irwin Arieff, 
“Syria disputes US charges it incited cartoon mobs,” Free Republic February 25, 2006, accessed February 
21, 2017,  http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1585196/posts?page=2. It is important to note here 
 123 
group put together was between Danish and Arab people from different faith 
backgrounds.   
 A plethora of NGOs work at the grassroots level to improve inter-religious or 
inter-sectarian relationships.  Some are local (created and run by Lebanese nationals), 
while others are bilateral (primarily European or America), regional, or international.  As 
one respondent noted, “Many NGOs are being created more and more to deal with this 
issue, to bring people together- Muslims and Christians, and now more to brings together 
Sunni and Shi’a; [the Sunni-Shi’a division] is now really worrying for everyone, 
especially the minorities in the area because if anything happens in Lebanon it will spread 
all over.”266  Grassroots-focused NGOs are numerous and continue to increase, saturating 
the scene with programs and initiatives.   
While these initiatives have focused primarily on engaging elite religious clerics, 
those involved in these efforts reported skepticism about how effective they are in 
promoting widespread, sustainable cohesion within Lebanon.  As one respondent said, 
“They have no power, in the end.  So, each one of them represents officially the religious 
leadership of his own sect in this dialogue committee and they are well-known in this 
field…[but] they are preaching to believers.”267  Some noted that this is indeed the goal: 
“From a religious point of view, the solution is not from communities dialoguing, but 
                                                                                                                                            
that sometimes vague references to “outside influences” in Lebanon is a cover for critiques of Saudi or 
Iranian influences in particular.  
266Author interview with Respondent 1, July 2, 2015. 
267 Author interview with Respondent 1, July 2, 2015. 
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from an intra-community dialogue.”268 Thus, the intra-community education and 
discussions are where some see the most promise, as the “ambivalence” of any religious 
tradition leaves much room for divergence of approach within each religious community, 
and much of the strife emerges from internal battles for representativity or power, for 
asserting the most “true” face of a given religious tradition.   
Indeed, several respondents pointed to the increasing importance of work in intra-
religious dialogue, within the context of religious institutions: “We’re dealing with a 
system of values and norms, but [we are] also dealing with institutions [when working 
with religion]..the value systems promoted by these religious systems are failing and if 
we don’t engage religion in peacebuilding then it will turn against us.”269  Another noted 
that intra-religious work has to come first, as Christians and Muslims in Lebanon are both 
largely ignorant about their own religions.  This respondent posited that Daesh/ISIS has 
given the Lebanese Muslim community an opportunity to return to the text and to intra-
religious learning and examination.270 
 The biggest division that emerged from my interviews was between the grassroots 
and elite-centered approaches, with the former focusing on institutional change as a 
means of achieving justice, while the latter focuses heavily on achieving and maintaining 
consensus, which often means shying away from challenging the institutional status quo.  
While the ambivalence of religion allows room for difference in expressing any given 
                                                
268 Author interview with Respondent 10, July 9, 2015. 
269 Author interview with Respondent 7, May 5, 2015. 
270 Author interview with Respondent 14, July 8, 2015. 
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tradition in a way that promotes peace or violence, another dimension emerges here, as 
religion can be mobilized toward maintaining or challenging the status quo.  This divide 
runs through the peacebuilding infrastructure, and thus while numerous organizations are 
technically working in the same space (that of “peacebuilding”), their perspectives, goals 
and methods are vastly different.  
  
The Religious Peacebuilding Infrastructure  
 One key legacy of the civil war is a strong NGO infrastructure in Lebanon.  
Numerous international organizations have set up camp in Beirut and beyond, with a 
strong ongoing United Nations presence; this reality both supports and complicates 
locally-led efforts at peacebuilding work.  The NGO infrastructure in Lebanon drives 
many of the peacebuilding initiatives that engage religion, explicitly or implicitly, and 
thus a survey of a selection of these organizations will help to flesh out and ground the 
analysis of this work.   
 One major NGO working at both the grassroots as well as institutional levels is 
Adyan, which means religions in Arabic.  Founded in 2006, and officially registered in 
2008, by Christian and Muslim Lebanese leaders, the organization works through a 
number of programs to tackle the persistent sectarian division in Lebanon.  This 
organization works through youth clubs for co-existence, citizenship curriculum 
development and implementation in partnership with the Ministry of Education271, and 
                                                
271 The National Charter for Education on Living Together, developed by Adyan, was officially introduced 
in partnership with the Ministry of Education in 2013 and is being implemented in stages, with the goal of 
this curriculum eventually being adopted country-wide. See 
www.adyanvillage.net/Content/uploads/Resource/140305104646765.pdf, accessed October 22, 2016. 
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other programs for bringing Lebanese together into a shared understanding of and 
commitment to citizenship.  Adyan maintains strong partnerships with international 
organizations and governments, and while their work in Lebanon is primarily conducted 
in Arabic, they have a strong English language web presence, suggesting an outward-
facing orientation, along with the inward-facing work.   
Our Unity Is Our Salvation (Wahdatouna Khalasouna) is an NGO collective 
working through a number of sectors on advancing civil peace.  It has member 
organizations working on environmental issues, women’s rights, and a number of other 
issues, all with the aim of increasing peace in Lebanese society through a multi-sectoral 
approach, according to … their website? Charter?.  Together, this collective will make 
calls to religious clergy to “quiet down their followers,” among the many other activities 
of this group.272 
Hayya Bina works on grassroots peacebuilding through a number of efforts, 
integrating clerics within other programs (e.g., teaching English to lower income women 
without access to formal education opportunities) when possible.  They also work to 
directly engage clergy through a program called “clerics without borders”, bringing 
clergy together around the ideas of peace and justice.  Another grassroots organization is 
Fighters for Peace, which involves ex-fighters speaking in schools and universities, as 
well as putting together public press conferences addressing people who are considering 
joining violent factions, in order to dissuade them. 
                                                
272 Author interview with Respondent 1, July 2, 2015. 
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Several NGOs focus primarily on youth.  Offre Joie has been bringing youth from 
different sects together through summer camps, solidarity actions, and joint service 
projects since its emergence in 1985, five years prior to the Ta’if.  For example, under 
this NGO’s banner, youth and adults from different religious groups recently came 
together to rebuild a mosque in Tripoli that had been attacked.273  The Forum for 
Development, Culture, and Dialogue (FDCD), which is considered the youth arm of the 
Arab Group for Muslim-Christian Dialogue, works on peacebuilding and conflict 
resolution through yearly work and study camps, bringing together youth from across the 
globe.274 This organization also works on citizenship projects across the Arab world, 
prioritizing equality and women’s rights, among other issues, in their workshop 
curriculum.  Much of their work recently has focused on Syria, rather than Lebanon.  
Another group, Groupement Libanais d’Amitié et de Dialogue Islamo-Chretien 
(GLADIC) was founded in 2012 with the stamp of approval from the Lebanese Ministry 
of interior and municipalities.  Its flagship program, called Christian Islamic Living 
Together, is conducted through the University of Saint Joseph to introduce 16-18 year-
olds to inter-religious dialogue in coordination with public and private schools.  
Many respondents working on the levels of grassroots and grasstops noted the 
important roles local clerics play in quelling outbreaks of violence.  On this front, the 
FDCD has taken on an evaluation of the sermons, media statements, fatwas, and the like, 
of clerics in Syria and Lebanon.  They intend to hold workshops for clerics when the 
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274 Author interview with Respondent 2, July 7, 2015. 
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research portion of the project is complete, to look at the results and consider how they 
might adjust their public speech to advance peace.  There are several projects underway 
to engage clergy to produce speech and writing that promotes peace and unity, for their 
own religious constituencies and for the consumption of the broader public.  This is 
important in a context where clerics are free from state control of their sermon topics 
(which is not the case in some other national contexts in the Arab region, like the Gulf, 
where states dictate what religious leaders can and cannot speak about).   
While some organizations do not explicitly focus on inter-religious dialogues or 
relationship-building, many do intentionally engage religious leaders in development and 
peacebuilding projects in various ways.  This is true for several international 
organizational efforts, including Catholic Relief Services and UNDP, among others.  
Through track-two dialogues in high conflict areas in Lebanon, UNDP engages 
influential religious leaders and works to build strong networks for conflict mitigation, 
involved religious and community leaders.  For example, they worked with the Sunni 
Mufti of Baalbeck and Hermel on reconciliatory initiatives between families of killed or 
abducted soldiers from different sects.275  Additionally, one respondent noted a “charter 
of honor”, signed by religious officials, political actors, and members of parliament from 
Baalbeck and Hermel in September 2014, denouncing violence and pledging cross-
sectarian solidarity.  One example of the outcome of this effort was a beheaded Sunni 
                                                
275 Muzna al-Masri, “Between Local Patronage Relationships and Securitization: The Conflict Context in 
the Bekaa Region,” Lebanon Support & UNDP Conflict Analysis Report (January 2015) 25; Author 
interview with Respondent 4, July 3, 2015. 
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man’s family travelling to pay condolences to the family of a beheaded Shi’a soldier.276  
This is a critical display of solidarity in a culture that places great value on condolences, 
thus demonstrating the important ways that cultural norms intertwine with expressions of 
religious difference and solidarity.   
Another ongoing approach of a number of NGOs and religious institutions 
involves public collective displays of unity.  A local NGO, Adyan, has led a symbolic 
spiritual solidarity day, which moves locations around the country from year to year, 
since 2007.  Additionally, NGOs successfully pushed for Lebanon to adopt the 
Annunciation of Mary as a national shared Christian-Muslim holiday, and a number of 
groups and religious institutions work together to put on public celebrations of this 
holiday.  The National Committee for Christian-Muslim Dialogue was involved in 
making this official ask of the government, and now, one respondent noted, “Lebanon is 
now the only country in the world that brings together Muslims and Christians on that 
day...everybody participates, even the Druze.”277 Several interviewees spoke of the heavy 
emphasis placed on public symbolic displays of unity, including joint prayers, joint 
position statements on specific issues, joint marches for peace, and joint symbolism.278   
 Several NGOs and universities have taken up work to create and disseminate a 
shared narrative of the Lebanese war.  Speaking about the importance of re-creating 
shared war memories for the next generation, one respondent stated, “I am 60 and I lived 
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the civil war, and nobody is going to change my mind regarding my reading of that war.  
But it would be very helpful for those who are 30 and younger, a unified reading- just a 
series of events- should have been available.”279  The Lebanese Renaissance Foundation 
developed what it heralds as an objective research study on casualties of the war (drawing 
on newspaper reports) and disseminated it at universities, but this had little traction, in 
part due to the massive amount of work that was still needed to complete the research and 
to make it easily accessible to others.  Actors focused on this approach argue that 
developing shared war narratives across sects (including a common understanding of the 
level of casualties across all communities) is one of the key ways Lebanese will be able 
to build social cohesion across sectarian boundaries into the future: if there is a shared 
sense of history and pain.   
Some groups articulate the goal of their work as trying to re-infuse sectarian 
identities with religion, arguing that sectarianism is religion without the spiritual, value-
driven content.  Thus, adding back in the spiritual content will save sectarianism from 
being used as a divisive political tool.  Particularly in locations where religious language 
has been used to invoke or justify violence or enmity towards an “other”, such as 
incidents and ongoing clashes framed in terms of sect over the last couple of years in 
Tripoli and in the Bekaa valley,280 practitioners are finding it critical to have religious 
leaders and language as part of the solution.  These practitioners will argue for religious 
                                                
279 Author interview with Respondent 8, July 2, 2015. 
280 See https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/world/middleeast/a-sectarian-wedge-pushes-from-
syria-into-lebanon.html and http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0515/Sectarian-
violence-in-Lebanon-echoing-Syria-s-conflict for examples (accessed February 21, 2017). Violence in 
both areas has come in waves, rather than being a constant, and it has been framed in sectarian terms by 
both news coverage and by perpetrators of the violence.  
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literacy (knowing one’s own religious texts, etc.) as an essential part of the approach to 
peacebuilding.  Those arguing for this approach talk about how religious literacy helps to 
“re-infuse” the tribal model of religious identity with spiritual substance, which many 
referred to as the “real” religion.  Those advocating for this approach would argue that 
the challenge is less about knowing about the religion of the Other, though many would 
argue that this is also important, and more about having a more multidimensional- and 
“full”- understanding of one’s own religious identity.         
A majority of respondents agreed that “religion is not the real problem” and 
asserted that faith or spirituality is something different entirely than religion as we see it 
in the public square in Lebanon. While most interviewees thus saw religion as 
instrumental in conflict- as a tool utilized and manipulated by politicians, rather than the 
problem in and of itself - a few saw it as more intricately tied up in the conflict dynamics. 
As one interviewee, a former general in a Christian militia during the civil war, put it, 
It’s not faith that is the source of conflict, it’s religion-- by religion, I mean the 
social and political and identity and rite things of the faith- that are the source of 
the troubles...we become tribes more than sects even, we think as tribes and we 
act as tribes.281 
I understand this interviewee to be referring to religion in its institutionalized 
form, considering faith to be something different- something more pure. The problem, 
according to another interviewee, is when “religion became ideology….the faiths have no 
religion- it is a question of the human being about life, about the sense of the world, and 
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have have many response about this question...religion are human institutions” that 
created societal chaos and disunity.282  Understanding how those who work in the field of 
religious peacebuilding in Lebanon conceptualize the relationship between religion and 
conflict, helps to shed light upon the theoretical underpinnings of the various approaches 
to engaging religion in peacebuilding efforts.   
 There is no shortage of programs and initiatives to engage religion for 
peacebuilding in Lebanon.  Indeed, one respondent noted that the field is in a state of 
saturation: “In Lebanon, we have a kind of overdose...a state of saturation.  In a sense 
there is so much people dialoguing and at the same time the level of tension- and I’m not 
just talking about clashes in the street or theatrical clashes- the level of tension and the 
increase in the identitarian, the religious identities, is so high that where we are today is 
this kind of [saturation].”283  This saturation, however, has not produced social cohesion 
across Lebanon, and it is notable that this is a reality shared by Bosnia, where the post-
conflict “peacebuilding wonderland” has also saturated the field with numerous efforts to 
engage religion in peacebuilding, with limited results to show at national scale.   
 
Assessing Lebanese Social Cohesion 
Given the multiple approaches and plethora of programs and initiatives aiming to 
improve religious literacy, build better relationships between people and communities, 
engage clergy to promote messages of unity and peace, and reform curriculum in the 
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school systems to inculcate a shared national narrative and vision, one might imagine that 
social cohesion in Lebanon would be improving- if gradually- over time.  However, my 
interviews along with World Values Survey data and several recent studies of Lebanon 
tell a different story than the one that might be expected. Both vertical and horizontal 
measures of cohesion and trust are very low, as demonstrated by the data that follows.   
The most recent World Values Survey was conducted in Lebanon between 2010-
2014, and thus reflects opinions and sentiments from this time frame, which have likely 
shifted over the last several years, given the increased intensity and spillover from the 
Syrian war.  The data shows that Lebanese are nearly evenly split on whether they trust 
people of another religion,284 showing a fairly high level of horizontal distrust. 
Vertical distrust was also high, with many noting that confidence in the 
government is extremely low, with only 22.7% of respondents expressing “a great deal” 
or “quite a lot” of confidence in the government.285  The data showed sectarian divides 
when it comes to feelings of national pride or belonging. Overall, 79.6% of those 
surveyed said they are proud of their nationality; however, this number was much lower 
for Roman Catholics286, at 46.2%, showing a sectarian divide in feelings of national 
                                                
284  World Values Survey (Wave 6 2010-2014), World Values Survey Association, accessed February 22, 
2016, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp.  The religious categories were 
limited to Muslim (generic), Orthodox, Protestant, Roman Catholic, Other/not specific, or no answer, and 
thus while some of the data shows trust levels between sects (for the Christians), the rest of the data is not 
broken down further into inter-sectarian (rather than broadly inter-religious) categories.   
note that the question explicitly asked about people of another religion, not people of another sect.  
285 World Values Survey (Wave 6 2010-2014). 
286 The World Values Survey (Wave 6) uses the following religious categories for their data analysis in 
Lebanon: Muslim, Orthodox, Other/not specific, Protestant, Roman Catholic, or no answer. This is, of 
course, a key limitation on the survey since these categories do not accurately map onto the religious 
groups present in Lebanon (including the very important lack of differentiation between different Muslim 
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pride.  Higher levels of pride in nationality correlated with higher levels of importance of 
religion.  This suggests that perhaps a stronger sense of religious identity is seen by many 
as an integral component of what it means to be Lebanese- to be part of a “community of 
communities.”  One’s bonding cohesion with one’s own religious group correlates with a 
sense of nationalism, but not necessarily with a sense of bridging (cross-sectarian) 
cohesion, which is not seen as necessary to Lebanese nationalism.   
Similarly, high levels of people surveyed agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement, “I see myself as part of the nation,” but Catholics were much lower on this, at 
46.2%.  Again, importance of religion in life correlated with higher levels of considering 
oneself part of the nation, though it is worth noting that Maronites in general tend to 
consider religion quite important.  I would point to this as a key outcome of how 
Maronite identity developed within the Arab context, with a need to hold tight to 
religious identity as a way of differentiating from the surrounding culture. 
The data also revealed that religion in Lebanon means different things to different 
people (as is the case anywhere else), and that Lebanese do not self-identify as 
particularly religious.  This may come as a surprise to people who see the strong role 
sectarian identities play in politics and social life, but for many, these two realities are not 
in conflict, but rather see the decline in religiosity as an outgrowth of the politicization of 
religious identity through sectarianization. This reveals a key feature of the sectarian 
system in Lebanon: religious identity is high, while religious practice may not necessarily 
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correlate, and may indeed be quite low.  This is one reason many interview respondents 
asserted that Lebanon needs more religion, not less.   
Additionally, geographic segregation is an ongoing reality, and while many hoped 
after the war to return Christians to the “Muslim areas” and Muslims to the “Christian 
areas”, this did not happen fully.  As one respondent noted,  “Although the Christians in 
the Chouf could get back their lands and what was left of their houses, they never came 
back seriously.  The go for weekends, in summer mainly.  They don’t feel yet 
comfortable enough because nothing serious was done.”287  And since 2005-2008, “we 
see a sectarian cleansing not done by force, but by the environment.”288  Further 
geographic segregation has taken place since 2008.  This contributes to a lack of social 
cohesion, as there are few organic opportunities for cross-sectarian interaction and 
relationship-building.  Most of these opportunities must be constructed, and are thereby 
often “opt-in,” limiting their impact to a very small segment of society.    
Generational dynamics also suggest that social cohesion is actually worsening 
with time, rather than improving among younger generations. Many interviewees noted 
that the older generations are actually more willing to engage in dialogue, because they 
have memories of Lebanon before the civil war, which they describe as a Lebanon that 
didn’t prioritize people’s religious identities.  This observation challenges the idea that 
                                                
287 Author interview with Respondent 1, July 2, 2015. It is important to note here that the Chouf mountains 
are primarily seen as Druze territory, though there are indeed many Christian families that have homes in 
the area; however, the idea of being able to “go back” may have less to do with sectarian segregation and 
lack of comfort, and more to do with the fact that economic shifts are such that professional opportunities 
in the Chouf are quite limited. Thus, multiple factors are at play in these geographic and demographic 
shifts.  
288 Author interview with Respondent 1, July 2, 2015. 
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sectarian boundaries were hardened prior to the war and led to the violence; rather, it was 
through both the actual experience of the war, and the subsequent creation of war 
narratives and histories that the sectarian divides were truly generated and solidified.  
While, as discussed above, the battles during the 1975-1990 often did not reflect clean 
sectarian boundaries, the war narratives that are prevalent in post-war life do.  One 
respondent asserted, “maybe we could focus on tomorrow’s Lebanon, not the past,” 
questioning the effectiveness of the focus on re-making war memories.289   
On this note, many respondents noted that youth consciousness of sectarianism is 
worse than the older generation, according to many, “because we did not tackle the issue 
of the memory.  We did not work on improving reconciliation.  We did not bring youths 
together.  They might sit next to one another in pubs or universities, but it’s not social 
living together.  It’s coexistence- and I hate that word.  It’s either living together or 
nothing.”290  For example, many Christian students at American University of Beirut, for 
instance, which is in an area (Hamra) seen as predominately Sunni Muslim, had never 
before been to a predominately Muslim area of Lebanon, and the fact that most students 
commute rather than residing on campus limits the ability of university life to provide 
deeper and more sustained opportunities for cross-sectarian relationship-building.  
Additionally, several university-affiliated respondents attested to the fact that campus 
politics mimic the sectarian system.291  Rather than running for campus posts as 
                                                
289 Author interview with Respondent 22, March 12, 2015. 
290 Author interview with Respondent 1, July 2, 2015. 
291 Author interview with Respondent 15, July 1, 2015. 
 137 
individuals, there are electoral lists, which mimic the existing political blocs, if not 
publicly then implicitly.   
It is important to note that survey data in 2006 showed that Hassan Nasrallah, 
Secretary General of Hizbullah, was the most popular figure in the Arab region, 
demonstrating widespread Sunni support of him as an anti-establishment figure (which, at 
that time, overrode sectarian loyalties).292  Additionally, several respondents reported a 
high sense of unified nationalism during 2008, in the wake of mass mobilizations after 
the expulsion of Syria from Lebanon, but said it only lasted a week, after which the 
groups divided starkly into pro- and anti-Syria (March 8 and 14 blocs).  One respondent 
commented that the only reason this divide did not produce another civil war was because 
Christians were on both sides, although this opinion dramatically oversimplifies the 
shifting alliances and actors on the ground in and after 2008.   
Beyond reporting social division and geographic segregation, a number of 
respondents spoke of the dismal state of inter-religious relations.  One reflected that 
“interfaith relations were excellent before the war.” He noted the way Muslims and 
Christians alike in south Lebanon honored the Virgin Mary at Christmas, and found a 
kind of solidarity and camaraderie in this.  This respondent felt that interfaith 
relationships have deteriorated rapidly over the last several years.  He noted that Muslims 
are no longer visiting shrines to Mary in the south, lamenting this as a sign of the decline 
in positive interfaith relationships.  Additionally, he noted that in neighboring Syria, 
Christians there were no longer seeing their Muslim neighbors protecting them like they 
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had experienced in the past.  While in the past, he noted that Syrian Muslims had been 
strong in their support for their Christian neighbors, prioritizing their safety over the 
safety of one’s own family, there are only a few Syrian cities where he reported this 
being the case over the last few years.  While there was a case he cited in Qalamoun 
where “Muslims stood in front of a church when the Islamic brigades came,” he noted 
that this is the rare exception.293 
A recent report by Joy Aoun and Marie-Joelle Zahar reinforces the claim that 
Lebanese social cohesion leaves much to be desired, pointing to the ways in which the 
Lebanese economy, consociational politics, and international donor intervention have 
together perpetuated sectarianization of Lebanese society and reinforced bonding, over 
bridging, cohesion.294  On the vertical axis, we see a society that is deeply untrusting of 
its government, and on the horizontal axis, we see continued geographic and other forms 
of demographic segregation along with low levels of social trust, bolstered and 
perpetuated by a deeply embedded sectarian system that works to maintain these 
boundaries and divisions.   
 
Barriers to Impact of Religious Peacebuilding Work 
 Part of the reason the numerous initiatives have not been able to break through in 
creating greater social cohesion in Lebanon is that there are multiple strong barriers to 
current peacebuilding initiatives, including and beyond those that explicitly engage 
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religion.  Four barriers in particular surfaced through my research and interviews:  
External factors, including regional politics in particular; religious extremism, and the 
subsequent focus of peacebuilding actors on extremism; over-reliance on the role of 
religious leaders (or communities); and finally, and I would argue most importantly, the 
entrenchment of the sectarian system.   
 
1. External factors  
Commentators on the Lebanese conflict have often pointed to the strong impact 
that regional and geo-political events have on internal Lebanese dynamics.  This remains 
a key intervening factor today, in the wake of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011.  
As one interviewee noted, “we have found that a lot of what is going on in Syria is 
affecting the interfaith relations, not only in Syria but what is going on in other places as 
well.”295  The way in which sectarianism has been exploited in the Syrian conflict is 
rippling out, impacting sectarian identity in other parts of the region.  
One can observe the effects of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon on a number of 
fronts, given both the physical proximity of Syria to Lebanon as well as the history of 
Syrian political engagement in Lebanon (and the existing divisions among the Lebanese 
regarding that involvement).  Specifically, three major contributing factors stand out:  the 
influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon (estimated to be over a million, or 1/5-1/4 of the 
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Lebanese population)296, the fact that fighters (including Hizbullah) are moving back and 
forth across the border between Lebanon and Syria, and the geopolitical involvement and 
subsequent narratives thereof.  This last factor includes both the “proxy war” between 
Saudi and Iran that many argue is being waged through the Syrian conflict (which is 
often articulated and interpreted through a Sunni-Shia sectarian lens), and the on-the-
ground sectarianization of the conflict in Syria.297   
The influx of refugees in particular has put an extreme strain on the already weak 
Lebanese economy and infrastructure, including Lebanon’s already strained electric and 
water systems, for example.  This, combined with the sectarianization of the Syrian 
conflict, has led to a deepening of existing sectarian tensions in Lebanon, along with the 
emergence of some relatively new forms of sectarian tension.  For example, the influx of 
primarily Sunni Syrian refugees into some cities has caused tension with poorer Shi’a 
communities, as government and international resources are diverted to aid newly arrived 
Syrians rather than the existing Lebanese poor.  Joy Aoun and Marie-Joelle Zahar note 
that,  
most Lebanese political and religious leaders are more concerned with internal 
stability and security than providing services and support to Syrian refugees but, 
paradoxically, the longer the refugees’ needs remain unmet, the more pressure 
                                                
296 Amnesty International, “Syria’s Refugee Crisis in Numbers,” available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/02/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/, accessed February 18, 
2017.  
 
297 Bassell Salloukh, “The Geopolitics of the Struggle for Syria,” E-International Relations (September 
2013), accessed February 18, 2017, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/09/23/the-geopolitics-of-the-struggle-for-
syria/. 
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their presence will exert on ill-equipped host municipalities and the communities 
therein.298   
 
Thus, both the Lebanese government and international aid groups have no choice 
but to work to address the needs of incoming Syrian refugees.  International aid has 
indeed shifted primarily toward the Syrian refugees and away from the Lebanese poor, 
and international peacebuilding organizations have also shifted much of their attention to 
ISIS and the more overt forms of violence and discord threatening Lebanon, which has 
shifted attention away from addressing pre-existing sectarian tensions and root causes. 
This can add to the resentment that non-elite Lebanese might already feel toward Syrians 
[ should be some literature on this, how interventions should aid everyone to not make 
targets of the refugee population]  
Additionally, ISIS’ explicit targeting of Syrian Christians has bolstered a narrative 
among Lebanese Christians about an existential threat against them, and has resulted in 
stronger in-group cohesion as well as a number of Lebanese Christian groups taking up 
arms, sometimes in collaboration with Hizbullah.299 Finally, there are intra-communal 
divisions emerging in response to the ongoing Syrian conflict.  Sunnis in particular are 
pulled between loyalty to the more traditional Sunni political parties in Lebanon and 
divergent extremist Sunni groups like ISIS.  Those involved in organizations like Jamaa 
Islamiyya, which has denounced ISIS, have been caught in between, and thus we see 
                                                
298 Aoun and Zahar, “Confessionalism, Consociationalism, and Social Cohesion in Lebanon,” 15.  
299 Alessandria Masi, “Christians Threatened by ISIS in Lebanon Turn to Hezbollah for Help,” 
International Business Times, April 21, 2015, accessed February 18, 2017, 
http://www.ibtimes.com/christians-threatened-isis-lebanon-turn-hezbollah-help-1889610. 
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multiple levels of fracture and competing loyalties within Lebanese Sunni 
communities.300   
 Another respondent pointed to the Syrian conflict as the main reason for recent  
disintegration of inter-religious relationships in Lebanon:  
The infrastructure of the Christian Muslim relations has been destroyed 
unfortunately due to the conflict.  We have to do a lot of work to rebuild that 
again..I will say this conflict has made interfaith relations very fragile and easy to 
break at any minute.301 
 A religious leader suggested that the Syrian conflict’s heavy impact on internal 
Lebanese relationships demonstrates the way in which Lebanon’s fate is inextricably 
intertwines with the rest of the region:  “Maybe the situation of Lebanon is proving for all 
of us that this country until now is not ruled by its own people.”302 This response suggest 
that, on top of being vulnerable to regional shifts, Lebanon is subject to the whims of 
foreign powers, rather than having the autonomy to control its own destiny. 
One interviewee notes that the “religious lobbying” prevalent throughout the 
Lebanese war continues today, noting in particular the tactics both Sunni and Shi’a 
leaders in Lebanon used to get Lebanese to fight in Syria: “how to convince someone 
who is Lebanese that he should be part of this conflict? The Shi’ite community said we 
have the Shi’ite in Damascus that is in danger, and we should defend it, and we should 
                                                
300 Aoun and Zahar, “Confessionalism, Consociationalism, and Social Cohesion in Lebanon,” 16.  
301 Author interview with Respondent 2, July 7, 2015. 
302 Author interview with Respondent 6, July 5, 2015. 
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defend our religious identity through this religious fight.” And on the other side, “the 
[Syrian] regime is not fighting the opposition, the regime is fighting Sunnis.”303 Thus, 
articulating the Syrian conflict as a religious or sectarian one has continued to provide 
fighters on every side, and has had important ripple effects in Lebanon. 
One respondent commented that, “the confessional rift in Lebanon is not enough 
to create a conflict except if this is exacerbated by events outside of Lebanon.”304  
Another said, “Of course the confession element plays out and is very important, but not 
so much because of existing internal Lebanese dynamics but because of what this means 
in terms of repercussions of events that are happening outside.”305 According to the 
majority of respondents, the role of regional factors, and particularly the current Syrian 
conflict, continues to serve as a barrier for the success of religious peacebuilding work in 
Lebanon.   
 
2. A Heavy Focus on Religious Extremism  
 According to a number of respondents, another key barrier to the ability for 
peacebuilding programs to have strong and lasting impact is the uptick in religious 
extremism.  One respondent remarked that, while the Syrian crisis has really negatively 
impacted sectarian relations, ”the most dangerous thing in this whole thing is religious 
                                                
303 Author interview with Respondent 6, July 5, 2015. 
304 Author interview with Respondent 4, July 3, 2015. 
305 Author interview with Respondent 4, July 3, 2015. 
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extremism.”306  Clearly, this barrier is directly intertwined with the issue of external 
factors. 
 The rise in religious extremism has had a particularly strong impact on the Sunni 
community, where there is “this very sensitive issue of the risk of losing the base, 
especially in areas where people might be the most attracted to Daesh.  Their main 
objective is to portray themselves as the real leader of the Sunni community.”307  A 
parallel trend is happening in Lebanese Christian communities as well, as one respondent 
noted that Christian militias and vigilantes in Baalbeck, trying to prevent the intrusion of 
ISIS, have ramped up rhetoric against the Syrian refugees, accusing them of hiding 
terrorists in their camps.  This respondent noted that, “this situation right now, somehow 
you can see a trend in the Lebanese society of people going back to their confessional 
roots in a sense.”308 The rise in religious extremism on any “side” is being met with 
similar trends in other communities, thus perpetuating extreme bonding cohesion. 
One person commented that, “right now, if there’s one thing that all NGOs are 
working on, it’s the rejection of the threat of ISIS.”309 Much of the funding for Lebanese 
peacebuilding has been funneled into the fight against Muslim extremism, and thus even 
NGOs that would not have previously prioritized efforts to counter extremist ideology 
and action have reallocated funds and energies toward these programs, as this emphasis is 
                                                
306 Author interview with Respondent 2, July 7, 2015. 
307 Author interview with Respondent 4, July 3, 2015. 
308Author interview with Respondent 4, July 3, 2015. 
309 Author interview with Respondent 4, July 3, 2015. 
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currently the most appealing to funders.310  This demonstrates the ways in which funder 
interests can drive NGO activities, shifting the priorities of local groups.  This has been a 
perpetual challenge in both Bosnia and Lebanon, as funder interests have often driven 
post-conflict peacebuilding and development efforts in both cases. This can mean that the 
donors’ reading of a conflict often overrides local needs and values.   
 
3. Over-reliance on religious leaders  
Another important barrier to religious peacebuilding effectiveness, according to 
respondents, is that too much stock is placed in the religious leaders.   One pointed to the 
fact that the Maronite Patriarch had not (at the time of my interviews) been able to broker 
a deal between Aoun and Geagea, for the presidency: “The church has had very little 
leverage over the candidates...So to say the religious leaders have that much influence, it 
goes up and down and depends on the candidate.  Ultimately, their role is hostage to that 
division.”311   
Elite dialogues have been important for creating a common space, but several 
respondents commented on the importance of recognizing the limits of these efforts:  “If 
you don’t put these things in law and you don’t protect them institutionally, these efforts 
are very vulnerable.  Not that I don’t see hope coming from these initiatives, no, on the 
contrary, but hope without political change and institutional structures, can fall back into 
                                                
310 Author interview with Respondent 19, July 2, 2015; Author interview with Respondent 14, July 8, 2015. 
311 Author interview with Respondent 3, July 7, 2015. Note that Michele Aoun was elected president in 
October of 2016, after more than two years of presidential vacancy.  
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things that are not very healthy and fall back to war.”312  Thus, while most respondents 
believe that these initiatives play an important role, there are clear limits to what they can 
be expected to accomplish. 
 Another respondent noted that, “during more than three generations, the religious 
institutions were accomplices and silent.”313  While now, this person noted, religious 
institutions and leaders are more outspoken against violence, the media does not cover it.  
One interviewee commented on the disconnect between talk and action by religious: 
You know, there is a French word that says ‘pompier de’ [literally, firefighter]- 
you light the fire and you extinguish it.  I have a feeling that religious authorities 
in Lebanon have been playing this game for 40 years and people are very happy 
when they see them all aligned saying outlined stances of unity and even though a 
week before each one of them was behaving in a different way. So it is true that 
now they are playing a pacification role, but you won’t get a solution until their 
role gets confined to religious matters.314 
One respondent asserted that the effectiveness of religious leaders is entirely 
dependent upon political elites’ need for certain figures and messages at any given time: 
“Now we have a lot of religious figures who are wise enough, who are charismatic 
enough, I believe I am one of them, but it is not our time now.”  As for the ones who are 
currently lifted up, “Maybe they are not [great] but they are needed now just to gather the 
                                                
312 Author interview with Respondent 3, July 7, 2015. 
313 Author interview with Respondent 5, July 6, 2015. 
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body, to make the body come to each other and stick to each other.”315  This respondent 
gave the example of the fighting in Tripoli during the civil war.  Battles- about nineteen 
in total- raged between two neighborhoods, and “no one could stop it, and then suddenly 
it just stopped.  We say like this, those who used to send the message that we should start 
the fighting, now they send the message that we should stop the fighting.”316     
Another respondent commented, “Can we expect that...interfaith dialogue will 
lead really on a conceptual level to anything? Personally I think not.  But will using the 
clerics as icons help sometimes in calming down a situation? I would say yes.”317  This 
respondent, among others, argued for the importance of getting into the specifics when it 
comes to strategically engaging religious leaders.  For instance, the respondent asserted 
that a Muslim cleric in Lebanon often has more leverage in people’s personal lives that a 
Christian cleric does.  While this is a reflection of this particular respondent’s perception 
of relative clerical power, the reality of some imbalance of clerical authority between and 
within different religious communities can lead to an disparity in many dialogues looking 
to engage different religious leaders, as the weight and scope of leaders’ influence differ.   
One respondent also noted the new ways in which religious leaders are exerting 
influence: “It’s a new situation- clerics who are al-fresco, clerics who are on the public 
stage, are not necessarily the most influential.”318 This respondent went on to say that, 
“Lebanon, ok, clerical institutions are recognized as kind of national institutions: Muslim 
                                                
315 Author interview with Respondent 6, July 5, 2015. 
316 Author interview with Respondent 6, July 5, 2015. 
317 Author interview with Respondent 10, July 9, 2015. 
318 Author interview with Respondent 10, July 9, 2015. 
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and Christian clerics speaking on television, appearing in public functions, but are they 
the ones that exert the higher level of influence? Is the dialogue between these guys...will 
the results of a dialogue between these guys go downstream and have...the expected 
influence? Unfortunately, it’s not the case.”319  These are political dialogues, serving a 
political agenda, and “their religious load is depleted.”320  
Calibrating the potential impact of religious leaders is thus an important part of 
the religious peacebuilding assessment process.  Some asserted that religious leaders, at 
this point, really only have an influence on their followers.  One articulated this reality as 
follows:  “For the time being I think that the religious leadership will have an effect 
mostly on their own adherents who are not directly involved in conflict.  But those who 
are involved are already involved and they wouldn’t listen to them.”321 Another noted 
that social media has dramatically changed the types of religious leaders exerting 
influence, and their mechanisms for doing so, citing the quality of internet in Syrian 
refugee camps in Lebanon as one place where religious speech is getting a lot of traction 
online.322 
However, there are also limits to the reach and impact of religious leaders’ ability 
to exacerbate violence or inspire peace, as another respondent noted, warning against 
placing too much stock in these efforts:   
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Interfaith, inter-religious, inter-sectarian dialogue in a situation of conflict are 
band-aids.  Sustainable peace cannot be brought to any society if we don’t reach a 
point where citizenship prevails.  So obviously in emergency cases, you need to 
apply these band-aids.  But in the long run, I don’t think that they really offer a 
solution...we are going back to the same logic of the system where to exist you 
need to belong to a sect.  Yes, these are band-aids to be applied from time to time, 
in extreme situations we need them, but they should be considered as a tool in a 
larger toolbox.323 
 Another reflected their observation of this issue as follows: 
 
What is the percentage of religious influence? Let’s take the case of the Sunni.  
Ok, the Sunni, the Hariri establishment presents itself as the moderate 
establishment.  But when this establishment has no more funds, its religious 
message goes down, and this is what you are seeing now.324  How do we explain 
nowadays the marginalization of the moderate trends within the Sunni community 
and the emergence of all the radical trends? Because finally the religious message 
itself needs to be encapsulated with a set of services-- it’s not enough to tell 
people you should not kill your Shi’a neighbor, but you should also...provide him 
with a job, with a political perspective.  Otherwise we find that people are sinking 
                                                
323 Author interview with Respondent 10, July 9, 2015. 
324 The respondent is referring here to ongoing financial troubles within the Hariri establishment and Saudi 
business supporters, which in 2016 resulted in layoffs within the Future Party (led by Saad Hariri).  See 
Tom Perry, “Cash crunch at Saudi firm casts shadow over Lebanon’s Hariris,” Reuters, September 5, 2016, 
accessed June 16, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-politics-idUSKCN11B1X7.   
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in this deep despair.  Or finally and so they will join, or easily be attracted by 
radicals, or radicals will be the ones offering both money and a key for heaven.325 
Thus, the efficacy of religious leaders lies not only in what they say, when, but 
also how it is amplified and received, which is contingent upon a number of factors that 
are not controlled by the religious leaders or by peacebuilding organizations themselves. 
 
4. Entrenchment of the sectarian system 
 The biggest barrier to peacebuilding efficacy that emerged through my interviews 
was the sectarian system itself.  One respondent commented that, “[the diffusion of 
power among sects] further radicalizes this dimension of society, which in turn becomes 
an inhibiting factor for the formal political system to conduct the needed reforms.”326  
Thus, while deeply embedded sectarian tensions are not in and of themselves the root 
causes of Lebanese social and political strife, they act as barriers to the very institutional 
reforms needed to disembed these divides.   
 The majority of respondents agreed that sectarianism has gotten worse in the last 
several years.  One stated that,  
We’re trying to get out of religion and sectarianism in Lebanon, but recent events 
have brought us back into this magma.  We’re trying to act on our own political 
beliefs, but there is a way to fight this.  You could fight it by military or physical 
means, which is suicidal, or you can fight it by trying to promote values by people 
                                                
325 Author interview with Respondent 10, July 9, 2015.  
326 Author interview with Respondent 3, July 7, 2015. 
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and organizations and even by politicians.  So yes, we cope [with sectarianism], 
but we don’t condone.327 
Another interviewee stated that sectarian identities are preserved so that leaders 
can utilize them to leverage power: “So, at any point in time if you’re a leader who wants 
to either rally support around you or differentiate yourself from another group, you may 
use that identity- that sectarian identity- as a tool...and also as a way of creating...a 
network of mutual support.”328  Political elites, according to this analysis, utilize and 
maintain sectarian identities to further bonding cohesion, often at the expense of bridging 
cohesion in Lebanese society.  As one respondent articulated, “the system feeds on these 
divisions”329 
 Despite there being agreement among respondents that sectarianism is a barrier to 
peacebuilding efficacy in Lebanon, I found disagreement on how, exactly.  Here, two 
divergent goals for Lebanese religious peacebuilding emerged.  While some actors and 
initiatives see dismantling sectarianism itself as the only route to social cohesion and 
sustainable peace, others prioritize the preservation of unity and consensus through the 
sectarian system.  Thus, for the latter group, while the current sectarian system is indeed 
problematic, it is because there is corruption that needs to be deal with.  Sectarianism in 
theory is not the problem.  This is a key finding from the Lebanese case study, as there 
are strong forces in society- within and outside of the religious peacebuilding 
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community- working in these competing directions.  Religion in Lebanon is inextricably 
intertwined with this reality.  One cannot engage organized religion in Lebanon without 
dealing with institutions, and those institutions (the Maronite Church, for example) are 
inherently related in some way to the sectarian system, monitoring and controlling issues 
of legal status and rights, among other factors.   
Several pointed to the problem with the fact that there were paragraphs of the 
Ta’if agreement that were left unfinished- including the eventual move away from 
sectarianism as a political system.  One person noted that this was not due to actual 
problems preventing the full implementation of Ta’if, but rather, it was empty talk to 
begin with:  “it was almost an unspoken agreement that some things will never be 
applied.”330  Another commented that, “[there’s a] possibility of evolution into 
deconfessionalization but it will take a long time...The generation of the civil war is still 
the generation that is occupying the cabinet in Lebanon...And I don’t know if it will ever 
be complete.  Lebanon has been created in such a way that some level of this 
arrangement will have to persist.”331 
While for some, the emptiness of the promise of Ta’if (to shift from the sectarian 
system) was seen as highly problematic, others noted that the empty promise was, and 
still is, necessary for maintaining Lebanon’s fragile peace: “It is better to have inefficient 
agreement than war.”332  
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One respondent pointed to “an equilibrium of fear, [which] is somehow protecting 
us from further unfolding of events.”  This person went on to describe this situation as 
follows: “Yesterday there were clashes between Sunni and Shi’a just south of Beirut.  
Twenty years ago this may have spread to other areas, but I have a feeling the leaders 
didn’t want it to spread because they cannot control the consequences.”333  Thus, at least 
for the short term, there is a benefit in carefully balancing the power of sectarian leaders, 
to assuage further devolvement into violence: 
I know this doesn’t serve a long-term purpose, but it’s good to have groups that 
are roughly equal in weight in power because they neutralize each other.  One 
knows that he would not gain power by resorting to weapons and arms.  Right 
now I think we are in a safe zone, but we are still really far from what we want the 
state to be.334 
The weakness of the Lebanese government plays into the entrenchment of the 
sectarian, as one respondent noted, “the problem is that the government is weak, and 
when governments are weak, tribes are strong.”335  This respondent talked about how 
clientelism has increased in recent years, forcing people to go to their religious or 
sectarian leaders- rather than directly to the appropriate government office- if they need 
something, “from a phone line to building outside of your legal percentage on your own 
block.  Anything you need from your government, you don’t go to the government 
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officials, you go to your leaders who are in the end from a certain religious group.”336 
This reflects the ways in which Lebanese lean heavily on members of their own sect 
within various government offices, rather than approaching the government as individual 
citizens.  Another respondent commented on how most Lebanese subsist on electricity 
from private generators, rather than relying on the public utilities system.  Even if the 
cost of state-provided electricity were half the price of the generator, this respondent 
remarked, everyone would still go with the generator, as the trust in the state’s ability to 
provide this service is completely absent.   
One respondent noted that,  
 
Individuals can do a lot of work, NGOs can do a lot of work.  Organizations 
having one color-being related to one specific group- or having multi-colors like 
Adyan, can do a lot of work.  But at the end of the day, if you don’t have a strong 
government, a just government, a trusted government, a government which can 
give you the feeling that it can provide you with your basic needs and it will treat 
you equally with the others, if you don’t have this government no one will support 
it because if you have a weak government, an unjust government, it’s a threat for 
the community. And then to be able to face any bad luck or any bad chance is to 
be more sticking to my own people, and then maybe the umbrella of the religious 
sect is the best tool to make this kind of lobbying.337 
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The continued failure to elect a President the time of my interviews338 shows how 
little power the president had, but according to one respondent, “it shows how little 
power everybody has...The system is going down.  We’re drowning.  And of course the 
Lebanese are unable as usual to define their own way to get out of it, so everyone is 
expecting a hand down to help- Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, the US...We should be able to 
do something from within.”339  Another respondent commented, “No one wants to go 
back to civil war.  There is a government of national unity that has decided that unity is 
more important than electing a president, or having national elections.”340  This was a 
prevailing sentiment, that unity is prioritized by the system above all else, including 
justice, democracy, and individual rights.   
Indeed, one respondent pointed out that Lebanon has never shifted from the 
economics of war: “The government is paralyzed, and everything continues.  It’s not a 
country that depends on institutions so much, you don’t have electricity- you have 
generators.  It’s still the economics of war.  You know, during the war the economy of 
generators was created, and it’s still there.  That’s why there is no reform of the 
electricity- it’s the generator mafia.  There’s also a mafia of the water tanks and the 
private providers, they are making some people in the government very rich...But they 
                                                
338 Lebanon had a presidential vacancy for a total of 29 months, when the Parliament continuously failed to 
elect a new one. (Presidents are elected by the Parliament, and generally an election is not held unless a 
consensus has been reached among MPs as to who will win.) In October of 2016, Michel Aoun was elected 
to fill the post. See https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/world/middleeast/michel-aoun-lebanon-
president.html?_r=0, accessed February 9, 2017.  
339 Author interview with Respondent 1, July 2, 2015. 
340 Author interview with Respondent 4, July 3, 2015. 
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use this [confessional language] as an excuse- oh, we cannot upset the Christians.”341  
According to this perspective, political and religious elites point to confessional and 
sectarian divisions as the problem- the barrier to peace- when in fact it is in their interest 
to maintain these very divisions.  This respondent’s comments reflects the way the 
government is able to shift blame for its own lack of provision of public goods and 
services, faulting sectarian dynamics rather than owning up to the governments failures to 
provide for its people.   
One respondent noted that this is the self-preserving goal of sectarian elites, 
including those who are publicly committed to building social cohesion at the national 
level: “It seems that a lot of times the issue of peace is used as a pretext to maintain elite 
interests, in the name of consensus and peace and not to upset anyone, you have a model 
that has become very inefficient, is a model that has the faction of disunity and favors and 
making sure that everybody has a piece of the pie.  No one has interest in building an 
efficient functioning public institution.”342 Thus, several suggested that elite-stamped 
peacebuilding programs are distractions, or empty verbiage.  Indeed, several of the key 
issues on which religious leaders have acted (not just spoken) in unity are in opposing 
civil marriage343, and in opposing the desegregation of schools by sect. These examples 
demonstrate the ways in which some religious and sectarian leaders have, over time, 
                                                
341 Author interview with Respondent 4, July 3, 2015. 
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343 See http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/70066 and http://www.independent.co.uk/news/old-enemies-
from-lebanons-civil-war-unite-to-maintain-the-social-divide-1153532.html, accessed June 17, 2017; and 
Maurus Reinkowski and Sofia Saadeh, “A Nation Divided: Lebanese Confessionalism,” in Citizenship and 
Ethnic Conflict: Challenging the Nation-state, ed., Haldun Gulalp (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 107.  
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unified in efforts to maintain bonding cohesion, often against the will of grassroots multi-
religious activists. 
Another respondent argued that everyone but the Sunnis is directly benefitting 
from the rhetoric of sectarianism, including in particular Christians who are currently 
focused on decentralization as a solution to Lebanon’s socio-political strife.344  One of the 
key benefits, to the political and economic elite, is financial, as one respondent 
commented, “Historically, Lebanon has always been the little place to keep an open 
financial system because everyone needs it.  Everyone needs a place to go and put their 
money, relax, and so on...it serves the interests of everyone.”345 This again demonstrates 
the importance of external forces on Lebanon’s internal affairs, including the regional 
designation of Lebanon as a vacation spot.  
Several expressed deep frustration with the way in which the logic of sectarianism 
seems to prevail over any attempts at sustainable peacebuilding, commenting on the 
preservation of sectarianism as similar to dictatorship in its prioritization of stability over 
peace: “because dictators can bring stability and the dictators are much better stability 
providers than democratic regimes.”346  Thus, some expressly articulated their goal to be 
ending the sectarian system, in the interest of peace.  One respondent stated, “I think a 
civil government, a civil system, civil society is the only way to protect our communities 
and to have a just and peaceful outcome that we may reach.”347 
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On the other hand, some respondents were much more positive about sectarian 
politics as the right way for Lebanon’s communities, long-term: “All of the Lebanese 
who are talking about the sectarian system as something bad, they are talking about the 
system itself or how the system is being used? I believe it is not the system itself, but 
what they have witnessed in the system...it’s the corruption in the system, not the system 
itself.”348  This respondent expressed fears about Druze, Maronites, and others losing 
their identity and communal rights if the system were dismantled.349 
Some of the successes noted by those working in the field of religious 
peacebuilding clearly play a preserving role when it comes to sectarianism. Commenting 
on the way in which religious leaders have good relationships and indeed, are working 
together across sectarian lines, one actor working directly in interfaith relations told me 
that, “We have seen how Muslims and Christians have come together on so many issues 
related to humanitarian aid...and neither Muslims or Christians accepted the issue of civil 
marriage.  They agreed- the religious leaders agreed on it [in opposition to it]. While the 
people were in support of it, the religious leadership did not want it.”350  This 
interviewee’s comment seems to raise another paradox: religious leadership (rather than 
“Christians and Muslims” as this respondent inaccurately states initially, since it is the 
leadership rather than the people who have taken these positions) has worked together to 
                                                
348 Author interview with Respondent 6, July 5, 2015. 
349 For example, the Druze constitute an estimated 5% of the Lebanese population (see 
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2008/108487.htm, accessed June 17, 2017), but are represented at a 
slightly higher proportion in the Lebanese Parliament, occupying 8 of the 128 total seats.  Additionally, 
Maronites widely express support of religious authorities controlling personal status laws.    
350 Author interview with Respondent 2, July 7, 2015. 
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bring positive change through humanitarian projects, and yet the other place they find 
consensus is around standing together in opposition to potential advances in individual 
civil rights (civil marriage).  This demonstrates the emphasis on consensus among 
religious leadership, as well as the drive to maintain the status quo.   
From my interviews, it became clear that the humanitarian projects religious 
leaders choose to work on together are important and positive, but largely “safe”- they 
would not work on controversial humanitarian issues that cross into structural injustices.  
Additionally, the work to oppose civil marriage demonstrates the stake that religious 
leaders have in maintaining much of the structural status quo.  Thus, the seeming paradox 
of religious leaders working together to further humanitarian causes, while also working 
against the desires of the Lebanese people, simply demonstrates the careful balance that 
religious leadership in Lebanon walks- doing good for society (and opposing overt 
violence) without shaking up the structures from which they benefit (along with the 
political and economic elites). The entrenchment of the sectarian system, combined with 
the other key barriers mentioned above, makes it exceedingly difficult for any 
peacebuilding efforts to break through.   
 
Our Aim is to Slow Down the Fall into Abyss 
Beyond identifying these barriers to success, how do those engaged in religious 
peacebuilding, in its various forms, see their own impact?  The vast majority of those I 
interviewed agreed that religious leaders can play a very strong role in exacerbating 
violence or inspiring peace through interpretations of scripture, but in a limited way, as 
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noted above.  As one respondent reflected,  “Religion is extremely important in 
Lebanon...I absolutely believe that the spiritual leaders in Lebanon play a fundamental 
role in preventing the exacerbation of conflict.”351  This respondent gave an example of 
Sunni leadership helping to defuse a radical Sunni leader in confrontation with the army 
in Saida, noting, “I think that the spiritual leaders in Lebanon have played a very 
important role and will continue to play a very important role in maintaining stability, as 
long as they are not using inflammatory language.”352   These reflections demonstrate the 
extremely negative way of framing goals of religious peacebuilding work in Lebanon at 
present, aimed at disaster prevention, rather than focused on building something positive.   
 One interviewee, while somewhat skeptical about the broader impact of initiatives 
to engage religious leaders for peacebuilding, yielded that “ultimately, these initiatives 
are essential because they have an impact on the discourse.”353  Thus, many highlighted 
the effect the current work with religious leaders has on public rhetoric in particular as an 
indicator of success. 
 When considering the impact of person-to-person or other grassroots programs, 
some focused on individual change as the key indicator of success, while others talked 
about a slow, ripple effect of shifts in understanding and education about the Other:   
I think that not everything is always a success but a lot of it provided to be a 
successful by the fact that many people do start accepting the religious other and 
                                                
351 Author interview with Respondent 4, July 3, 2015. 
352 Author interview with Respondent 4, July 3, 2015. 
353 Author interview with Respondent 3, July 7, 2015. 
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having a better understanding...when you have this kind of ignorance of the 
religious other [like in Syria today] you get distortion.  So ignorance leads to the 
distortion of the image of the other and this in consequence leads to him going to 
his own ghettos….So I think what you know we can say about the interfaith 
dialogue and peacebuilding- that we are fighting this kind of ignorance and trying 
to have people get together and understand each other.354 
While none of these initiatives can impact everything at once, one respondent 
noted that, “If you have these institutions and these actors engaged proactively to 
promoting peace and tolerance then you have somehow a multiplying effect within 
society.”355  Another reflected on three key factors that indicate broader impact of 
peacebuilding initiatives, generally: 
I think the trickling up has to do with a few factors.  One, it has to do with the 
efficiency and effectiveness of civil society.  Two, it has to do with the space that 
civil society has and how it uses that space.  And third, it seems to me that it 
would be important for the trickle up effect to work to start peeling off particular 
individuals from the political hierarchy to buy into this new way of doing things.  
They would at least temper their own coalition’s statements.356 
 While many stated that it is impossible to see or measure the results of these 
programs, respondents noted that evaluations can show the impact on individual attitude 
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shifts357 and that they are laying the groundwork for the future: “A lot of these initiatives 
have been incubators of new ways of looking at things...but they are still hostage to 
bigger and stronger dynamics that continue to dominate society.  They might be the seeds 
of things to come.”358 
Others were less ambitious when it came to thinking about impact, with one 
pointing to the counterfactual of what Lebanese society would be like without so many 
NGOs and programs,359 and another stating that, “we are throwing onto the political 
market each year 17-20 members of political groups.  Now we cannot measure their 
improvement unless they get into power….Our aim is to slow down the fall into 
abyss.”360 
While many talked about the aforementioned barriers to peace and felt that, 
without these intervening factors, their initiatives and programs could have more impact 
toward peace, a few saw their inter-religious work as disconnected entirely from socio-
political peacebuilding.  As one said, “There are different hats, but one head- there is one 
goal, it is Christian-Muslim understanding.  Christian-Muslim dialogue.”361  Thus, while 
most respondents saw their work- whether directly or indirectly engaged with religious 
leaders, values, and communities- as directly contributing to peacebuilding in some way, 
a few of those more explicitly involved in inter-religious dialogue did not articulate that 
                                                
357 Author interview with Respondent 7, May 5, 2015. 
358 Author interview with Respondent 3, July 7, 2015. 
359 Author interview with Respondent 8, July 2, 2015. 
360 Author interview with Respondent 8, July 2, 2015. 
361 Author interview with Respondent 9, July 3, 2015. 
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same goal, but rather indicated that inter-religious relationships are themselves the goal, 
not a means to achieving or maintaining peace in a pluralist society.  
A respondent directly involved in inter-religious dialogue work noted that, while 
there is indeed a saturation of dialogue, people are striving to keep their identities in the 
face of increasing globalization.  This respondent noted that the global narratives are 
stronger than any local or regional initiatives, so while these dialogues might temper their 
effect, they are fighting a huge uphill battle to counter narratives of religious or sectarian 
division.362 
Another respondent argued for the preservation of unity, rather than focusing 
energies on advancing democracy as such: 
We are not after a perfect democracy, but we are after a perfect conviviality.  
How can I use democracy to protect my national unity?  National unity is my 
target, which I care for.  How can I protect and survive this national unity?  That’s 
my aim.  I use democracy in this way in order to protect my national unity.  
Lebanon is the only country in the Middle East where the rights of communities 
are preserved, not only the rights of individuals...So yes, our political system, 
sectarianism is not good, but so far, it is the only way to find, to preserve the 
rights of communities, and to give them the chance when others are eliminating 
the rights of communities, to give them the chance to feel free when expressing 
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themselves and living in their own beliefs.  This is the good thing about 
sectarianism in Lebanon.363   
 This emphasis on unity and consensus was strong in other interviews with those 
actors who were themselves religious elites, or prioritized work with religious elites as 
part of their peacebuilding and inter-religious relationship building efforts.  The focus for 
many involved directly in inter-religious work was essentially damage control and 
building of individual and institutional relationships, rather than seeing these efforts as 
working to change institutions or socio-political structures in any way.  This is critical, 
because there is an assumption that explicitly interreligious work in a context like 
Lebanon would naturally have peace, or increased social cohesion, as one of its goals, 
and yet, a different sentiment entirely emerged through many of my interviews: those 
working in these spaces often do not see their work having a ripple effect into society, but 
rather see the work as important for those on the inside of this “bubble,” protecting them 
and their relationships while social and political strife continues unabated.  This leads to 
some of the key findings that emerged from my observations and analysis of the religious 
peacebuilding efforts in Lebanon.   
 
Key Findings: What can we say about religious peacebuilding in Lebanon? 
1. Religion is shaped through, and in turn shapes, conflict in Lebanon.  The World 
Values survey data shows that many Lebanese identify with spiritual beliefs and with 
sectarian identities, but do not identify as explicitly religious.  The meaning of religion 
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itself has been changed through conflict, and the fact that one cannot engage with religious 
institutions in Lebanon without the sectarian system coming in tow is an important factor 
shaping this reality.   
Religion cannot be confined to the realm of the personal/internal and the 
apolitical, because religion itself is made through politics.  Lebanese and Lebanon 
observers often separate out religion from sectarianism because there is a common 
assumption that religion cannot be this politicized.  This belief is reified in the realm of 
inter-religious work, as practitioners and Respondent s attempt to parse the truly religious 
from the political and sectarian.  However, religion is made through, and exists in, a 
dynamic relationship with the socio-political, as demonstrated in this chapter’s journey 
through Lebanese history.   
Adam Gaiser argues for a narrative identity approach to understanding Islamic 
sectarianism in particular, which  “treats intra-religious divisions as participatory 
discourses in which individuals ultimately choose to locate themselves in a plot (‘emplot’ 
themselves)—or not to do so—and which can thereby imply certain kinds of 
practice/behavior.”364  He goes on to argue that this is a “dynamic and conscious process 
of adoption, maintenance, and manipulation of certain types of narrative identities in 
particular places and at particular times by particular persons or groups of persons,”365 a 
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finding that comports with what a material approach to studying religion in Lebanon 
reveals.   
The persistence of global & regional narratives is important to the Lebanese story.  
While on the localized and quotidian level, religious tension is rarely present, the regional 
and global discourse on religious division (i.e., the clash of civilizations narrative) is 
often stronger than the local realities of coexistence and cooperation.    Religion is always 
local.  And yet, local manifestations of religion are often highly informed by external 
global or regional narratives that connect oppression and conflict to religion in explicit 
and implicit ways.   
 
2. Institutional change is necessary for religious peacebuilding efforts to be truly 
effective in improving social cohesion.  Otherwise, the changes that are made are too 
fragile and undermined by the dominance of sectarian logic.  Cross-sectarian ties (often 
initiated through peacebuilding programs) can be part of pushing for this institutional 
change.  However, their work is extremely uphill, since elites work against sectarian 
cooperation that is anti-status quo.  Institutions, not just initiatives, are necessary for 
sustainable social cohesion. As one respondent noted, peacebuilding programs and 
initiatives are building the infrastructures of a new kind of Lebanon, but they need 
institutional engineering to make a lasting difference.  Successful programs judged on 
their own merits cannot make sustainable change if they do not shift the institutions and 
structures constantly maintaining and reproducing sectarianism.   
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 The overview of Lebanese history in the first part of this chapter demonstrates 
how the institutionalization of the sect, and its subsequent self-perpetuation, constrains 
social cohesion as it continues to sow both horizontal and vertical distrust in many ways.  
Additionally, the biggest barrier to social cohesion that emerges from my study is the 
sectarian system itself – this is distinct from the existence of different sects, which I argue 
is in and of itself is not the barrier, but rather the ways the sectarian mode of functioning 
has been entrenched and hardens boundaries and inequalities, while creating more and 
more distance between the state and individuals.    
 It is clear that Lebanese elites do indeed understand and know one another.  The 
issue is not interpersonal division, but indeed, the elite cooperation to maintain 
sectarianism and thereby elite control of communities.  When programs are primarily 
focused on changing beliefs (about one’s own religious tradition, and about the Other), 
structural barriers to social cohesion are often left to the side, thus precluding sustainable 
change.  Improved relationships between people of different sects are important in and of 
themselves, but do not have the power to “trickle out” to improve social cohesion without 
structural shifts.   
 
3. Many overt religious peacebuilding initiatives (particularly those that are elite-
centric) are playing by, and either advertently or inadvertently reinforcing, the logic 
of sectarianism.  As one respondent argued, everyone in Lebanon has to play the 
sectarian game to get ahead, NGOs included, and thus their efforts are often wrapped up 
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in sectarian agendas.366  Religious leaders cannot extract themselves from the sectarian 
system in doing inter-religious work.  
Religious leaders in Lebanon are often upholding the status quo of communal 
representation, mimicking the sectarian system itself and re-inscribing the status quo.  
Two key examples of how this manifests are the religious institutions’ collaboration in 
opposing civil marriage and in preventing schools from being desegregated by sect.  
Rather than promoting a genuine societal transformation that deals with the injustices of 
the past and present, religious elites play by the sectarian logic, speaking of unity and, 
indeed, united themselves in opposition to shifting the status quo of sectarian 
representation and control.  It is clear that the language of sectarian elites and state-
sanctioned religious elites is highly controlled and carefully calibrated to maintain a 
minimal amount of national unity without sacrificing sectarian loyalty, thereby losing 
their sense of control.  
In a recent Carnegie paper, Alexander Henley asserts that,  
Because high-level religious leaders in Lebanon are generally drawn from elites 
and emerge from institutional apparatuses, and in a number of cases are 
dependent on the state, there is no cultural expectation that they be followed 
blindly—or at all. They are not ‘of the people,’ nor are they necessarily regarded 
as being ‘for the people.’367   
 
This comports with the findings of my research, as religious leaders are deeply 
embedded in and benefit in many ways from the status quo of sectarian politics in 
                                                
366 Author interview with Respondent 15, July 1, 2015. 
367 Alexander D. M. Henley, “Religious Authority and Sectarianism in Lebanon,” Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace Paper, December 16, 2016, accessed February 21, 2017, 
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Lebanon, thus creating distance between their efforts and the desires of the Lebanese 
people.   
Henley goes on to argue that,  
 
the reality is that religious leaders often have to walk a fine line in terms of 
rhetoric and behavior among their own community, the political elite, and other 
communities. In order to avoid being ostracized and isolated, they usually take 
pains to remain in favor with the elite, in that way maximizing their own 
influence through their ability to engage in gentle persuasion or soft negotiation. 
At the same time, they avoid straying too far from the dominant political values of 
their own community, let alone the values of coexistence that are a part of 
Lebanese political life.368 
 
 Religious leaders do not have to overtly create sectarian strife in order to help 
curate sectarian divisions; indeed, they must show their commitment to unity in order to 
preserve their place in the Lebanese order, but it is the implicit ways that they benefit 
from status quo maintenance that have a stronger impact on Lebanese society and 
politics, holding back much of the justice-seeking social cohesion work that is of interest 
to the people at large.   
 
4. Points 2 & 3 create a paradox for religious peacebuilding efforts.  If an effort or 
initiative is aligned with the sectarian system, or has a vested interest in upholding it, then 
their work serves to uphold the status quo and the interest of the state.  If they are not so 
aligned, they have a very hard time making an impact that trickles up in any way.  One 
respondent noted that as long as civil society level programs are not connected vertically 
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to impacting political institutions or engineering, they are allowed to do their work, 
because they are not seen as a threat.369     
As Salloukh, et. al., have argued,  
By binding Lebanese to their sectarian/political patrons and clientelist networks, 
and by making them materially dependent on the latter’s patronage benefits, the 
political economy of sectarianism operates in such a way as to sabotage 
experiments in non-sectarian forms of political mobilization and organization, 
forcing most Lebanese to privilege their sectarian identities over alternative and 
more appropriate class, professional, or local affiliations.370   
Thus, the dilemma at hand is that political elites will only allow programs and 
initiatives to gain traction that do not challenge their authority and control.  Anything that 
truly challenges the sectarian system gets squashed, and yet challenging the sectarian 
system is the only way that these programs could actually achieve their desired effects.   
While most Lebanese politicians and sectarian leaders are verbally promoting 
social cohesion from their platforms, certain actors have at times diverged from this 
common message, as Aoun’s call for Christians to rally in the streets in the summer of 
2015 shows.371  Christian and Shi’a politicians often reference the risks of leaving any 
community behind in Lebanon, focusing on their own community’s rights being 
curtailed.  Thus, the current political rhetoric is about maintaining an amenable balance 
of power and participation, rather than regularly spouting overtly negative rhetoric about 
other groups.  That said, the electoral system promotes bonding, rather than bridging, 
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strategies for political parties to gain seats.372 This points to the way in which bonding 
cohesion, or reifying the sectarian boundaries, actually serves the status quo version of 
cohesion in Lebanon. The current model of unity, enshrined in Ta’if and more deeply 
entrenched thereafter, is dependent upon sectarian boundaries with powerful elite 
representatives and guardians.  The sectarian system requires elites to take part in this 
careful dance, promoting enough unity to stay in play in Lebanon (and to avoid war), 
while simultaneously maintaining enough bonding cohesion (i.e., sectarian loyalty) to 
remain as the representative of a given sect.   
Additionally, it is useful to consider Bruce Lincoln’s categories of religions of the 
status quo, religions of revolution, and religions of resistance, when considering how 
religion manifests at present in Lebanon.  While religious and sectarian elites 
predominantly reflect manifestations of religion aimed at maintaining the status quo, this 
is not immediately clear from the surface.  For example, Nasrallah and Aoun both use 
resistance or even revolutionary language at times, but nearly always act in the service of 
maintaining the status quo of political and religious elite social and political control.  
Generally, only those who benefit from the status quo in Lebanon are invested in keeping 
it, and thus Lebanon is ripe for religious narratives that resist and revolt.  Thus, there are 
resistant and revolutionary forms of religion always present and rising to the surface 
when opportunities present themselves (such as, at present, on the Syrian border, as well 
as on the southern border at moments of particular tension with Israel).   
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5.  Those interested in advancing social cohesion in Lebanon need to calibrate and 
specify the roles and effects of religious actors in peacebuilding.  As one respondent 
pointed out, a focus on local religious leaders will yield more results, as local leaders may 
be more invested in and willing to work for real, sustainable peace than national religious 
leaders.373  Additionally, one must distinguish between preventing or extinguishing overt 
violence, and the longer term goal of sustainable social cohesion.  As one respondent 
said, “when you need to negotiate a ceasefire, ok you make concessions.  But you should 
not mix up ceasefire building and peacebuilding.”374  The same strategies of engaging 
religion in times of immediate/urgent crisis are not the strategies that will help build 
social cohesion over the long term.  Thus, there is a need to differentiate the roles and 
impacts of religious leaders, and to note that their impact will ultimately be calibrated by 
how useful their message or work is to the political elites, and on the urgency and 
overtness of particular episodes of violence.  As one respondent noted, “sometimes, you 
just need a fatwa.”375 
 There is some promise in embodied approaches to religious peacebuilding, 
including the adoption of Annunciation Day into the national calendar as a multi-
religious holy day, and the cooperative public rebuilding of houses of worship that have 
been damaged or destroyed.  However, the effort for mainstreaming Annunciation Day as 
a cross-sectarian national holiday is stymied by the fact that very few are aware of its 
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existence, and it is widely still seen as a (somewhat obscure) Christian holiday. If and 
when efforts to integrate cross- or trans-sectarian modes of being and belonging into the 
Lebanese nation-state are successful, we are likely to see increased social cohesion in the 
country, and yet efforts to do so are often confined to small peacebuilding or activist 
circles.   
 
Conclusion  
My analysis of current religious peacebuilding efforts in Lebanon reveals a 
notable divide between efforts working to tame, control, and preserve a status quo, under 
the banners of unity, consensus, and communal rights; versus efforts challenging the 
status quo and seeking to remake social norms, under the banners of justice and 
individual rights.  Efforts in inter-religious engagement are bound by the logic of the 
sectarian system itself.  They often go one of two ways- they either work (explicitly or 
implicitly) to reinforce and uphold the sectarian system, or they work to resist it.  It is 
highly challenging to straddle the middle, and ultimately, work that tries to take a middle 
path is rendered ineffective or is constantly undermined by the deeply-embedded 
sectarian logic.   There is a fragile but carefully calibrated effort among sectarian elites to 
prioritize bonding cohesion without losing the minimal amount of bridging cohesion to 
maintain Lebanon’s precarious national unity.  
The religious peacebuilding space is varied, as are the ways religion shows up in 
socio-political conflict, and all of this is dynamic, as religion becomes something new 
and takes on new meanings and modes of operation over time.  In both analyzing religion 
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in conflict and in peacebuilding, we are better served by looking at the ways religion 
serves to preserve or challenge status quos in various contexts, rather than asking if 
religion is promoting violence or peace.  It gives us a more nuanced approach to 
peacebuilding, if we can see how religion is being employed to challenge or uphold a 
norm- it helps us look beyond the immediate and overt instances of violence.   
Salloukh, et. al., argue that, “although wrapped in velvet clientelist and 
ideological gloves, the violence of the sectarian system is profound though not always 
discernable or physical.”376  The current religious peacebuilding approaches are good for 
dealing with overt, urgent violence, but are less effective at addressing deeper systemic or 
institutional violence.  Without dealing with the systemic, less obvious forms of violence, 
the overt violence will continue to emerge.  The distraction of extremism often sidelines 
efforts to address systemic violence, and much of the energy and capacity of religious 
peacebuilding gets rerouted to manage the most obvious violence, at the expense of 
creating long-term change.   
The Lebanese socio-political conflict are not “about” religion, and yet, it takes 
place through the lenses of religion and sect.  Religious identities become salient through 
very particular political processes, and this process in turn changes the religious 
identities, as it is a dynamic relationship.  In other words, it is not just religion being 
“used” by politicians as if religion itself is somehow static, but it becomes itself through 
the socio-political conflict processes.  What it means to be religious is shaped by socio-
political dynamics, in both conflict and peace, and many root-cause issues (such as 
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economic disenfranchisement and inequalities) take on a sectarian or religious lens in the 
Lebanese context.  In this way, religion is inherently political.  Efforts to engage religion 
in peacebuilding are thus essential, not optional, as there is no clean divide between the 
religious and the socio-political.  However, current approaches to engaging religion in 
peacebuilding in Lebanon have been limited in their ability to increase social cohesion.  
While these efforts have proven to work in quelling direct and immediate forms of 
violence, from the civil war until the present day, they have not been able to effectively 
move Lebanese society further than this, and have in some cases served to further 
entrench the sectarian system.   
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Chapter 5: How Did We Get Here? Tracing Bosnia’s Religio-Political History 
As you walk through the center of Sarajevo, you quickly comes across a number 
of religious structures, including the Gazi Husrev Beg Mosque, founded in 1531; the old 
Orthodox church, built in the 1530s; a synagogue, built by the Ottoman governor of the 
time in 1580-81; and a Roman Catholic cathedral, built in 1889.  Along with a number of 
other religious structures, these four houses of worship are located within a half square 
kilometer of one another, nestled amongst the shops and restaurants that comprise the 
bustling center of the city.377  This heritage is a source of pride for many residents of 
Sarajevo to this day. The geography of sacred space in any given city can show the 
nation’s commitment to religious expression and pluralism, and yet, it does not always 
mean that this pluralism is without tension.  
Bosnia has been a lab for engaging religion in peacebuilding over the last 20 
years. The high levels of international intervention immediately post-war were 
unprecedented, and many focused, at least in part, on healing religious divides.378 Indeed, 
Bosnia and religion-focused conflict resolution efforts have become closely linked in 
research, with more focus here than in Lebanon on intentionally engaging religion in the 
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post-conflict climate. Immediately post-conflict, a national Interreligious Council was 
formed to help facilitate the reconciliation process. In a country where group identity 
lines during conflict were clearly correlated with religion (as well as ethnicity), even if 
these lines were constructed, and where religious symbolism and language played heavily 
into the specter of violence, Bosnia seemed like a clear case where involving the religious 
institutions, leaders, symbolism, and language in the peacebuilding processes would be 
absolutely necessary.  
Bosnia is often seen as one of the paradigmatic religious conflicts of the 20th 
century, and yet, in 1990 right before the conflict, emerging from years of socialism, very 
few within Bosnian society would identify as particularly religious.  As one of my 
respondents stated, “in Bosnia, you are a believer from 1992.” 379  How, then, can we 
explain what happened here? Do we simply say that religious symbolism and identity 
were mapped onto ethnic identity, as a cloak of sorts?  This may be part of the answer, 
and yet, there is much more to the story.  This answer does not satisfy how and why 
religion came to factor so prominently into the articulation and dynamics of the war at the 
particular time that it did.  Additionally, religious identity was itself shaped through the 
lead up to the conflict in the 1990s, through the war itself, and beyond.  How religion 
functions in Bosnian society now, and what this means for peacebuilding initiatives that 
engage religion, is shaped largely by these processes of meaning-making. 
To start to unravel these questions, we must understand the history of religion-
making in Bosnia, as it intertwines with (and is in many ways inseparable from) cultural 
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and ethnic identities.  Through this chapter, we will look at this through socio-political 
moments of groupness in Bosnia’s history, then analyze how some of these moments 
became “sticky,” to invoke Ashutosh Varshney’s terminology.   
 
Talking about Religion in Bosnia  
Bosnia, like Lebanon, was part of the Ottoman Empire, which affects the ways in 
which religion developed in this context.  Additionally, the 20th century context of 
Yugoslav socialism shaped religion in Bosnia in unique ways.   Under the Yugoslav 
socialist project, religion was highly privatized.  While the free exercise of religion was 
permitted, public displays of religion were discouraged and religion was not integrated 
into political life.   
For many, the combined factors of the near equivalence of religious and ethnic 
identity, and the privatization of religion under the socialist government, created a 
context in which numerous people confined religion to their homes and with their 
families, precipitating increased bonding cohesion.  Many of my respondents referred to 
their pre-war selves as “Eid and Baklava Muslims,” or as “Christmas and Easter 
Christians.”380 Many noted that religion was primarily seen as private and cultural; it later 
became much more public and politicized, transforming the way religion functioned in 
Bosnian society, as I will expound upon later in this chapter.   
In modern day Bosnia, religion has been mapped onto by ethnic identity nearly 
completely.  Serbs are Serbian Orthodox, Croats are Catholic, while Bosniaks are 
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Muslim.  “Muslim” legally became an ethnic category in Bosnia in the 1970’s, in 
response to the increased politicization (and institutionalization) of Serb and Croat ethnic 
identities, a point that I will examine further in this chapter.  Regardless of what one 
believes (or does not believe), or how one practices (or not), religio-ethnic identity is a 
key organizing structure for Bosnian socio-political life, from electoral and governance 
structures to employment quotas to geographic distribution and schooling, demonstrating 
many similarities to Lebanon’s socio-political organizing structures. 
Bosnia is divided into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Republika Srpska. Bosniak and Croat citizens make up the bulk of the population in 
the former, and Serbs make up the primary population in the latter, though both entities 
are multi-ethnic.  Within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are 10 cantons, 
eight of which are either Croat or Muslim, while two are mixed.381   
The highly complex electoral system in Bosnia and Herzegovina institutionalizes 
ethno-religious divisions.  The Presidency is shared between the three primary ethnic 
groups (Serb, Croat, and Bosniak), with one candidate from each group being elected 
through a plurality vote, and then rotating between occupying the Presidency and two 
Vice Presidency slots.  This closely mirrors the Lebanese consociational structure of 
government, giving explicit preference to the predominant ethnic groups in an effort to 
balance the power between them. No one who is not from one of the three primary ethnic 
groups can run for this office, and thus the Jewish and Roma minorities, for instance, are 
rendered ineligible.   
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Citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina are not compelled to vote for their ethnic 
candidate, but can only vote for one candidate (so a Croat could not, for instance, vote for 
both a Croat and a Bosniak candidate from the electoral lists).   The seats in the House of 
Representatives, one of the bodies of the Parliamentary Assembly, are proportionally 
representative of the main ethnic groups in the country.382  It is worth noting here that the 
numbers from the 1991 census are still being used to determine quotas and electoral laws; 
there was a census in 2013, but the ethnic data from that census have still not been 
released, as it would likely cause political turmoil.383  This is similar to the situation in 
Lebanon; although the census data being used in Lebanon is much older, the same 
operating principle applies: that the political structures rely on a very specific snapshot of 
ethnic/sectarian belonging, rather than being malleable over time to changing 
demographics. Florian Bieber has observed that, from 1990 until the present day, voters 
in Bosnia have opted for ethnonationalist parties, even when other cross-cutting platforms 
are available and viable in elections.384 In showing that ethno-religious political parties 
were not the only options, Bieber’s research demonstrates that ethno-religious political 
identities became embedded and embodied in Bosnian political life over time. 
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  Bosnia has institutionalized religious freedom (including the freedom to change 
one’s religion) for both individuals and communities in society, with such guarantees 
enshrined in the constitution, although there are numerous cases in which these 
guarantees are challenged or transgressed. 385   Personal status laws (including marriage, 
divorce, inheritance, and the like) are treated by civil, rather than religious courts, and 
thus unlike Lebanon, Bosnians do not rely upon clerics for personal status concerns.  
Ahmet Alibasic and Nedim Begovic argue, however, that this  
model of separation combined with equality, however, does not preclude the 
state’s control and cooperation with religious groups. The main terms of the 
state’s control over religious life are elaborated on under the procedures for 
awarding the status of legal personality and for registering religious communities 
at the Ministry of Justice.386   
 
Thus, the state indeed exerts authority over religious life by determining what 
counts as an accepted religious community in Bosnia. 
Data from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) shows that Bosnia 
has fairly low levels of government regulation of religion (3.7/10).  The state does exert 
control over what counts as religion by determining what can and cannot be considered 
an official religion in Bosnia.  The social regulation of religion is higher, at 5.6/10, 
showing that social forces act to restrict religious practice in more ways than do official 
government interventions or regulations.   
 While the Muslim and Jewish communities in Bosnia are autonomous, for the 
most part, the Catholic and Orthodox communities answer to outside authorities 
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(Catholics to the Holy See in Rome, and Orthodox to the Serbian Orthodox Synod in 
Belgrade).  Religious leaders and institutions played varied and ambivalent roles in the 
lead up to and during the Bosnian war.  One respondent observed that, “before the war, 
there was a lot of media hype of religious leaders recruiting people to join their side in 
the fight.  After the war, these same leaders were telling people to make peace.”387  Thus, 
while the employment of religion in war tactics is indisputable, the specific roles of 
religious institutions and leaders were wide-ranging.    
For Bosnia, religion is in no way a “root cause” of conflict, and yet, it played into 
and was shaped by conflict in the region over time in critical ways. We see here the ways 
in which the Bosnia case resides at the intersection of instrumentalist and constructivist 
approaches to understanding the role of religion in socio-political conflict. As a 
historically non-religious society, which has become more religious over time in terms of 
personal practice and belief, Bosnia is a key example of how religion functions as a 
dynamic conflict variable, religion in Bosnia took shape through socio-political processes 
and became an important factor in defining conflict, as well as in defining the current 
state of Bosnian society.   
 
The Social Cohesion Frame  
 As I argued in Chapter One of this dissertation, utilizing a social cohesion 
framework better measures societal progress toward peace than utilizing the more vague 
concept of peace.  Social cohesion looks at the vertical and horizontal, as well as the 
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informal and formal, ways in which social groups relate to one another, and society to the 
state.  Additionally social cohesion considers injustice and inequalities, while one can 
conceivably measure peace in a more negative sense, as the absence of overt conflict.  
 While social cohesion is my way of assessing the progress of peace work in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is not necessarily the way in which many involved in 
peacebuilding- and particularly in “religious peacebuilding”- are articulating their own 
goals and objectives, as will become apparent through discussions of my interview data 
later in the chapter. I will continue to use the term “peacebuilding” to refer to the efforts 
in the field, as this is consistent with how actors themselves talk about their work, but 
social cohesion is my measure of efficacy of these efforts, taken as a whole.   
 
Research Methodology  
I conducted field interviews in Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 2016, then 
followed up with phone interviews, between April 2016-February 2017.  I interviewed 17 
individuals, concentrating the bulk of my interviews in Sarajevo, with a few interviews in 
Banja Luka and some in Maglaj, along with some interviews with people previously 
involved in Bosnian peace processes who are now residing in the United States.  Several 
respondents that I interviewed in Sarajevo worked and lived outside of the city.  I 
selected respondents from different ethno-religious groups in order to get a sampling of 
perspectives, and I spoke with persons who reported different levels of religious 
commitment- some were religious leaders, while others identified as religious but had 
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varying levels of engagement with the institutions affiliated with their faith tradition, and 
others identifying as secular.   
I spoke with peacebuilding actors, religious leaders, and political officials. 
Interviewees spoke from both individual and organizational perspectives on how they 
have engaged religion in peacebuilding work, and how they think about the impact of this 
work within the Bosnian socio-political context.  Many were born and raised in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and my respondents spanned several generations.  Some had been 
working in peacebuilding or doing inter-religious work since the war began, while others 
were newer to active engagement in this work.  
I selected my interview respondents through preliminary outreach to individuals 
or organizations that emerged as key players in the field of religious peacebuilding, based 
on my initial desk research.  I reached out to these individuals and organizations prior to 
arrival to make contact and set up interviews.  Once on site, I recruited new interviewees 
through snowball sampling, taking recommendations from those with whom I interacted 
on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those I interviewed were very willing to 
recommend other players in the peacebuilding field, and thus, my cohort of interviewees 
grew naturally from these initial points of contact.  This methodology is similar to the 
approach I took in Lebanon, although it was slightly modified to fit the Bosnian context, 
and I was able to interview more people outside of Sarajevo that I was able to outside of 
Beirut.   
My analysis in this chapter combines the findings from these interviews with a 
study of materials from a large sampling of peacebuilding organizations.  These materials 
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included evaluations, internal planning documents, and public project and program 
descriptions and advertisements.   These materials help to supplement my interviews by 
demonstrating how practitioners involved in these approaches frame their objectives, 
goals, and scope of work for both internal purposes as well as for external audiences.   
Additionally, I draw upon survey data from three surveys, including two from the 
University of Edinburgh along with the UNDP National Human Development Report 
2009 on Social Capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina.   
  
Scope and Structure  
This case study is divided into two chapters, and proceeds as follows: in the 
present chapter, I outline the social and political history of religion and ethnicity in 
Bosnia from the Ottoman era to the present, focusing on several key historical periods.  
This is not meant to be a complete overview of Bosnia’s history, but rather reveals 
several key socio-political moments that helped to shape ethno-religious identities and 
make them politically meaningful at different points in time. I then shift in Chapter Six to 
an overview and analysis of a sampling of recent and current approaches to engage 
religion in peacebuilding in Bosnia, analyzing the challenges and impact of these efforts 
in terms of social cohesion in the country.  Through this, I will provide the reader with 
several key insights relevant to understanding the complex relationship between religion 
and peacebuilding in and beyond Bosnia.  
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Tracing Religion in Bosnia’s Socio-Political History 
The first part of this chapter is a tour of some of the key “moments of 
groupness”388 for the religious communities in the area now known as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, including an analysis of how some of these moments stuck and, in many 
ways, fused with ethno-political identities.  This examination demonstrates that the 
religious tensions that showed up in the conflict of the early 1990’s do not stem from 
“ancient hatreds,” nor do they derive from religious ideologies as such.  Rather, religious 
ideologies were used to create exclusive bonding cohesion and to justify violence during 
the war were themselves shaped through a series of socio-political events throughout 
Balkan history. 
 
Bosnia on the Edge of Empires 
Bosnia has been a multi-religious context for centuries, and over the years, 
different religious communities have been dominant, leaving other religious communities 
with varying degrees of freedom and autonomy.389  This reality undercuts any one 
group’s ability to claim exclusive native dominance.390 While the ethnic and religious 
histories of the Balkan people is disputed, historians assert that south Slav peoples arrived 
in the Balkans between the 6th and 7th centuries, with large conversions to Christianity in 
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the 9th century.  The Christian population was split into western and eastern Christianity, 
mirroring the schism of the church.  The split population began using different scripts for 
writing, thus materially reifying the sense of difference between the two primary 
Christian communities.391   
The area now known as Bosnia was a trade crossroads in the Balkans.  Seen as a 
meeting ground (or, from the perspective of some, a ‘no man’s land’) between Catholic 
Dalmatia and Orthodox Serbia during the Middle Ages,392 Bosnia was overtaken by the 
Ottomans in 1483, and large numbers of Bosnians converted to Islam over time.393 The 
Serb Patriarchate, which had been set up in the Kosovo region in 1346, was abolished by 
the Ottomans in the 15th century but re-established- still under the Ottomans- in 1557.  It 
remained until 1766, when the Ottomans again abolished it for fear of it being used to 
cultivate anti-Ottoman revolutionary sentiments and action.394 The Serbian church was 
then re-subsumed under the jurisdiction of Constantinople until the Serbian Patriarchate 
was re-established in 1920. 
 The pre-Ottoman borderland identity of Bosnia also came with a lack of strong 
religious institutional oversight.  Thus, Bosnian Catholics among other groups developed 
their own local religious traditions that were seen by the outside Catholic religious 
                                                
391 Sells, Michael, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (Berkeley:  University of 
California Press, 1996), 32.   
392 Fine, John V.A., “The Various Faiths in the History of Bosnia:  Middle Ages to the Present,” in Islam 
and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States, ed. Maya Shatzmiller 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 3. 
393 Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, 32-35.   
394 Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, 53.   
 188 
authorities (including in particular the Hungarian Catholics, as Austria-Hungary gained 
control of the region for a period) as heretical. Subsequently, outside authorities 
established greater institutional oversight as an effort to bring them back in line.  The 
local Catholics rebelled against this oversight, breaking ties with Rome and forming their 
own Bosnian Church in the 1250s.  While the Bosnian Church leaders did return to the 
fold of the official Catholic Church about a century later, the boundaries and beliefs of 
the local Catholics (including their leadership) remained porous and open to regular 
interaction with other religious communities.395 
In this period, the three major groups (Serb, Croat and Bosniak) all spoke dialects 
(with their own unique scripts) of the same language, which was until recently referred to 
as Serbo-Croatian.396 Additionally, in medieval Bosnia, no one known as Serbs or Croats 
lived in Bosnia proper, as the local population of varying religious traditions considered 
themselves to be Bosnian.  Thus, any wars at this point were international, not internal 
ethnic wars.397 
 During the final five years of the pre-Ottoman Bosnian state, as the Ottoman 
Empire advanced toward the Balkans, the king sought to eliminate the Bosnian Church 
entirely in an effort to attract European aid to the Bosnian cause.  Thus, when the 
Ottomans conquered most of Bosnia in the 1460s, the Bosnian Church had mostly 
disappeared.398 During the early Ottoman period, more Orthodox Christians were 
                                                
395 Fine, “The Various Faiths in the History of Bosnia,” 4.   
396 Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, 5.  
397 Fine, The Various Faiths in the History of Bosnia, 8.  
398 Fine, “The Various Faiths in the History of Bosnia,” 5.  
 189 
entering Bosnia from Serbia (fleeing an earlier Ottoman takeover there), and Catholics 
fled to Dalmatia and Croatia (which were still not conquered by Ottoman forces), thus 
creating major demographic shifts in the Christian populations.  Additionally, converts to 
Islam came from all of these religious communities, but this was a very slow process of 
conversion, as it was not until the 17th century that a majority of Bosnians had become 
Muslim.399 
 While there are different perspectives on the notions of religious tolerance and 
coexistence under the Ottoman millet system, Michael Sells notes that,  
The truth is that while for many centuries religious coexistence was undoubtedly 
more accepted under the Ottomans than almost anywhere in Christendom, the was 
certainly no sense of religious equality.  If there was no ethnic conflict, it was not 
because of ‘tolerance’ but because there was no concept of nationality among the 
Sultan’s subjects, and because Christianity stressed the ‘community of believers’ 
rather than ethnic solidarity.400 
 
 Thus, we can acknowledge the unique nature of religious coexistence under the 
Ottomans without romanticizing it, while also recognizing that it looked different in 
different geographic and cultural contexts and changed over time.  Christians and Jews 
had special status as “people of the book,” as the millet arrangement allowed for a certain 
level of autonomy for religious communities and particularly for the religious elites.  At 
the same time, non-Muslim religious communities (and the individuals that comprised 
them) also experienced discrimination and sometimes harsh treatment and higher 
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taxes.401  This includes in particular the practice of devşirme (often translated as the ‘levy 
of boys’), in which select Christian boys were enlisted into military or administrative 
service for the Ottoman state and compelled to convert to Islam.402  This practice indeed 
entailed forced conversion, while also, some argue, providing advancement opportunities 
for men from Christian families.  Scholars of the period disagree on whether or not this 
was met with acceptance and praise or resistance from Christian communities, as records 
show that reactions from Christian populations were mixed.403 
Demographic changes by the 15th century led Muslims to Balkan cities, while the 
countryside remained mainly Christian.  While tax registers between 1520-1539 reveal 
that more than 80% of the residents of the Balkans were Christian, Muslims were more 
numerous than Christians in most Balkan cities.404  The Ottomans did not seek out mass 
conversion to Islam, though there were certainly waves of conversion, in part because it 
was beneficial to have non-Muslims living in the territories to pay higher taxes and 
provide other benefits, 405 although there is mixed evidence of how this played out in 
reality. The Orthodox Church in particular received many benefits from this arrangement, 
as they were given more control over their own people, collecting taxes from them and 
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dispensing justice through religious courts.406  The Bosnian Franciscans also had their 
own millet, though a number of Catholics in the region converted to Islam, as their ties to 
Rome led to a less desirable arrangement for local Catholics than that of local Orthodox 
Christians.407 According to Mark Mazower, “Ottoman rule was bringing Balkan 
Christians not only religious autonomy but increasing prosperity as well.”408  It is 
important to note that the reference to “Balkan Christians” here means the leadership, not 
the masses.   
While institutional religious separation and autonomy was a reality in the Balkans 
under the Ottomans, lived religion saw much more cross-pollination among religions.  
Christians commonly visited Muslim sacred sites and vice versa, and particularly in areas 
outside of the reach of the institutions, there was more institutional “slippage” as well, 
with non-Muslims frequently opting to utilize Islamic courts.  John Fine notes that,  
The interaction between religious communities on the village level during the 
Ottoman period, supported by the local priests, most of whom were 
locals….allowed the development of what truly is a Bosnian culture, shared by 
Bosnians of all faiths and distinct from that of the neighbouring regions (now 
states).409 
 
Shared religious life was thus a reality, working within the simultaneous 
experience of religious division at the institutional levels.410   
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The 18th century entailed both chronic fighting on numerous fronts, and increased 
decentralization in Bosnia, leading to a very weak central state or sense of national 
identity. Ethnic distinctions within Bosnia became much more pronounced in the 19th 
century.  Religion and ethnicity were becoming more fused, and religio-nationalism 
began to develop. Fine asserts that,  
The concept of ethnicity itself had raised its dubious if not evil head in Bosnia 
only in the nineteenth century, when Christian Bosnians began to take up ethnic 
and national ideas that penetrated Bosnia from Serbia and Croatia.  With this 
development, new dimensions were added to one’s religious identity.  If you were 
a Catholic, you were also a Croat; if an Orthodox, then also a Serb.  Now, for the 
first time, the names ‘Serb’ and ‘Croat’ were applied to people in Bosnia.411 
 
 A particular form of nationalism was thus beginning to emerge, developing and 
reifying ethno-religious identities in a way that had no been seen before in this context.  
Peasant uprisings began in the mid-1800s, with a particularly notable revolt in 1875 in 
Herzegovina, proceeded by major declines in Ottoman power in the region.  These 
revolts were not explicitly nationalistic, as they focused on the rights of the peasants, but 
the calls for independence coincided with nationalist sentiments that were on the rise in 
the region, precipitated by the Balkan enlightenment.412 
 Austria-Hungary began to occupy Bosnia in 1878, precipitating a crisis in 
Catholic and Muslim communities on the local level, as the Catholic Austrian authorities 
brought with them a secular, European approach to education.  Muslims feared mass 
conversions to Catholicism, and the Muslim elites became more interested in asserting 
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authority over the religious lives of village Muslims.413  This trend was echoed by 
Catholic authorities as well (both from Rome and from local Franciscan elites), as fear of 
major changes spurred a much stronger interest in asserting more religious control over 
their own flock.414  Under Austrian authorities, Bosnian Muslims became more organized 
in a centralized local hierarchy, as Austrians hoped to create distance between Bosnian 
Muslims and Ottoman authorities.  Thus, the Austrian emperor appointed the first Rais 
al-‘Ulama (Grand Mufti) of Bosnia in 1882.415   
 Fine argues that, “the tensions that came to the fore with the Austrian 
occupation...are within religious (becoming ethnic) communities, not between them.”416  
This is important to note, as it is often the case that tensions within religious 
communities, and assertions of control from institutional elites, often precede tensions 
between religious communities, as seen in the increased control different religious 
authorities attempted to assert over their own communities in this time period. Multi-
direction conversion took place during the 15th and 16th centuries in particular, with 
conversions between Islam and the Christian sects, but also from one Christian sect to 
another as well (i.e., from the Bosnian Church to the Orthodox or Catholic).417  
Additionally, there were clashes, toward the end of Ottoman rule in particular, between 
external institutional religious authorities and local religious communities.  One such case 
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was between the Catholic leadership in Rome and the local Franciscans in Bosnia, as the 
latter were seen as too loose in their tolerance for diverse and heterodox practice among 
lay Catholics.418  In order to exert greater control, the Pope (with the support of the 
Austrian emperor) appointed an archbishop to Sarajevo- something that had not been 
done previously. 419  In the other communities, this intra-religious tension was also seen 
through competing authorities vying for control and community representation, both 
leading up to and during the war in the 1990’s.     
The Ottoman Empire officially fell in the Balkans in 1923, as the modern political 
map of the Balkans emerged, leading into the multiple Yugoslav eras.420  The Autro-
Hungarian occupation of Bosnia, paired for a length of time with formal Ottoman rule, in 
many ways nationalized the millet system of governance, as it reified the religious 
communities as socio-political entities, subscribing these religious distinctions into socio-
political life in a very material way.   
 
Ethno-political Identities in the Yugoslav Eras  
The Yugoslav state existed in various forms from approximately 1918-1991, first 
as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, following the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire, then as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, then, after World War II, as the Socialist 
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.421  While at the emergence of the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, enthusiasm for South Slav unification was mostly limited to intellectual and 
societal elites, the growth in higher education in the Balkans prior to World War I helped 
cultivate the spread of this enthusiasm for unified South Slav identity.422  World War I 
created tensions for this vision, as ethnic nationalism grew in the Balkans, but the 
Kingdom was created nevertheless, known in 1918 as “the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes.”423  The multi-confessional, multi-national Kingdom included the regions 
of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia and Dalmatia, Vojvodina and Croatia-
Slavonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they adopted a constitution for the new entity in 
1921, asserting that this people spoke a single language (“Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian”).424   
Lenard Cohen notes that,  
Some momentum toward the formation of a Yugoslav identity did take place 
during the 1920s simply owing to the cohabitation and routine interaction of 
different South Slav elites and citizens in a unified state, but on balance the 
countervailing force of disappointment and bitterness regarding overcentralization 
and ethnic inequalities proved to be far more influential.425  
 
Thus, while political elites were successful in creating the official political body, 
they faced numerous challenges trying to spread a sense of common identity among all of 
the peoples that made up the Kingdom.    
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In 1929, King Alexander renamed the entity the “Kingdom of Yugoslavia,” and 
abolished the existing constitution, further centralizing authority and banning political 
organizations with religious, regional or ethnic goals.  While he did experience initial 
success in this effort, ethnic movements continued to gain momentum, and the King was 
assassinated in 1934 by Croatian Ustashe and Macedonian fighters working in 
collaboration with one another.426   
The second half of the 1930s saw greater stability for the Kingdom, and a 1939 
agreement with Croatian forces essentially federalized the country, giving Croatians their 
own “national unit”.  This created some temporary balance between the two largest ethnic 
groups- the Serbs and Croats- and this era saw an increased sense of common Yugoslav 
identity, in the midst of decentralization.427  Under the Kingdom, religion was not 
prohibited, but it was not particularly welcomed, nor was it a key part of how different 
ethnic groups identified themselves in public, political ways. While a Bosnian identity 
still existed, the Kingdom did not formally recognize a Bosnian entity or “nation.”   
 In the early 1940’s, the fascist Ustashe military ruled in the Croatian state, 
promoting a dedication to “greater Croatia,” a vision that included expelling the Serbs.  A 
“Chetnik” guerilla army of Serbs fought back against this destruction, and while some of 
them nursed an idea of “Greater Serbia,” the army, under the leadership of Josip Broz 
Tito, was of mixed ethnicity and was eventually able to ward off the Ustashe fighters.  
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 World War II sparked bloody interethnic violence and civil war across the 
region.428  In 1941, following the partition of Yugoslavia, Bosnia was joined to Croatia; 
at the time, it was 20% Croat, 35% Muslim, and 42% Serb.  The Croatian leadership 
began wooing Muslims while cleansing the Serbs, and the local Franciscan priests had by 
and large supported the violent Croatian Ustase rulers.429 Thus, religious rhetoric 
supporting ethnic violence emerged more strongly within the context of World World II 
and the disintegration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.   
In 1945, Tito reestablished the Yugoslav federation, which had been destroyed by 
Nazi Germany in 1941.430  Tito’s motto of “brotherhood and unity,” under which 
Yugoslavia was liberated and its constituent regions re-joined to one another as 6 
republics, was meant to cast a regional sentiment of unity among the republics.  
However, as Yugoslavia became increasingly decentralized, ethnic identity increased and 
became more central to political activism.   
In the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, there was freedom of expression 
of religion but no public display of beliefs or ritual.  Devoutness was seen as 
incompatible with holding membership in the Yugoslav Communist Party.  In the 1950s 
and 1960s, Muslim Communist Party members were discouraged from giving children 
traditional Muslim names and there were no workplace accommodations for religious 
observances.   
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Tone Bringa observes that,  
The Yugoslav’ authorities’ curb on the expression of religious beliefs in public 
was a combination of the basically atheist outlook of their communist ideology 
and their fear of any expression of separatist nationalism.  The authorities were 
well aware that for many ‘Yugoslavs’ adherence to one particular religion was 
intimately linked to their identification with one national community (or 
‘nation’).431   
 
 Because of this, before 1990, religious beliefs and rituals were expressed 
privately, often in people’s homes, largely dominated by women. Under Tito’s 
Yugoslavia, religion was private & individual, while the religious institutions 
(specifically, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Croatian Catholic Church, and the 
Islamic Community in Bosnia) served as the keepers of culture in many ways, and 
indeed, paved the way for ethno-religious mobilization later. A number of respondents 
talked about their own experience of religion under socialist Yugoslavia.  A Muslim 
activist described their own family as “Eid and Baklava Muslims”, while a Serb activist 
talked about being “Christmas and Easter Christians.”  In other words, religious identity 
before the war was for many part of the landscape of life, worn lightly, but not at the 
forefront of one’s identity.  Religious identity was thus re-shaped through the war. 
Some argue that because religion existed on Balkan life’s periphery before the 
war, and was for many an “empty” cultural container, it was easy to manipulate (or “fill”) 
by religio-political entrepreneurs looking to mobilize otherwise similar people against 
one another.  Serbian Orthodox leadership early on bought into the politicization of 
religious identity as part of an ethno-national project, led by Serbian politicians, and the 
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church hierarchy quickly became supportive of these efforts.  The images of priests 
blessing soldiers and weapons and of monasteries harboring fighters remain visceral in 
the minds of many I spoke with.  Additionally, the emergence of a Muslim ethnic identity 
as such was a key development in the 20th century that contributes in important ways to 
the utilization of religion in subsequent conflict and strife.   
 
Emergence of a Muslim Ethnic Identity  
Muslims in the region did not have their own ethnic identity until the latter part of 
the 20th Century, seeing themselves as members of their political-national entities, and as 
“Bosnian” more generally, but not as a separate nation based on religious identity until 
the late 1960’s, when this shifted.  The increase in the importance of ethnic identity 
regionally led Muslims to seek an identity label of their own, akin to the Serb and 
Croatian labels that were gaining prominence.  Thus, in 1968, they were officially 
recognized under the label “Muslim,” which was meant to signify a religious community 
and now, an ethnic identity.432 
 Ashutosh Varshney notes that,   
In the post-1945 Yugoslavia, Croats, Macedonians, Serbs, Slovenes, and 
Montenegrins were called nations; Albanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians were 
nationalities; and Austrians, Greeks, Jews, Germans, and Poles were ‘other 
nationalities and ethnic groups.’ In the 1971 constitution, Muslims of Yugoslavia 
were promoted from a nationality to a nation.433   
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The Yugoslav government recognized this new national category of “Muslims” in 
order to give Muslims an equivalent alternative to Serb and Croat classifications (which 
were the other options; “Muslim” became the only option now for non-Serb, non-Croat 
Bosnians).434 Thus, the emergence of a Muslim political identity a in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
results from the changing socio-political climate between 1945 and 1971, during and 
following World War II. 
 While this, according to Sells, “finally gave Bosnian Muslims a political voice 
alongside Catholics and Orthodox Serbs…it did so at the cost of further reinforcing the 
identity between religion and nationality.”435  Bosnian Muslims had held onto their 
secular identity prior to this, attempting to make a stand against the erosion of a secular 
Bosnian state. However, the political climate essentially forced a politicized religious 
identity category for Bosnian Muslims as the only way to hold weight against the 
increasingly nationalist Serb and Croatian powers, in order to secure institutional space 
for their community in political and social life.436 This demonstrates one way in which a 
certain form and function of religious identity became materially manifest in Bosnian 
life, a legacy for years to come.  
 This push for a strong public religious identity did not reflect the ways in which 
many Bosnian Muslims viewed themselves, which was primarily as Bosniaks, rather than 
prioritizing their religious identity.   
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As Bringa observes,  
Among Bosnian Muslims, there were devout believers who held deep religious 
convictions, there were people who practiced certain key rituals and honoured 
major religious holy days out of respect for tradition, there were those who 
believed in God but had never learned how to practice Islam, and there were those 
Muslims by ‘ethnicity’ who declared themselves atheists. In other words, among 
Bosnia’s Muslims there was a continuum of degrees of conviction and practice 
similar to what is found in Christian-defined societies in Western Europe.437 
 
 The decision to take on “Muslim” as an ethnic identity, then, did not naturally 
follow religious developments within the community, but rather reflected political 
developments (both inside and outside the community).  An increased religiosity 
followed, to some degree, as the shift in the way Bosnian Muslims became politically 
identified as Muslims led to shifts in how Islam was lived out within Bosnian society.  
There was an uptick in religious expression (attending sermons and religious rituals or 
services, and so on) toward the end of the 1980’s.  This was also true for other religious 
communities, as communist structures were losing control of society.438  Bringa notes 
that while many welcomed this increased openness for public religious expression, which 
had been tamped down in socialist Yugoslavia for fear it would breed ethno-nationalism, 
it also served to highlight the distinctions between the three primary ethno-religious 
communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.439 
This brief tour of Bosnian history demonstrates that the Balkan conflict does not 
in any way reflect “age old” religious animosities brewing, but rather, religion was 
                                                
437 Bringa, “Islam and the Quest for Identity in Post-Communist Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 29.   
438 Bringa, “Islam and the Quest for Identity in Post-Communist Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 29.   
439 Bringa, “Islam and the Quest for Identity in Post-Communist Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 26, 29.   
 202 
employed in a specific way to support a nationalist project and others were driven to 
follow suit in taking on the badge of religious identity as a primary form of social and 
political expression.  Simultaneous to Muslim development as ethnic identity, Serbian 
Orthodox narratives were also shifting and hardening. Ethno-religious identities 
sharpened in response to one another, paving the way for war to take on religious tones 
when it broke out.  These processes and events changed what it meant to be Muslim in 
Bosnia, in interaction with the flexing of other ethno-religious identities in the region.  
Additionally, the emergence of a Muslim ethnic identity in Bosnia helped to prioritize 
religion as one of the key differences between groups.  This material reality of religio-
political identity becomes critical in understanding how the Bosnian war played out.   
  
Preparing for War  
 The Yugoslav state continued to weaken, as demands for decentralization and 
autonomy increased, and the 1974 revised constitution reinforced this trend by shifting 
federal power to more localized institutions. In the midst of these regional and 
geopolitical shifts, political movements within Yugoslavia took on an increasingly 
nationalist tone.  The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), for example, readopted the 
Croatian symbols used during WWII, displacing the Yugoslav symbols they had been 
utilizing.  The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Bosnian Muslim Party of 
Democratic Action (SDA) both took on nationalist rhetoric and membership as well.440 
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Following Tito’s death in 1980, the Yugoslav presidency became rotational 
between the different Yugoslav republics.  Strife between the republics became more 
pronounced, including a struggle between Albanian and Serbian powers in the late 1980s.  
This fueled Serbian nationalist rhetoric, and Slobodan Milosevic, a Serbian communist 
party official, utilized this to claim control over Yugoslavia in 1987.  In response, both 
Slovenes and Croats declared independence in 1991.  Confrontations subsequently 
increased between Serbian and Croatian forces, particularly in areas where Croatian 
nationalism had been prominent during the time of the Ustashe and where Croat leaders 
had not acknowledged Ustashe atrocities during World War II.441  These confrontations 
often left Bosnians, and particularly Muslim residents of the region, caught in the middle, 
though sometimes being targeted more explicitly by actors such as Serb leader Radovan 
Karadzic.   
Dino Abazović argues that during the early post-socialist period, there were two 
simultaneous and interactive processes occurring: the “nationalization of the sacral” and 
“sacralization of the national.” He states, “In other words, ethno-national political 
ideologies have demanded (and have been granted) the support of organized religious 
doctrines in order to legitimize new establishments.”442 Both national political entities 
and religious institutions took refuge, of sorts, in these processes, as religion re-entered 
the public square with force.   
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Prior to the war, then, the groundwork had been laid for religiopolitical 
entrepreneurs to draw on religious narratives in their framing of the struggle for power 
and territory, as religion was produced materially in ways that served key socio-political 
purposes.  As mentioned previously, expressions of nationalism had become increasingly 
religious in tone. Sells points out that, “at the heart of the agitation by Serb radicals 
against the Muslims of Yugoslavia there has been a mythology which presents Slavic 
Muslims as Christ killers.”443  The mythology that Sells refers to here references the 
death of the Serb Prince Lazar in a 1389 battle with Ottoman Sultan Murat (who also died 
in the same battle).  Prince Lazar’s death became an anchor of Serb national mythology, 
though this national myth was not continuous from 1389, but rather was revived and 
repackaged in the 19th century by Serb nationalist writers and artists, including Vuk 
Karadzic.444  
Milosevic often appeared with pictures of Prince Lazar, portraying himself as the 
savior of the Serbian Christians from Muslim and other “occupiers.”  As Stuart Kaufman 
points out, this is a key example of symbolic politics being used to inspire and embolden 
narratives that would come to life to justify violence in particular ways.445 Thus, 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs (including writers, artists, politicians and religious elites) 
built the scaffolding for a Serb nationalist identity that would clearly draw on religious 
tropes.  In the demographic shifts of the 1980’s, a number of Serbs moved out of Albania 
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and Kosovo, while the Muslim population in each context grew.  This fed a Serb 
narrative that Muslims were planning genocide against the Serbs, and the story of Prince 
Lazar became more and more popular.  This narrative was not limited to Muslims in 
Albania and Kosovo, but rather was projected onto all Slavic Muslims.446 
A Serb festival in 1989 demonstrated what Sells refers to as several “streams of 
rage” that were routed into violence against Bosnian civilians in the following years.  
Sells argues that,  
Three streams of rage-- disinterment of remains of Serb victims of genocide in 
World War II, procession of Lazar’s relics through Bosnia and around Kosovo, 
and pilgrimage of Serbs to visit the relics in Kosovo-- were channeled into a 
single raging torrent.  Within three years, those who directed the festivities in 
1989 were organizing the unspeakable depravities against Bosnian civilians.447   
 
The building of a national Serbian mythology that drew upon religious symbolism 
and narratives was thus lived out materially through these events before the nationalist 
rage took a large step further into the violence in the early 1990’s.   
 Serb nationalists continued to spread the view that Ottoman rule was oppressive, 
depraved, and backwards, and this “became the foundation for a new religious ideology, 
Christoslavism, the belief that Slavs are Christian by nature and that any conversion from 
Christianity is a betrayal of the Slavic race.”448  These nationalists posited that those who 
converted to Islam under the Ottomans were either forced or decided to do so out of 
cowardly or selfish opportunism.449  These narratives, and the material ways in which 
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they were enacted in public spaces, served to increase ethno-nationalist cohesion, 
bolstered by religious stories and symbols, while pushing the sense of a multi-ethnic, 
multi-religious Bosnia further and further away.   
All of this led to major shifts in the way religion was understood and lived out in 
Bosnia.  One respondent, reflecting on the lead up to the war, commented that, “as 
Yugoslavia fell apart, it felt like there was a need to put back on your religious or national 
identity in some ways.  This made it hard for mixed marriages.  It didn’t used to matter, 
then it became the only thing that mattered.”450 This demonstrates the starkness of the 
shift that took place in the immediate lead-up to the war for many Bosnians.  For Bosnian 
Muslims, Perica observes, while religious fundamentalism was not a driving force of 
Muslim nationalism in Bosnia in the early 1990’s, ethnic nationalism (mapped onto 
religious identity) was:  
Religion boomed, but so did a ‘new’ history, without which a nation cannot exist.  
School textbooks glorified the Ottoman era.  The Bosniaks have become a martyr-
nation, victim of a genocide perpetrated against Muslims by the two neighboring 
Christian nations.451  
 
 The re-entry of religion into the public square was closely intertwined with ethnic 
nationalism, and thus what it meant to be “religious” in Bosnia took on an entirely 
different tone over this time period.   
In the spring of 1992, Bosnia voted for independence in a referendum and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was recognized internationally as a sovereign state, while Bosnian Serb 
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nationalists declared their own independent “Republika Srpska” with a separate 
headquarters, backed by Serbia, and with Karadzic as its president.452 After the vote, Serb 
nationalists opened fire on those celebrating in the street outside the Parliament building 
in Sarajevo, and the Yugoslav National Army, which was Serb controlled, began a full-
fledged assault on Sarajevo, which involved ethnic cleansing and the destruction of 
cultural and religious artifacts and buildings.453  The burning of the Vijecnica, the 
National and University Library, was a particularly striking blow to the rich and varied 
cultural heritage of Sarajevo.   
As Andras Riedlmayer argues,  
This systematic assault on culture can be explained as an attempt to eliminate the 
material evidence-- books, documents, and works of art-- that could remind future 
generations that people of different ethnic and religious traditions once shared a 
common heritage and common space in Bosnia.454  
 
The erasure of common spaces and culture furthered the sense of division, with 
repercussions far beyond the course of the war itself.   
By the fall of 1992, the Serbian military occupied 70% of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and mass killings of non-Serbs were committed across the country.  Sells notes that,  
When through historical circumstance such rage was diverted from the Albanians 
in Kosovo to Slavic Muslims in Bosnia, there was nothing the Bosnian Muslims 
could possibly do to convince their attackers of their peaceful intent; even their 
peaceful smile could be read as the smile of a Judas.455  
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These mass killings were bolstered by a growing sense among Serbs that they 
were fulfilling a religious duty, protecting their own and exacting revenge.  
In 1993, Croat nationalists began to follow the path of Serb nationalists in 
targeting Muslims, as the observed Serbs gaining territorial concessions rather than being 
punished for their horrific treatment of the local Muslim population.456 They revived the 
Ustashe, the Croatian militia that, supported by the Nazi regime, was quite brutal during 
the Second World War.457    
 During the Bosnian war itself, religion was drawn upon to identify victims, as 
well as to justify violent actions.  Sells remarks that,  
 In the world of Omarska [a town in Bosnia], if an inhabitant of Bosnia had a 
name identifiable as Muslim or parents with names identifiable as Muslim, that 
was considered guilt enough, whatever the beliefs or practices of that individual 
and whether or not that person was categorized as ‘Muslim’ in the nationalities 
census.  Those organizing the persecution, on the other hand, identified 
themselves and their cause through explicit religious symbols.  The symbols 
appeared in the three-fingered hand gestures representing the Christian trinity, in 
the images of sacred figures of Serbian religious mythology on their uniform 
insignia, in the songs they memorized and forced their victims to sign, on the 
priest’s ring they kissed before and after their acts of persecution, and in the 
formal religious ceremonies that marked the purification of a town of its Muslim 
population.458 
 
This reality in Bosnia, which is similar to the Lebanese case, demonstrates the 
deep and widespread ways religious symbolism and identity came into play in the war, 
transforming conflicts over territory and political control into “religious conflicts,” 
between increasingly polarized ethno-religious groups.  While certainly there were many 
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Serbians opposing the ethnic- and religio-nationalists, Serbian nationalists cracked down 
on dissent.  Sells remarks that one of the features of religion-based violence in BiH was 
the “elimination of all dissent within a particular religious group and destruction of the 
people outside of it.”459 Intra-religious tension was certainly high and those with power 
worked hard to stamp out divergence and dissent.     
Additionally, numerous religious and cultural artifacts were specifically targeted 
for destruction through the course of war,460 and a number of my respondents noted the 
ways in which mosques were targeted for destruction, even when the areas in a city or 
town surrounding the mosque were left intact.461 One respondent noted that in his town, 
all of the houses of worship were intentionally targeted during the war.462  These 
anecdotes are confirmed by Gregory Most’s research on the destruction of houses of 
worship during the Bosnian war, which shows that this happened at very high levels 
country-wide.463 
Alliances between the religio-ethnic groups shifted throughout the war, with 
Serbs and Croats collaborating in certain cities, Croats and Muslims in others, and all 
three groups fighting one another in other contexts, as politics shifted over time- a trend 
seen in the Lebanon case as well.  One Croat respondent, who comes from a smaller city 
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a few hours outside of Sarajevo, reflected that the Croats and Muslims were working 
together to defend his town against the Serbs in the first year of the war.  However, once 
word came from the Herzegovina region that Croats and Muslims were fighting there, 
things shifted in his town and the larger Muslim population began to take Croats into war 
camps.  This respondent was in a war camp for nine months, and noted that he could see 
his own home from where he worked, and he personally knew the vast majority of his 
captors.464 
The international response to the Bosnian conflict favored the demands of ethnic 
nationalists, rather than prioritizing the calls of the Bosnian government calling for a 
multi-ethnic state.  Both internally and externally, a narrative of an “Islamic component” 
was also prioritized, even though any Islamic nationalism arose late in the conflict and, 
some argue, was primarily imported from outside actors.465  Bringa notes that there was a 
widespread perception in Europe that Islam was foreign and/or a product of a past era.466  
This played heavily into the international perception and discussion of the Bosnian war, 
which was bolstered also by an obsession with Islamic fundamentalism, as Bringa states, 
“It is important to note that in Tito’s Yugoslavia, Islamic fundamentalism (or just 
‘fundamentalist’) was considered synonymous with Muslim nationalism and a parallel to 
Serb and Croat nationalism.”467  Internal and external observers, who saw any political or 
public expression of Islam as somehow “fundamentalist” in nature, thus shared this 
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obsession with seeing Islamic fundamentalism as a key component of the Bosnian 
conflict.   
The Muslim identity of Bosnians was thus prioritized more by those outside 
looking in than by the Muslim population itself, at least in the first couple years of the 
conflict.  Muslims across the globe saw Bosnian Muslims as being victimized because of 
their religious identity and began sending humanitarian and military aid to the 
population,468 while Western observers fixated on their Muslim identity as partially to 
blame for the conflict (some as victims, some as perpetrators).  As Maya Shatzmiller 
observes, “no matter how the secular Bosnian Muslims viewed themselves, their 
neighbours and other Europeans regarded them, in the first place, as Muslims.”469 This 
prioritization of Muslim identity by outsiders led to local reification of this narrative in 
certain ways, as leaders like Mustafa Ceric, head of the Islamic community, pushed for 
more public Islamic identity and education, and Qur’anic quotes and Islamic symbols 
began to show up in the armed forces, particularly in 1994-1995.470   
In 1993, Alija Isakovic, the head of the congress of Muslim leaders, is quoted as 
having said, “Now that multiethnic Bosnia has been destroyed, the Muslim state must 
create its own political and constitutional framework in the same way as the Bosnian 
Serbs and Croats have done.”471 Thus, again, Bosnian Muslim identity as a 
                                                
468 Fine, “The Various Faiths in the History of Bosnia,” 18. 
469 Shatzmiller, “Introduction,” Islam and Bosnia, xii  
470 Fine, “The Various Faiths in the History of Bosnia,” 19. 
471 Quoted by Fine, “The Various Faiths in the History of Bosnia,” 17.   
 212 
nationalist/ethnic identity continued to develop in interaction with and response to Serb 
and Croat nationalist trends.   
Middle Eastern religious actors, primarily from the Gulf, also fed into the 
“Islamicization” of the Bosnian Muslim cause as well, patronizing Bosnian Muslims and 
seeing them “as ignorant of the true faith and therefore in need of instruction and 
proselytizing.”472  This led to a reorientation of Bosnian Muslims toward the worldwide 
community of Muslims in a way that was not previously seen in Bosnia.  Additionally, 
Karadzic played into Western fears of Muslims and orientalist tropes, referring to 
Bosnian Muslims as Turks and fundamentalists, and playing up acts of terrorism and a 
general “Muslim threat” to Christian civilization. These factors demonstrate not only the 
important ways in which Bosnian Muslim identity was shaped in reaction to other 
emerging ethno-religious identities, but also the important role that outsiders (and 
particularly religious outsiders) on all sides played in feeding the religious narratives of 
the conflict.  
 Bringa notes that, there was not a rejection 
of a specific Muslim identity anchored in Bosnian society, but it does mean a 
stronger stress on the Islamic heritage of that collective identity...In Bosnia, 
however, the more public use of Islamic symbols has to be seen in relation to the 
increase in public use of religious symbolism among the Catholic Croats and the 
Orthodox Serbs.473  
 
Thus, the war certainly was not religious in the sense of being waged “between” 
Christianity and Islam writ large, as shared interests of the primary actors involved were 
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far more territorial than religious.474 However, the rhetoric and framing of the war, both 
from the inside and from the outside, became increasingly religious as ethnic identities 
hardened and took on religious symbols and identity markers in processes of 
differentiation and conflict with the other, demonstrating the ways in which religious 
identity is produced and refined in situations of friction.   
The war raged on until the NATO strikes of September 1995 broke the siege of 
Sarajevo.  All in all, estimates indicate that approximately 236,500 people died between 
1992-1995 in Bosnia.  164,000 of these were Bosnian Muslims, 31,000 were Croats, and 
27,500 were Serbs.475  Thousands of places of worship were intentionally destroyed, 
including 1024 mosques and Muslim religious sites, 182 Catholic churches, and 28 Serb 
Orthodox churches and monasteries.476 
By 1995, as Bosnians themselves were exhausted and brutalized by war, 
international actors had begun working together to try to find a way to end the bloody 
conflict.  Elizabeth Cousens articulates the two main goals of the international actors 
engaged in Bosnia in 1995 as follows:  “first, that a war would not resume, and second, 
that Bosnia would rebuild for itself a just peace, which international observers by and 
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large considered a multiethnic one.”477  The years following the peace agreement did not 
see these goals come to fruition.  While elections were being held, displaced people were 
returning to their homes, and the cease-fire continued, there were numerous elements of 
the peace agreement that remained (and many argue still remain) stagnant.478   
Cousens notes that the Bosnian war ended with a “coerced compromise,” as a 
local and regional response to international force, rather than what is referred to as a 
“mutually hurting stalemate,” which meant that the international parties heavily involved 
in bringing about the agreement itself would be required to work equally hard to see 
through its implementation.479 There were numerous reasons that this did not happen, 
with the problematic nature of the peace agreement itself being one. 480  
While there was some return of refugees and internally displaced persons 
following the Dayton Agreement, many returns that were planned as part of the 
agreement (which would have reset the demographic shifts caused by the war) were not 
seen through, in part because there were numerous politicians pushing against remixing 
areas that had become ethnically homogenous. 481  Additionally, other efforts from ethno-
religious nationalists served to reify boundaries of exclusion.  For example, Sells points 
to an incident in 1997 when the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church endorsed the 
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Declaration of the Association of Writers of Serbia, which included the following 
statement in the accompanying press release: 
The account by SRNA [the Serbian News Agency] states that His Holiness, 
Patriarch of the Servs, Pavle, gave his blessing for the Declaration, which was 
signed by sixty intellectuals, including fourteen members of the Serb Academy of 
Science and Art...The Declaration states that the Hague Tribunal has ‘acted solely 
as an instrument for persecution of Serbs.’482 
 
Despite the Dayton Agreement ending the conflict formally, this demonstrates the 
hardening of positions of nationalist groups in the days and years following the end of the 
war. Overall, the Dayton Agreement was partially implemented, with international help, 
but was not carried out to the full extent needed in order to accomplish the goals of 
rebuilding a just society.  
While there is no longer active fighting, the logic of religio-ethnic conflict and 
division lives on in Bosnian society, providing a challenge for those seeking to build 
social cohesion in the country.  Many expressed a fear of opening a Pandora’s Box if they 
pushed for too much change too fast. Thus, Bosnians were left with a ceasefire, but what 
many of my respondents referred to as a “frozen conflict.”  
 
Conclusion 
The lead-up to the war, and the course of the war itself, reshaped religious identity 
in Bosnia. Through the disintegration of Yugoslavia, religious expression re-emerged 
strongly in the public square- a sharp shift from the private way in which religion was 
conceptualized and practices under Tito- and simultaneously emerged as a political force.   
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Religion became public and politicized simultaneously, and as the fusion of 
religion and ethno-nationalism grew for Serbs, so did it grow for Croats and Bosnian 
Muslims, in a symbiotic relationship that led to deeper bonding group cohesion, at the 
expense of bridging cohesion or a sense of common national identities.  Religious leaders 
allowed themselves to be used (and some arguably led the charge), perpetuating the idea 
of “what is good for my community is good for me” (and, one might add, what threatens 
a co-religionist is a personal threat).483 Thus, these moments of groupness that took place 
before and during the Bosnian war influenced the way religion would be perceived and 
lived out in Bosnian life for years to come, as the next chapter will demonstrate.    
 
 
                                                
483 Interview with Respondent 11, March 17, 2016.  
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Chapter 6: Religious Peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for Better or for Worse? 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Bosnia is inundated with peacebuilding 
work.  Within the first week of my research there, I was invited to four separate 
peacebuilding gatherings or events in or a short drive from Sarajevo. The grassroots 
peacebuilding work is ongoing and appears tireless, in Sarajevo and beyond. After the 
war, numerous relief organizations and groups, both foreign and domestic, undertook 
humanitarian and peacebuilding work in Bosnia. While many of the international 
organizations have become less directly involved in peacebuilding, they still support 
numerous projects and a number of the locally-led projects and organizations stemmed 
from this international intervention.  Many of these were religious actors, with ties to 
religious institutions and authorities. Perica asserts that, “the religious peace-building 
operation in the Balkans expanded into the most massive such operation in the history of 
humanitarian work and peacemaking.”484 Bosnia is, indeed, a peacebuilding wonderland 
of sorts, and has been a particularly interesting case for those interested in religious 
engagement in peacebuilding.   
 
Mapping Religion and Peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 The peacebuilding work in Bosnia, like in Lebanon, can be categorized in 
multiple ways.  There is work happening that is either led or endorsed by the government, 
                                                
484 Perica, Balkan Idols, 179.   
 218 
and there is work that is driven fully by civil society and grassroots actors.  Some of the 
initiatives that explicitly engage religion are focused on clergy and religious institutions, 
while others emphasize the importance of person-to-person interaction across lines of 
religious difference.  Some focus in the realm of belief, while others primarily consider 
opportunities for engagement and joint action, without talking about religious belief or 
practice.  
 Those engaged in peacebuilding work in Bosnia have differing opinions on if and 
how religion should be engaged in this work.  Several respondents asserted that religious 
leaders play an important role in people’s lives in Bosnia.  For example, one respondent 
noted that religious leaders often work into their sermons who people should vote for.485 
Thus, according to this perspective, engaging religious leaders is non-negotiable if one 
wants to make progress toward peace, in part to stop them from acting as spoilers to the 
process.  Other respondents argued that it is best to avoid religion entirely, or to only 
carefully and sparingly call attention to religious identity or engage religious leaders or 
institutions in this work.486  One respondent, who has been working in peacebuilding 
since the war, said that he used to have extremely negative feelings about religion, but 
has come to believe that religion might be the one thing that brings reconciliation.  From 
his perspective, right now, it is still bringing division, but it has the potential to bring 
reconciliation.487  
                                                
485 Interview with Respondent 2, March 8, 2016.  
486 Interview with Respondent 1, March 8, 2016, and interview with Respondent 5, March 11, 2016.   
487 Interview with Respondent 9, March 15, 2016. 
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 The most notable effort in terms of explicitly religious engagement in 
peacebuilding is the Interreligious Council.  The leaders of the four primary religious 
communities in Bosnia (Serbian Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish) were, 
according to many respondents, among the first to enter the peacebuilding process in 
Bosnia, and played a key role in facilitating the political peacebuilding process.488  
Religions for Peace International helped to formally establish the Council, though 
respondents told me that it began through self-organized coffee meetings between the 
Sarajevo-based leaders of the four primary religious communities during the war; 
international actors helped to formalize what had already begun.   When the Interreligious 
Council was formally established, the leader of the Jewish community, a very small 
community had been in Bosnia for approximately 450 years, became a key partner in the 
Interreligious Council, taking on the role of the first president.  The Jewish community 
was seen as the most neutral in relation to the war. The Jewish leader served a three-year 
term, which was extended from the original assignment of a one-year term, and then the 
presidency started rotating among the rest of the communities.489 
During the war, Sarajevo religious leaders started to work together through joint 
prayers and on humanitarian issues.  After the war, they drew inspiration from South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission to start working on reconciliation through 
religious leaders and communities.490  While one respondent noted that it was successful 
                                                
488 Interview with Respondent 1, March 8, 2016. See also Ina Merdjanova and Patrice Brodeur, Religion as 
a Conversation Starter: Interreligious Dialogue for Peacebuilding in the Balkans (London: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2009). 
489 Interview with Respondent 11, March 17, 2016.  
490 Interview with Respondent 11, March 17, 2016.  
 220 
early on, the leaders later felt that it was too complicated to do from a religious point of 
view because the sense of forgiveness and reconciliation was too different in different 
religious traditions.  This led them to give the planned Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission over to civil society, though it never came to fruition.491  
 One respondent, an international peacebuilding practitioner, spoke about the 
specific challenges of forming and maintaining the Interreligious Council just after the 
war.  He noted that, “the fact that you had nearly 100% coincidence of national and 
religious identity…there was no way for the religious leaders to speak to a distinct faith 
community without also speaking to a national community.”492  This made it very 
difficult to work with the religious communities within some sort of separate realm, away 
from the politics of ethno-nationalism.   
 While the ethnic-religious conflation made working with religious communities 
as such a huge challenge, this respondent observed that it, 
was further complicated by the socialist history.  So you did not have the kind of 
depth of social infrastructure in the society that you find in other places.  You 
didn’t have faith communities that were providing a lot of health and social 
service work- that had all be stripped away and was being done by the state.  
Leaders were doing things in spite of (not because of) the society.  A lot of people 
had been returning to their religious institutions as a national statement.493 
                                                
491 Interview with Respondent 11, March 17, 2016. 
492 Interview with Respondent 15, January 13, 2017.   
493 Interview with Respondent 15, January 13, 2017.   
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Thus, from this perspective, a weakened central state made room for bonding 
cohesion and mobilization along religious lines.   
One of the first legal projects of the Interreligious Council was the freedom of 
religion law, which was adopted in 2004.  According to one respondent, the Council 
drafted approximately 95% of the text of the law.494  Another respondent involved in the 
process noted that this effort came about specifically because the leaders of the religious 
communities all agreed that it was important to restore freedoms to practice religion 
openly.   
The law itself prohibits discrimination against any religious community, granting 
each “equal rights and obligations,”495 While much of the content of the law focuses on 
religious community rights rather than the rights of individuals, it does allow for freedom 
of conscience or belief.  Additionally,  
According to the law, (a) the state may not accord the status of state religion to 
any church or religious community; (b) the state may not interfere in the affairs 
and internal organization of churches and religious communities; (c) no church 
may obtain any special privileges from the state; and (d) the state may provide 
material assistance but without discrimination on any grounds.496   
 
Thus, the law both prohibits discrimination and clearly outlines a separation 
between religious communities and the state, although the law also gives the government 
the right to decide which religious communities are to be recognized as such in Bosnia.   
 
                                                
494 Interview with Respondent 13, March 22, 2016, also noted in Alibašić & Begović “Reframing the 
Relations between State and Religion in Post War Bosnia,” 23-24.   
495 Alibašić & Begović “Reframing the Relations between State and Religion in Post War Bosnia,” 24.   
496 Alibašić & Begović “Reframing the Relations between State and Religion in Post War Bosnia,” 24.   
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The respondent involved in the drafting of the law stated that,  
That was an important and really effective way of countering the political national 
trap and finding an area where each of these communities had a similar 
experience under socialism and communism where their rights to practice were 
circumscribed…and all facing being in the religious minority and majority in 
different parts of the country.497 
 
Finding a common space for joint political action, then, was a key part of keeping 
the Interreligious Council together and engaged.  While the work on the religious 
freedom law was a careful foray into the political space, one respondent noted that now, 
religious leaders have mostly stayed away from the political processes (with the coaching 
of the Interreligious Council).  They send messages of peace, but are less overtly getting 
involved in politics.  This is something that many local religious groups support, as they 
fear what could happen if religious leaders are heavily tied into politics.498  One 
respondent involved in the Interreligious Council noted, in reference to political 
involvement, that “We try to stay away…We do not interfere in any political movements.  
But they influence the public and their influence reflects on us…they created a negative 
atmosphere and fear of others, and we have to fight that fear.  It is a secondary influence, 
we are not directly addressing [politics] but we have to deal with it later.”499  Thus, even 
though they work to stay out of politics, the realities of Bosnian socio-political life 
inevitably pulls the Interreligious Council into certain political debates.   
                                                
497 Interview with Respondent 15, January 13, 2017.   
498 Interview with Respondent 1, March 8, 2016.  
499 Interview with Respondent 17, February 8, 2017.   
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 One of the key principles of the Interreligious Council, according to one 
respondent, is consensus.  They do not take on a project unless it has consensus from all 
of the religious communities. 500  This respondent asserted that if they did take on projects 
that did not have full consensus, they would not be successful and the Council itself could 
be at risk.   
Several respondents described the early days of the Interreligious Council as a 
period of trying out different methods and strategies to get religious communities to work 
together and to have a ripple-out effect.  One noted it became easier as time went on to 
find things that the religious institutions and leaders could and would do, and the courage 
of the religious leaders themselves to speak out publicly increased over time as well.501  
One respondent commented on the positive aspects of religious overlap with 
ethno-national groups in Bosnia, stating that, “we are focusing on peacebuilding and 
trustbuilding process among three nations who were involved in war conflict.  But most 
of the time those three nations are also different religions.  So we use this religious 
background to connect people.”502  The religious dimension of ethno-national identities in 
Bosnia thus, from this perspective, provides a unique entry-point for peacebuilding 
efforts. 
Another respondent recalled an interaction he had with a Serb priest who came to 
a workshop with instructions from his Bishop to “report back,” but became invested in 
                                                
500 Interview with Respondent 17, February 8, 2017.   
501 Interview with Respondent 15, January 13, 2017.   
502 Interview with Respondent 17, February 8, 2017.   
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the conflict resolution approach.  When the priest tried to engage his Bishop in the work, 
he was rebuked, so was unable to participate formally in the activities.503  This story 
demonstrates the layers of religious, cultural, and ethno-nationalist norms at play when 
trying to do peacebuilding work that engages religious actors in a meaningful way.  This 
respondent notes that, “one thing I learned through this whole process was that there was 
absolutely no way you could categorize [an] entire religious community.”504 
While some noted that at the beginning, the Council remained a Sarajevo-based 
group, facing major challenges and resistance when trying to expand into other areas,505 
the Council now has 12 branch offices outside of Sarajevo, with three more under 
construction at the time of my interviews.506  While the Interreligious Council has 
undertaken a few legal projects, as noted above, most of the work attempts to be 
politically neutral, and focuses on modeling religious engagement (through religious 
leaders meeting and demonstrating camaraderie and solidarity publicly), developing 
programs that allow for religious leaders and laypersons to interact with one another and 
to explore commonalities, and responding to local incidents of violence directed at 
religious communities.  They have seen a decrease in the number of attacks in cities 
where they are active, and attribute this to local religious leaders showing up when 
incidents occur and trying to help deescalate hot spots.507 They have also been working 
                                                
503 Interview with Respondent 16, January 20, 2017.   
504 Interview with Respondent 16, January 20, 2017.   
505 Interview with Respondent 15, January 13, 2017.   
506 Interview with Respondent 11, March 17, 2016.  
507 Interview with Respondent 10, March 16, 2016; Interview with Respondent 13, March 22, 2016.  
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with local police to prioritize responding with justice in cases of these attacks, taking 
away the need for revenge.   
Additionally, the Council has projects focused on the rights of women within 
religious communities and society more generally, working with UN Women and other 
groups to lead reading groups focused on understanding religion texts and traditions 
within the context of global human rights norms.508 
 
The Religious Peacebuilding Infrastructure 
While the Interreligious Council is the most high-profile effort in explicitly 
religious peacebuilding, there have been, and continue to be, numerous other efforts to 
engage religious actors, institutions, and ideas in peacebuilding efforts.  Some 
peacebuilding actors ran conflict resolution workshops at the end and just following the 
war; one respondent was conducting these primarily with religious actors, holding several 
workshops that brought together people from every religious group in Sarajevo. This 
respondent noted that, “it was quite a feat to bring together that kind of representation 
during the siege itself.”509  Simply getting people from different backgrounds into the 
same room was considered an accomplishment in and of itself during and just following 
the war.510   
                                                
508 Interview with Respondent 12, March 21, 2016. 
509 Interview with Respondent 16, January 20, 2017.   
510 This comports with the “contact hypothesis” in Conflict Resolution, which asserts that interpersonal 
contact between conflicting groups will lessen prejudice over time.  For more on this particular theory of 
change, see Gordon Allport, “The nature of prejudice,” (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 1954); and 
Pettigrew, T. F.; Tropp, L. R. "A Meta-analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory," Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 90.5 (2006): 751–783. 
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 The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) launched an initiative in 2014 
called Dialogue for the Future: The promotion of coexistence and diversity in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  The program was requested by all three presidents, and was launched by 
the presidents with a declaration at a conference in April 2014. The stated strategic focus 
of this project is, 
to address the deterioration of relations amongst communities and substantially 
decrease the threat of renewed conflict and violence by promoting peaceful 
coexistence, which is characterized by increased trust, respect for diversity, 
strengthened civic and inter-cultural dialogue amongst citizens, in particular 
youth.511  
 
One of the UNDP programs involves bringing together university students from 
different ethnic backgrounds to work together on key development problems.  One 
respondent involved in the work noted that, “when they see common problems and work 
together, they’ll figure out that they are all the same, they’re all human.”512 For example, 
when there was extensive flooding in Bosnia in 2014, UNDP took a number of young 
people from across ethno-religious groups to peace camps in some of the most-affected 
sites, where they worked together on reconstruction.   This respondent noted that, while 
there was no explicit engagement with religion in the program design itself, the Serb 
students were very curious when the Muslim students slipped away for prayers, and 
organic inter-religious engagement resulted.513   
                                                
511 “Dialogue for the Future: Promoting Coexistence and Diversity in BiH,” accessed February 10, 2017, 
http://ba.one.un.org/content/unct/bosnia_and_herzegovina/en/home/what-we-do/joint-
projects/dialogue-for-the-future.html. 
512 Interview with Respondent 1, March 8, 2016.   
513 Interview with Respondent 1, March 8, 2016.  
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Another specific “Dialogue for the Future” project is to hold youth forums, which 
include training on non-violent communications.  Through this, youth have been given 
opportunities to engage with local decision-makers and politicians, and they are working 
to increase these interaction points ahead.  
Several NGOs recently formed a collective effort called Pro-Future.  Those 
leading this effort have mapped the needs and challenges for peacebuilding in Bosnia, 
then assigned different participating NGOs different roles (sometimes working together, 
sometimes in their own “lanes”, so to speak) to exert collective impact. They work in 36 
municipalities, and have paired off the municipalities (with each in a pair having a 
different ethnic majority).  Each municipality is required to have three people represented 
in a working group, with one of those people being an employee of the municipality and 
the other two being affiliated with different NGOs.  They do their work in a number of 
sectors, including particular foci on youth, schools, and war victims.  I attended one 
program where they brought three war survivors (of different ethnic groups) from one 
municipality to another, to share their stories with a group of school children.  They do 
these programs on a regular basis, in multiple cities and villages, working with the war 
victims on their own personal narratives, while simultaneously working with the schools 
to make time and space for the youth to hear these stories and to reflect on them 
afterwards.   
In its third year of implementation, funded primarily by USAID, Pro-Future has 
become the largest peacebuilding project in Bosnia, and is aiming to work with 60 
municipalities by the end of the project.  A large number of organizations are involved, 
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including Caritas, Catholic Relief Services, Mozaik, Parliament of Citizens in Banja 
Luka, the Inter-religious Council, and an independent group in Tusla.  Evaluative 
research on previous CRS and Caritas peacebuilding projects went into the design of this 
effort, drawing on lessons learned and best practices from previous program efforts.514   
Additionally, the Pro-Future project has begun working with the Interreligious 
Council on public forums for religious leaders to talk about peace from the perspectives 
of the different religious traditions, and to hold ongoing “open doors” days at houses of 
worship, inviting people from different religious communities to visit and learn about 
each tradition more deeply.515   
 Several smaller initiatives pull together people of different backgrounds on a 
regular basis for dialogue and engagement.  These involve numerous small, informal 
gatherings in order to slowly build deep, sustainable relationships across lines of 
difference.  One respondent spoke about using faith and religiosity as a tool, as Bosnian 
tradition is a great resource on the role of faith in peacebuilding.  This respondent 
described their work as digging religion out from the fear and trauma.516 
 One program, “Believers for Peace,” has conducted trainings over the past 7 years 
with over 1500 Islamic studies teachers, to help them use Islam and Peacebuilding 
manuals in Islamic schools.  Additionally, Believers for Peace has held conferences to 
                                                
514 Interview with Respondent 2, March 8, 2016.  
515 Interview with Respondent 2, March 8, 2016.  
516 Interview with Respondent 3, March 10, 2016.  
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help strengthen the capacity of religious leaders to use religious sources to effectively 
promote peace.   
Another respondent discussed the importance of seminary programs designed for 
inter-religious exchange, at the institutional and clerical levels.517  While there is much 
work between the institutional leadership of the Muslim and Catholic seminaries, 
according to this respondent, the Orthodox do much more of their inter-religious work 
through the Inter-religious Council, rather than at the seminary level.  This respondent 
noted that there are good everyday relationships between the Muslim leadership and the 
Orthodox priests, and they can discuss theological matters, but they avoid discussing non-
eternal matters.518  
There are a number of more localized programs as well.  One respondent 
described a survey they did in 2006-2007 in Sankimost, a city in northwestern Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and found that religious leaders had the highest level of trust from the 
community.  Thus, they began a slow process of building trust between the religious 
leaders, then had them go public after 5 years of internal conversations, then have built 
programs from there to engage young people.  They have their own independent 
Interreligious Council, but when the national Interreligious Council came to work with 
the religious leaders in this area, they did not get to know the local Interreligious Council, 
and thus were unsuccessful in recruiting religious leaders for their initiative.519 
                                                
517 Interview with Respondent 14, March 11, 2016. 
518 Interview with Respondent 14, March 11, 2016. 
519 Interview with Respondent 8, March 15, 2016.   
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In every program, this locally-focused initiative asks participants to reveal their 
religious identity, to help them feel comfortable in their own skin and to build trust and 
security among the group.520  It has also been important, according to this respondent, for 
the religious leaders to publicly speak together on a regular basis, to normalize their 
cooperation and camaraderie.521  However, the conversations between religious leaders 
have rarely discussed the past, which this respondent sees as a continued barrier to the 
healing process necessary for building social cohesion.522  According to this respondent, 
they are having these conversations (about the past) privately, when it is just the religious 
leaders meeting with one another, and eventually will be able to help lead the 
conversations publicly, but it takes time.523  The key, according to this individual, is that 
their peace work is not about programs, but is really “24/7.”524 
 As this overview makes clear, there are many different strains of peacebuilding 
work actively engaging religion in the Bosnian context. Some are government-endorsed, 
while others draw primarily from the grassroots civil society actors, aiming to keep their 
distance from the government. Still others operate in something of a hybrid space 
between government and grassroots.  Additionally, a number of the initiatives- 
particularly those framed as explicitly religious peacebuilding initiatives- prioritize 
religious identity and difference as the key “problems to solve,” while a smaller handful 
                                                
520 Interview with Respondent 8, March 15, 2016.   
521 Interview with Respondent 8, March 15, 2016.   
522 Interview with Respondent 8, March 15, 2016.   
523 Interview with Respondent 8, March 15, 2016.   
524 Interview with Respondent 8, March 15, 2016.   
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of initiatives engage religion while seeing it as one intersectional factor within a wider 
milieu. An examination of the ways that these varied organizations and initiatives 
conceptualize goals and success helps to reveal the significance of these differences in 
approach. 
Asking those involved with these efforts about their goals and expectations 
reveals a lot about how religion is being imagined in the Bosnian peacebuilding space, as 
well as how this work is impacting and interacting with broader socio-political 
dimensions.   
One respondent who worked closely with the Interreligious Council at its 
inception stated that, “for a lot of that time, the most fundamental measure of success was 
that the council held together.  Even if they felt like they couldn’t meet each other or have 
public meetings for a while, none of them felt compelled to pull out.”525  Thus, early on, 
success was measured by the Council members simply staying engaged.   
Another respondent observed that, when peacebuilding work is explicitly faith-
based or faith-rooted (rather than simply engaging religious actors), determining the 
benchmarks of success looks different than it does for “secular” peacebuilding work: 
There’s a couple different aspects that influence this.  One is motivations.  Faith-
based people can be motivated even in light of not seeing results…also, that sense 
that what takes place depends upon the involvement of the supernatural.  That has 
some influence also on the outcome.  There’s a much more personal 
                                                
525 Interview with Respondent 15, January 13, 2017.   
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understanding of that- a real force and investment, on the part of something 
greater.  So, success and failure continue to get looked at differently.526 
From this perspective, religious engagement and faith-rootedness of those 
involved in peacebuilding efforts fosters a deep commitment to the effort that might 
otherwise be hard to sustain. One respondent involved early on in the Interreligious 
Council described the tensions of balancing work with religious institutions and 
hierarchical structures with a desire to engage with the grassroots efforts that were 
happening.  This respondent noted that there was indeed tension, particularly in the years 
just following the war, and that “if work wasn’t sanctioned by or if the leaders didn’t see 
[the grassroots efforts] as trustworthy and loyal” then the Interreligious Council could not 
engage with it.527   
We see through this survey of efforts to engage religion in peacebuilding in 
Bosnia a plethora of programs and approaches.  How, then, should we think about the 
ways in which these efforts interact with social cohesion more broadly in the Bosnian 
context?  A look at the current state of social cohesion in Bosnia helps to situate this 
analysis.   
 
The State of Social Cohesion in Bosnia-Herzegovina  
While there have been numerous sustained efforts, coming from both institutional 
and grassroots levels, to rebuild social relations in Bosnia, social cohesion in the country 
                                                
526 Interview with Respondent 16, January 20, 2017.   
527 Interview with Respondent 15, January 13, 2017.   
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has not significantly improved since the end of the war.  One respondent pointed to the 
persistence of transgenerational trauma, noting that, “people who are Croat, who have 
never lived in Croatia, consider Croatia their country.”528  He noted that, for most living 
in Bosnia, there is a shared sense that they are still living in the war period, in a way.  
This reality persists despite extensive societal support for efforts to build social 
peace.  One survey, conducted in 2011 in four key cities in Bosnia by a team from the 
University of Edinburgh, found widespread support for building understanding, peace, 
trust, and reconciliation, as trust-building initiatives.  These all polled higher than support 
for “identification of liability/guilt”, historical accuracy, or apology, although support for 
all of these objectives were deemed important or very important by a majority of people 
surveyed.529 
 Survey participants differed in their feelings about explicit religious involvement 
in peacebuilding initiatives.  56% of respondents indicated that they are personally very 
religious, and “respondents who self-reported being personally religious tended to favour 
reconciliation and peacebuilding initiatives more than respondents who said they were 
not religious.”530  Additionally, those who reported higher levels of participation in 
religious services were more likely to affirm the importance of a reconciliation process, 
                                                
528 Interview with Respondent 2, March 8, 2016.  
529 Wilkes, George Wilkes, et. al., “Reconciliation and Trust Building in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Survey of 
Popular Attitudes in Four Cities and Regions,” Center for Empirical Research on Religion in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Sarajevo & Project on Religion and Ethics in the Making of War and Peace, The University 
of Edinburgh, 2012, accessed November 30, 2016,  
http://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/reconciliation-and-trust-building-in-
bosniaherzegovina(330541cd-f11e-44c4-a760-f6ebfd226431).html.  
530 Wilkes, et. al., “Reconciliation and Trust Building in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Survey of Popular 
Attitudes in Four Cities and Regions,” 13-14.   
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while those who reported not being religiously active were more likely to indicate that a 
reconciliation process would not make a difference.531  Respondents in Mostar and Banja 
Luka affirmed their believe that religious leaders and lay leaders have a special role to 
play in reconciliation; these numbers dropped in Bugojno and Sarajevo.532 
The data does not show stark divisions between Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks as 
such in their responses, but rather the more determinate indicator of their attitudes 
(toward supporting or not supporting peacebuilding efforts) was whether the individual 
was part of the ethnic majority or minority in their city.  Those who were in the majority 
were more likely to see value in the role of religion in reconciliation processes than did 
those who were minorities in their respective cities.533 
 A follow up study in 2013 confirmed the widespread support for trust-building 
and reconciliation efforts, particularly among those who self-identified as more 
religious.534  However, most respondents (60.8%) named the economy as the highest 
priority facing the country, and while just 39.9% felt that political change was most 
                                                
531 Wilkes, et. al., “Reconciliation and Trust Building in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Survey of Popular 
Attitudes in Four Cities and Regions,” 19.  
532 Wilkes, et. al., “Reconciliation and Trust Building in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Survey of Popular 
Attitudes in Four Cities and Regions,” 20.   
533 Wilkes, et. al., “Reconciliation and Trust Building in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Survey of Popular 
Attitudes in Four Cities and Regions,” 21.   
534 G. Wilkes, et. al., “Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust: Results 
From A Survey Conducted in 13 Cities Across Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 2013,”  Center for 
Empirical Research on Religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2013): 5, accessed November 30, 2016, 
http://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/factors-in-reconciliation-religion-local-
conditions-people-and-trust(7be43bce-c29d-43dd-992c-18dab2ef5248).html. 
 235 
important, only 29% said that improving social relations was a key priority for the 
country. 535 
In interpreting this survey data, it is important to understand the way in which the 
term “reconciliation” is employed.  According to the survey authors,  
Reconciliation is used here as a term which implies activities, practices and 
processes involving the building of relationships, both ‘horizontal’ relationships 
across the wider population and ‘vertical’ relationships, begging questions about 
the perception of a need for accountability between representatives and the 
populations they seek to represent.536 
 
While the aforementioned survey series focused on understanding whether or not 
there is widespread desire for reconciliation, a 2009 UNDP report reveals the very low 
levels of social trust, stating that, “the report finds that BiH’s social fabric is 
characterized by fragmentation and segmentation rather than cohesion and solidarity.”537 
This report reveals that only about 10% of people feel that most people can be trusted. 538  
Of those surveyed 88% believe the most significant level of social tension is between rich 
and poor; 86% believe it is between management and workers, and 79% believe it is 
between different ethnicities (note that respondents could select more than one 
                                                
535 Wilkes, et. al., “Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust,” 6.  Note that 
respondents were allowed to check more than one box when indicating which national issues were of 
importance to them.    
536 Wilkes, et. al., “Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, Local Conditions, People and Trust,” 10.    
537 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)  “The Ties That Bind” National Human 
Development Report 2009, Social Capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009): 3, accessed February 10, 
2017, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/ties-bind. 
538 UNDP, “The Ties That Bind,” 3, 22.   
 236 
response).539  This demonstrates that social trust is not only low between ethno-religious 
groups, but across multiple levels of social fragmentation.   
The lack of trust between ethno-religious groups can be correlated with the lack 
of social interaction people of different ethno-religious groups have with one another, as 
division has been made materially manifest in multiple ways throughout politics and 
society.  While large numbers of respondents reported spending time with people of their 
own ethnicity nearly everyday (44.6%) or a few times each week (30.5%), only 20.8% 
reported spending time with persons of other ethnicities a few times each month, with 
more reporting that their interaction is seldom (35.1%) or never (12.6%).540  It is worth 
noting that, while people reported low levels of trust in other ethnicities (ranging between 
10.2% and 12.3%), they also reported fairly low levels of trust in people of their own 
ethnicity (ranging from 20.7% to 22.3%).  People reported higher levels of trust when 
asked about family and close friends, demonstrating that familial, localized ties are very 
strong (pointing to high levels of bonding cohesion).541 
While GDP growth has been stable in Bosnia since 2000 and unemployment has 
been improving, unemployment remains high and is particularly alarming among youth, 
where unemployment is twice as high as for the general population. 542  While this report 
did not assess social exclusion, the last National Human Development Report that did, in 
                                                
539 UNDP, “The Ties That Bind,” 3, 22.   
540 UNDP, “The Ties That Bind,” 35.    
541 UNDP, “The Ties That Bind,” 3, 42.   
542 UNDP, “The Ties That Bind,” 14.   
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2007, revealed that over 50% of the population reports experiencing some form of 
exclusion. 543 
Overall, the UNDP report shows widespread frustration and distrust, not limited 
to ethnic division, and high levels of bonding cohesion, as homogenous networks 
continue to grow.  Informal networks have also grown, with “štela” (a term used widely 
in Bosnia, referring to gains made through nepotism and clientalism) playing a critical 
role in access to jobs and social networks. 544  Taken together, the surveys analyzed here 
show a desire for increased social cohesion, but a lack of progress and political will in 
that direction.   
Beyond these measures of social distrust and fragmentation, there are several 
contemporary factors contributing to maintaining, or in some cases increasing, social 
discord.  At present, one respondent observed, war memories are getting re-hashed and 
re-interpreted within the frame of current global events.  Islamophobic rhetoric has taken 
root and is more widespread, and young Bosnian Muslim identification with the global 
ummah has become more common.545   
 Trust in the state is very low, and there have been several incidents in recent years 
that have exacerbated frustration between ethno-religious communities and the state.  For 
instance, recently, high judicial prosecutors banned everyone wearing religious symbols 
from coming into the court building, a move that many saw as being directed explicitly 
                                                
543 UNDP, “The Ties That Bind,” 17.   
544 UNDP, “The Ties That Bind,” 18.   
545 Interview with Respondent 1, March 8, 2016.  
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toward Muslim women wearing hijab.  While the Muslim community publicly opposed 
this decision, LGBT and women’s rights activists also mobilized to support the rights of 
individuals to wear what they want.546 
It is clear that both vertical and horizontal measures of social cohesion are 
currently quite low in Bosnia.  While bonding cohesion continues to increase, the gaps 
between groups have grown wider and have been exacerbated by lack of trust in the state, 
which precipitates further bonding (over bridging) behavior, as smaller units of people 
feel they must look out for themselves to secure rights and privileges.   
 
Barriers to Impact of Peacebuilding Efforts  
 Despite the numerous efforts aimed at building peace over the last decade and a 
half in Bosnia, social cohesion remains low.  There are several barriers that contribute 
directly to the lack of broader impact of religious peacebuilding efforts in particular.   
 
1. Embodied Separateness  
 Bosnia is characterized by both physical and political separation between ethnic 
groups.  One respondent remarked that, “we established small medieval kingdoms after 
the war.”547  This is embodied in geographic segregation, as well as through the education 
system. 
                                                
546 Interview with Respondent 1, March 8, 2016.  
547 Interview with Respondent 3, March 10, 2016.  
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 Some have pointed to a “soft war” through schools in particular, through the 
divided education system. 548  A number of respondents pointed to the “two schools, one 
roof” system of education, where in mixed municipalities, children of one ethnic group 
will go to school in the morning, then children of the other ethnic group will use the same 
building in the afternoon, without the students mixing in classes.549  Additionally, as one 
respondent noted, students from Serbian schools take excursions to Belgrade, rather than 
to Sarajevo, and go visit monasteries in Serbia, rather than sites within Bosnia-
Herzegovina.550   
 Furthermore, one respondent noted that in the Republika Srpska, the non-Serbian 
Bosnian children are not allowed to call their language Bosnian, but rather must call it 
“the language of Bosniaks.”  This, they noted, is part of “the continued effort to deny our 
children the right of self-identification.”551  It is clear that there are both real and 
perceived efforts to maintain distance between ethno-religious communities through the 
education system.  This is mirrored in the geographical segregation that is rampant 
throughout the country as well, demonstrating the ways in which difference manifests 
itself materially, embodied and emplaced in Bosnian life.   
 Additionally, the identification of Bosnia’s social cohesion problem as ethnic or 
religious, rather than structural injustices, reinforces this embodied separation and shields 
                                                
548 Interview with Respondent 10, March 16, 2016. 
549 Interview with Respondent 2, March 8, 2016.  
550 Interview with Respondent 14, March 11, 2016.  
551 Interview with respondent 14, March 11, 2016. 
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the state from blame for lack of cohesion, since it is an “ethnic problem,” rather than one 
that can be adequately owned and addressed by the state.552 
  
2. Ambivalence of religious leaders 
 While religious leader have often been involved in peacebuilding and dialogue 
efforts, their engagement is ambivalent in a number of ways.  First, it is important to note 
that there are still a number of religious leaders who do not support peacebuilding efforts, 
even on the surface.  Some in the Interreligious Council noted that they do not enjoy full 
support from the top Bishops in the Catholic and Orthodox communities, and there are a 
number of places (i.e., with Catholics in the South and with Orthodox in the Northwest) 
where they are not able to do work.553 
 As one respondent observed, “every religious community is an interest or political 
party, basically.”554 Thus, often, religious leaders behave more or less like politicians. 555   
While generally, religious leaders aren’t participating directly in politics, there is often 
implicit engagement with the political system. For example, last election the top religious 
                                                
552 Belloni, et. al., speak to this issue, pointing to a speech by Valentin Inzko, High Representative of the 
International Community, in which he suggests that the large street protests in 2014 were coming from 
“Muslims” or “hooligans,” spurred on by ethnic leadership, thus validating the claim that frustration is best 
understood as an ethnic or religious problem, rather than one of economic mismanagement and political 
corruption.  See Roberto Belloni, et. al., “Bosnia-Herzegovina: Domestic Agency and the Inadequacy of the 
Liberal Peace,” in Post-Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Peace Formation and State Formation, ed. 
Oliver P. Richmond and Sandra Pogodda (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016). 58. 
553 Interview with Respondent 17, February 8, 2017.   
554 Interview with Respondent 10, March 16, 2016. 
555 Interview with Respondent 12, March 21, 2016.  
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leaders tried to issue a joint statement, but at the last minute the Islamic Community 
withdrew and issued a statement implicitly supporting a party.556 
 One respondent argued that each religious leader has at least three different 
stories- one for the international community (as a peacemaker), one for their community 
publicly (painting their own community as the first victims), and a third for own 
community behind closed doors. 557  This paints a mixed picture of religious leadership in 
Bosnia and how they engage in peacebuilding, as double- (or triple-) speak can make it 
very difficult to ascertain true motives and goals.  One respondent observed that, while 
the religious leaders in the Inter-religious council are outwardly supporting peace, they 
are undermining one another and “stabbing each other in the back” all the time. Beyond 
the “double speak”, there is also fear among religious leaders to do certain public 
appearances for fear of backlash from other leaders or their community.558 
Walking a careful political line (between maintaining a commitment to unity and 
peace, while looking out for the needs and desires of one’s own religious community) 
feeds into an avoidance of difficult issues, which prevents them from making real 
progress.  For instance, one respondent noted that religious leadership does not want 
gender justice to be part of these conversations (a reality that shows up in Lebanon as 
well).559  The “avoidance of politics” in this way, while playing into politics in other 
ways, as articulated above, limits the reach and efficacy of these efforts.   
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559 Interview with Respondent 12, March 21, 2016.  
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 Additionally, religious leaders have joined together at times to work against 
certain civic efforts.  For instance, religious leaders campaigned together against people 
declaring themselves “Bosnian-Herzegovinian” for the purpose of the census.560  This 
effort would have muddied the divisions between ethno-religious groups, and thus the 
religious institutions worked against the effort, despite widespread grassroots interest in 
it.   
One respondent noted that people expect too much from religious leaders, and 
that sometimes this makes it very difficult for them to meet expectations.  While many 
religious leaders are committed to working for peace, there are some who promote 
division as well.561  
Perica notes that, “religious authorities carried out…an ambiguous strategy that 
involved simultaneous backing of the nationalistic factions while playing the role of 
peace mediators before the international observers.”562  Indeed, there are instances of the 
institutional religious authorities collectively denouncing other clerics involved in peace 
advocacy as “Marxists, communists, and Titoists,”563 demonstrating a desire to control 
and contain the ways in which religious peacebuilding was being carried out in the 
country.  Additionally, a 1999 televised roundtable between the religious leaders featured 
them leveraging “charges against secular forces while denying any clerical liability and 
[they] saw no connection between religion, ethnic nationalism, and genocide in Yugoslav 
                                                
560 Interview with Respondent 9, March 15, 2016. 
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562 Perica, Balkan Idols, 180, drawing upon a 1999 USIP report on Bosnian Peacebuilding.   
563 Perica, Balkan Idols, 182.   
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lands.” 564  Later, reports indicated that the Interfaith Council refused a proposal to teach 
ecumenical courses on religion in Bosnia’s public schools, opting instead for religious 
catechism be taught in separate classes by religious authorities.565 
 
3. Limited reach of efforts   
 One respondent observed that there are thousands of projects, and each one is 
successful (measured through evaluations most often), but none have an impact on the 
broader dynamics.566  While this may be an overstatement, it was a common reflection 
among peacebuilding actors that their work only reaches about 5% of the population.  
They reflected on excellent individual change, but when people return home, they receive 
so much pushback that the transformation is reversed, rather than rippling out.567   
Another respondent noted that, while there are hundreds of NGOs, very few are 
really active toward long-term peace.  Additionally, government-stamped NGOs refuse to 
criticize the government, and thus are ineffective in much of their work, when the real 
transformation would need to come from changes to the system itself.568  These top-down 
efforts also fail to effectively engage civil society, and thus never see broad ownership. 
569 
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566 Interview with Respondent 9, March 15, 2016. 
567 Interview with Respondent 9, March 15, 2016. 
568 Interview with Respondent 10, March 16, 2016. 
569 Interview with Respondent 9, March 15, 2016. 
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 As Roberto Belloni, et. al., argue, there is clearly civilian desire and bottom-up 
efforts for institutional change toward greater justice and peace.  These desires are 
manifested through more hidden networks (including the ones under study in this 
dissertation), and make themselves known in more public ways only periodically, with 
some positive, though minimal, results.570  However, the ruling elites and the 
international community have often pushed back against these bottom-up pushes for 
change, preventing them from entering the official political process, and thus preventing 
high level, systemic impact.571  Belloni, et. al., posit that the international community has 
two particularly problematic priorities when it comes to peacebuilding in Bosnia: the 
preference for ethnic security over other concerns and values, and the acceptance and 
accommodation of ethnic identities in a way that has prioritized stability over change.572  
I argue that this is true for the ways in which religious institutions, and international 
efforts focused on religious engagement, have ordered their priorities as well, causing this 
same effect from multiple sectors preventing grassroots change efforts from having larger 
effects on social cohesion. 
Funder constraints also affect the reach and long-term effectiveness of projects, 
since they often operate within specific timeframes and limited funding parameters.  
Some respondents also felt that the need to cooperate with funders has constrained their 
ability to do the deeper, more sustainable work of peacebuilding.573 
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 Another factor at work here is the way in which many efforts to engage religion in 
peacebuilding treat religion as the source of conflict, even if those involved would argue 
that conflict does not stem from religion. For example, the Pro-Future project outlined 
above works to bring religious communities into one another’s sacred spaces, 
demonstrating a belief that by creating opportunities for religious encounter, conflict 
between groups will subside.  This type of approach assumes religion itself is causing 
conflict, and thus limits the reach of the efforts by isolating it in peacebuilding practice.   
  
4. Enshrining of ethno-religious difference through Dayton  
 While the Dayton Accords brought peace on one level (in that the active fighting 
stopped), it established a stagnant political system.  One respondent reflected this in 
saying, “we are not post-conflict; this is a frozen conflict.”574 Through the Dayton 
process, ethno-religious difference was enshrined in the political and geographic 
infrastructure, and thus efforts to build trust and cohesion between groups run into the 
very real barrier of a stagnant and divided political system.   
 Ethnic identity is entrenched in the political structures, as Dino Abazović argues,  
The peacebuilding/nation-building efforts cannot be successful because they go 
against Bosnia’s very governing structure…Declaring a unified state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina while recognizing two antagonistic entities, proclaiming democracy 
while entrenching ethnically based institutional structures and reaffirming 
individual rights while legitimizing ethnic majoritarianism, from the outset raised 
serious concerns as to which political concept in Bosnia-Herzegovina would 
prevail575 
                                                
574 Interview with Respondent 1, March 8, 2016.  
575 Dino Abazović, “Reconciliation, Ethnopolitics and Religion in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” in  
Post-Yugoslavia, ed. Dino Abazovic and Mitja Velikonja, (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 2014), 36.  
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  The system itself thus prevents the democratization and affirmation of individual 
rights, two key efforts of those looking to further social cohesion and justice in Bosnia, 
and also makes real the division between groups in a very material way. 
Political parties operate mostly along ethnic lines.  The three presidents represent 
the three different communities, and this political separation tracks all the way down, for 
the most part.  Elections are won by appealing to particular ethno-religious groups, rather 
than by trying to develop inclusive platforms.576  Ethnicity is indeed enshrined into the 
constitution, creating what one respondent called a “checkmate positions”, where you are 
required to have agreement at all levels.  This does not allow for a citizen-based country, 
as everything is divided into three (and leaves no room for Jewish or Roma citizens).577 
According to several respondents, the media also perpetuates narratives of 
division, and one respondent pointed to the fact that the media is government-controlled. 
“The governments don’t want us to reconcile- they say they do, but the way they act does 
not match that.”578  Thus, many are skeptical of the commitment of political leaders to 
truly seeing peace that accounts for inequalities and injustices in society.   
One respondent noted the politicization of religion, premised on an “us vs. them” 
way of thinking about religious identity and belonging.  She asserted that this religious 
division goes against fruitful peacebuilding initiatives and has contributed to the lack of 
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political will for peace.579  This respondent went on to say that, “Whatever initiatives you 
do, the administrative divisions and complexities prevent you from getting too far.”580  
The system is designed for self-preservation.   
 
5. Corruption and clientelism  
 Several respondents spoke of the extreme corruption and clientelism at work 
within the political system and beyond.  There is a lack of merit-based appointments, and 
one respondent argued that the country would function without the government ministries 
the same as it does now- in other words, it is stagnant.581  Another respondent stated that, 
“politics would influence so much if it was not so criminalistic.”582  The perception of 
political corruption is widespread, and perpetuates the vertical divides as citizens have 
very little trust in their government.   
These observations from respondents are indeed corroborated by numerous 
studies of Bosnian political and social life.  Roberto Belloni and Francesco Strazzari have 
argued that, while there are strong laws on the books against corruption in Bosnia, state 
and international actors have done little to prosecute high-profile corruption cases.  They 
argue that, “corruption is the cost international actors have been ready to accept in the 
name of stability, at least in the first post-conflict phase. Later, with corruption already 
engrained in the social fabric, governance reforms have been devised by international 
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officials and more or less openly accepted by local ones, but corruption has continued to 
prosper under the surface of formal institutions.”583  A strong desire for stability has thus 
overridden the focus on combatting corruption, contributing to low levels of social 
cohesion over the years in post-conflict Bosnia.   
 
“Change Shouldn’t be Rushed” 
The above barriers, among others, help to explain why, despite numerous 
peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia over the last two decades and beyond, social cohesion- by 
both vertical and horizontal measures- remains low.  While efforts to build peace are 
plentiful, these barriers impede their potentially positive effects.  This reality impacts the 
ways in which those involved in peacebuilding- and particularly religious peacebuilding- 
think about the purpose of their work, and the ways in which they conceptualize the role 
of religion therein.   
It is, of course, difficult to articulate goals and to measure success in any 
peacebuilding efforts, but it is also critical to understand how those engaged in such 
efforts see their own goals and theories of change.  One respondent observed that, while 
the new generation has never been involved in conflict themselves, they have spent their 
twenty-odd years of life segregated, as ethno-religious division has been materially 
inscribed into life at so many levels. As is the case in Lebanon, their parents have a sense 
of pre-war unity, but the younger generation does not, and thus the work is not about 
                                                
583 Roberto Belloni and Francesco Strazzari, “Corruption in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: 
a Deal among Friends,” Third World Quarterly 35.5 (2014): 856. 
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reconciliation for this generation, but rather establishing inter-group trust in the first 
place.584 This, then, is the goal for certain peacebuilding actors- to establish social trust.   
Some argued that one should not focus on goals broader than individual 
relationship-building.  One commented that, “I found myself concluding [after one 
particularly revealing workshop incident] that I think even though we tried to jump into 
problem solving and trying to basically help deal with issues, if we accomplished 
anything at all, it was probably in terms of building or rebuilding relationships between 
people.  I decided to make that my focus.  We did work on some issues, but relationship 
building continues to be part of my focus.  Unless you establish or maintain relationships 
of some kind, I think there’s really little you can do.”585  This was the articulated goal of 
a number of efforts across the country. 
Others pointed to instances of individual attitude change as evidence of success.  
One such example was a Croat coffee shop owner in Mostar, who was in a camp during 
the war and reported that he hated all Serbs and Muslims afterwards.  His coffee shop 
would only serve Croatian coffee (which is one letter different from other types of Balkan 
coffee) and he had photos of Croat war heroes lining the walls of his shop.  After a 
peacebuilding program worked with him on hearing the stories of other war survivors, he 
changed his views, started a romantic relationship with a Serbian woman, and is now 
retired and working to help others get to know one another across ethno-religious lines.586   
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 One respondent asserted that the goal should be to strengthen individuals as 
believers, to prepare them to do the work of peacebuilding.  As one respondent stated, 
“personally, I think it’s important for leaders to be promoting peace, but I believe in the 
strength of civil society; in the individual believers.  We are the ones who are leading our 
religious leaders.”587  The goal, then, is to strengthen and empower the individual 
believer to engage in peacebuilding work in their personal capacities.   
 Another respondent noted that their project measures success through post-event 
surveys that ask participants to self-report attitude changes and the like, while also 
maintaining relationships with participants over the long term in order to monitor and 
evaluate longer-term shifts in attitudes and behaviors.  This respondent stated that, “This 
is something you cannot measure- those human relations, those feelings, but we hear 
those stories, when they describe that their local community is relaxed after those board 
programs.  Also this depends on minority or majority.  We have a priest and imam just 
walk through the city, and the position of the minority community can be better.  So, [we 
evaluate our work] through the success stories and through the surveys.”588  Again, this 
points to small-scale changes in relationships as the goal and the measure of success.   
 One respondent who has been involved in peacebuilding work in multiple 
capacities since just after the war said he has seen progress in his 20 years of work.  
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While Dayton enshrined a certain unhealthy status quo, there has been very gradual 
change.  But change “shouldn’t be rushed”, according to this respondent.589 
 While goals and assessment were somewhat varied, there are a plethora of 
programs in Bosnia aimed at building better relationships between citizens, with the 
general aim of cultivating peace (this was a clear assumption, if not explicitly articulated 
by all respondents). Overall, there is a diversity of ways those involved in the religious 
peacebuilding space approach the work and think about goals and success, but most are 
looking primarily at internal program success, with a hope of a ripple-out effect, rather 
than assessing how it is feeding into larger societal change.  
 The lack of a material approach to understanding and engaging religion in 
Bosnian religious peacebuilding stands out starkly in these conversations with interview 
respondents.  For many, building and maintaining inter-religious relationships is key, and 
happens only outside the realm of politics.  Religion is thus treated as a primarily internal 
matter, to be safely shielded from the socio-political extensions of religious identity. For 
some, peacebuilding is a stale issue of sorts, unachievable and tired, and thus, the focus is 
on individual relationships, setting aside the goal of institutional, high-level change.  For 
many who take this view, change will happen eventually, as a new consciousness is 
raised among people, one individual or small group at a time.   
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Key Findings: What can we say about religious peacebuilding in Bosnia?  
 
1. Religious identities were produced as politically meaningful through the socio-
political processes preceding the war, and, in turn, shaped the way religion was 
employed and understood in the war and post-war periods in Bosnia. Religion itself 
became through the lead-up to and course of the war, as the emergence of a Muslim 
ethno-political identity particularly illustrates.  What it meant to be religious, and 
particularly its implications for socio-political life, changed over time through encounter 
with one another during increasingly politicized historical moments.  This, in turn, 
shaped the way religion was employed in and following the war as well.   
An additional factor at play here is the important role of outside actors (whether 
other governments or religious bodies) played in cultivating, framing, and sometimes 
exacerbating conflict. Indeed, this is especially true when they were outside backers, not 
just theoretical connections.  These connections, along with the outside “gaze” (i.e., 
defining the Bosnian Muslim community as Muslim first) transformed religion for those 
living within the boundaries of Bosnia.  Thus, even though religion is always lived out 
locally, it cannot be extracted from outside influences.    
 
2. The lack of institutional commitment to improving social cohesion is an 
irreconcilable barrier that makes it impossible for many of the efforts to have the 
desired impact.  Institutional entrenchment of ethno-religious identities perpetuates 
ethno-religious division, and thus efforts to build better relationships between individuals 
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and groups of different ethnic backgrounds will always be limited in the scope of their 
effect, since the looming institutional barriers prevent large-scale reconciliation.  Ethno-
religious division is thus materially inscribed into Bosnian life, making it impossible to 
think about or understand what it means to be religious apart from this embodied reality.  
This institutional entrenchment of ethno-religious identity was enshrined in the 
political system through Dayton.  It continues through the policies of embodied 
separation seen in geographic separation and segregated schools to this day.  Thus, ethno-
religious division is integrated into the Bosnian state itself, which has no interest in 
changing these realities that help to maintain the status quo, benefitting only institutional 
elites.   The role of religious elites in this is similar to the roles that international 
peacebuilding organizations have played more generally, according to Belloni, et. al., as 
described above: the prioritization of stability outweighs the commitment to just notions 
of peace, and serves in turn to reify ethno-religious difference.   
 
3. Religious institutions and leaders have played important roles in milestone 
peacebuilding moments in Bosnia, but subsequently slipped into preservation roles.  
For example, the Interreligious Council played an important role in getting to Dayton, 
and subsequently in establishing the political infrastructure for initial peace, including 
playing a strong role in the development of the religious freedom law.  In particular, the 
Jewish Community played a critical role as a religious community that was not directly 
involved in the war.  And yet, now religious institutions and leaders are careful to stay 
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“safe” and to maintain unity, but at the expense of playing an active role in furthering 
social cohesion more fully.   
The Interreligious Council now plays a preservation role, refraining from 
challenging the continued structural issues that act as barriers to social cohesion in 
Bosnia.  The commitment to consensus and to staying out of politics drives the work of 
the Council, and thus imagines religion and religious institutions as somehow separate 
from political life.  Through this approach, the Council thereby, perhaps inadvertently, 
helps to preserve political stagnation. This builds on the Interreligious Council and other 
entities’ “extraction” of religion from the rest of life, as delineated further above. By 
treating religion as an internal matter of belief, rather than seeing its integration with all 
aspects of socio-political life in Bosnia, efforts to engage religion to bring peace are 
rendered toothless in many ways.    
 
4. As is the case in Lebanon, points 2 & 3 combined bring up a paradox for religious 
peacebuilding.  Ina Merdjanova makes the case for the “repoliticization” of 
Interreligious Dialogue for peacebuilding in Bosnia, stating that, it “has to address more 
explicitly political and economic concerns and issues related to poverty and various 
forms of inequality and exclusion” in order to be effective in making any progress toward 
peace.590 Religious leaders, who have some capacity to influence institutions, display a 
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reluctance to address institutional and political concerns, while the grassroots programs 
that want to see institutional change are limited in their ability to make impact.  Thus, the 
status quo maintains, bolstered by political and religious elites who either benefit from its 
maintenance, or value unity and consensus over justice concerns.   
This demonstrates the way in which religion is imagined and operationalized in 
Bosnian religious peacebuilding.  Religion is most often treated as an internal matter of 
faith, which has been tarnished by its entanglement with politics, and thus, the way to 
address the conflict is to “rescue” religion from this entanglement somehow.  The focus 
here also assumes that religion itself is one of the key conflict drivers, rather than seeing 
the ways it is intertwined with, and produced by, socio-political realities.  This 
internal/extractive approach goes against a material understanding of religion, which 
recognized the ways in which religion is inherently integrated into socio-political life, 
and cannot therefore be treated as somehow separate from the rest of life.   
 
5. While grassroots religious peacebuilding efforts are unable to break through the 
institutional barriers to make broader societal impact, they play an important role 
in fostering resilience at the grassroots level.    As I noted in my analysis, Bosnian 
peacebuilders are a small but tireless group.  The sheer number of programmatic efforts 
and ongoing events demonstrates the resilience that is being built and maintained through 
these efforts.   
I asked some of the grassroots peacebuilding actors if they felt they had seen 
progress, and most said not really, so I asked what kept them going and, as one 
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respondent said, “what other choice do I have?”  Thus, while I argue that, due to 
institutional and political barriers, they are not able to produce large-scale social 
cohesion, these efforts play a very important role in cultivating resilience and in 
materially building an alternative way of living and thinking about socio-political life in 
Bosnia. While I do not concur with the idea that cultivating this consciousness among 
small groups of individuals will have ripple out effects, as the institutional constraints are 
too strong for this mechanism of change to be viable, the peacebuilding efforts are key 
for maintaining individual and group resilience in the face of a difficult socio-political 
climate.   
 
Conclusion 
 Religious identity, and the political meaning thereof, was shaped through socio-
political processes in Bosnia, and particularly by incidents of and sustained episodes of 
conflict.  This in turn shaped community approaches to social and political life, and to 
religion more broadly.  Religion thus becomes through these political/social conflict 
processes, and acts as a dynamic rather than static force.    
 In Bosnia, engaging religion in peacebuilding is highly varied, and those pushing 
these efforts with the hope of increasing social cohesion face a number of barriers, which 
in turn affect the way actors approach the religious peacebuilding work itself.  Religious 
peacebuilding actors often look to pull religion “to the side” for engagement 
uncomplicated by politics, and yet are unable to have a positive socio-political ripple 
effect due to this attempted extraction and treatment of religion as a primarily internal 
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matter.  Institutional approaches in particular become, perhaps inadvertently, guardians of 
the status quo, preserving ethno-religious distinction, division, and bonding, while 
speaking publicly of the need for bridging work, but failing to take the action on complex 
political issues that is needed to see progress on bridging cohesion.     
All of this points to the inherently socio-political nature of religion itself.  
Religion can serve to uphold or resist the status quo, but it is never entirely apolitical, 
particularly considering the way it is always shaped through socio-political processes. 
The assumption that we see operating in Bosnia is that extracting religion from the 
political is what is needed in order to build better relationships between religious 
communities (and thereby contribute to peace).  However, the reality is that religion was 
made through politics, and thus extracting it now and expecting the change to come from 
this remade form of inter-religious understanding ignores the past process by which it 
was itself developed/shaped.  I argue, then, that religion is inherently political and trying 
to “treat” it in a way that isolates it from politics is unproductive (or, at times, 
counterproductive indeed).   
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Chapter 7: Integrated Findings and Discussion 
In the last four chapters, I have provided individual assessments of how (and why) 
religious peacebuilding efforts have contributed (or not) to building social cohesion in the 
Lebanese and Bosnian contexts.  This chapter analyzes those findings in tandem, and in 
conversation with the larger theoretical framework of religious peacebuilding laid out in 
Chapter Two.  By looking at these case studies together, we have a richer understanding 
of how a material religion perspective better explains the ups and downs of current and 
previous efforts to engage religion in peacebuilding. 
Drawing on the findings of my research, I argue for a shift in how we theorize 
religion, conflict and peace.  While the ambivalence thesis is an important component of 
the field of religious peacebuilding, I argue that it is not sufficient in and of itself. We 
need an additional dimension of analysis, specifically regarding whether religion works 
to uphold or challenge the status quo, in order to conduct deep research about a given 
context. This will additionally aid in better designing nuanced programmatic approaches 
to engaging religion in peacebuilding work.   
This chapter will first look at how several specific theoretical approaches shaped 
the case study analyses. I will then examine several key comparative observations drawn 
from the Lebanon and Bosnia case studies before laying out several key findings that 
emerged from the case study analysis.  Finally, I will outline more fully my proposed 
theoretical shift in how we approach the analysis of religion, conflict and peacebuilding. I 
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will demonstrate how this theoretical shift will have a pragmatic impact on policy 
approaches when engaging religion in peacebuilding efforts.   
 
Theoretical Considerations 
 I began this dissertation by laying out several theoretical approaches that would 
anchor my approach and analysis of the country case studies under consideration in this 
project.  Specifically, I laid out theoretical approaches for how we conceptualize group 
identity in conflict situations, how we think about religion, and how we assess the vague 
notion of peace.  I also examined the current state of religious peacebuilding theory, 
which overlaps with the aforementioned theoretical areas, arguing that the current 
theoretical approach to religious peacebuilding is useful, but it does not capture the 
fullness of the realities on the ground in conflict scenarios with strong religious attributes.   
I return to these theoretical approaches here in order to more clearly articulate how the 
case study findings interact with the theories, and what these findings tell us about 
religious peacebuilding more generally. This section will thus briefly examine the core 
theoretical approaches at work in this dissertation, explaining how they helped in the case 
study analysis.   
 
Theorizing Group Identity in Conflict  
 Theorizing “groupness” is a critical component of any conflict analysis, as group 
identities (and how they are perceived internally and externally) play heavily into how a 
conflict progresses.  In Chapter Two, I laid out Ashutosh Varshney’s theoretical approach 
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to thinking about group identities in ethnic conflicts in particular.  Varshney combines a 
constructivist theory of ethnic identity (that group boundaries are constructed through 
rhetorical and situational means, rather than being bounded), with an instrumentalist 
theory of ethnic identity (that specific political actors utilize and aggravate group 
boundaries and tensions in order to achieve particular ends).  This hybrid theoretical 
approach allows for an understanding of how group boundaries come to be more salient, 
and gain a certain stickiness, at particular times.  I argued that this extends to religious 
group identities as well, which are often (as in the Lebanese and Bosnian cases) 
intertwined with ethnic or political identities.   
In chapter two, I also laid out Rogers Brubaker’s concept of groupness as an 
event, rather than as an ontological reality. Brubaker’s focus on the event of groupness 
helps to flesh out Varshney’s hybrid constructivist-instrumentalist theory, showing how 
group identities have developed and morphed over time through specific instances of 
encounter and socio-political change.   
These theoretical approaches to group identities grounded my analysis of religio-
political identities in both Lebanon and Bosnia.  Both cases showed that group identities 
and boundaries are porous and shift over time.  The salience of religious identities rose 
through particular historical events, and became especially critical in these contexts at the 
end of the Ottoman Empire, as nationalistic or independence-seeking movements adopted 
religious symbols and boundaries to advance their cause.  During situations of conflict in 
both contexts, there were often shifting alliances, and in Lebanon especially, there were 
many moments when religious communal identities took a back seat to geographic or 
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other ways of imagining group boundaries.  External observers and actors played major 
roles in defining or reifying group boundaries as well, as was seen in particular with 
external narratives on Muslims in Bosnia and with European narratives on Maronites in 
Lebanon, as I will further unpack later in this chapter.  Finally, the intra-religious 
dynamics that played out during situations of tension in particular show the ways in 
which groupness is constantly being defined and re-defined from within and from 
without. These findings on how group identities play out on the ground in Lebanon and 
Bosnia can be extended to other case studies of religiously-framed conflict, helping 
analysts and practitioners alike to approach religious group identities from a more 
nuanced and complex perspective. 
 
The Material Lens on Religion, Conflict and Peace  
 I outlined Manuel Vasquez’s material theory of religion in Chapter Two, arguing 
that this theoretical approach to thinking about religion helps us both to better understand 
the complex and varied roles religion plays in conflict (and vice-versa), and from there, to 
better conceptualize the ways in which we might better think about engaging religion in 
peacebuilding efforts.  The crux of Vasquez’s theory is captured in the following 
selection: 
The sort of materialism I would like to advance approaches religion as the open-
ended product of the discursive and nondiscursive practices of embodied 
individuals, that is, individuals who exist in particular times and spaces. These 
individuals are embedded in nature and culture, and drawing from and 
conditioned by their ecological, biological, psychological, and sociocultural 
resources, they construct multiple identities and practices, some of which come to 
be designated, often through contestation, as religious at particular junctures.  In 
other words, a materialist approach is interested in the processes behind the 
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naming and articulation of religion as relatively stable and patterned reality 
recognized by both insiders and outsiders.591 
 
 Vasquez’ definition here points to a process approach (through the “discursive 
and nondiscursive practices”) to understanding how religion comes to be and to take on 
meaning in particular ways for particular contexts.  Additionally, his definition points to 
an embodied and emplaced approach to thinking about religion, which is shaped and 
formed in specific places and times, often through processes of contestation (internally 
and externally).  This view of religion calls for the analyst to peel back the curtain of 
what may appear to be stagnant religious identities and to look at how they came to be 
thought of as such. Finally, Vasquez’s material approach to religion, as outlined in the 
above quote, calls for a view of religion as multi-directional, shaping and being shaped 
by embodied socio-political context.  This is a shift from analyses of religion in conflict 
that view religion as a source (from which violent or nonviolent interpretations can stem) 
and see it instead as a dynamic, multi-directional conflict variable.    
 My case studies on Lebanon and Bosnia traced moments of groupness and socio-
political circumstances that led to the formation and increased salience of religious group 
boundaries for particular historical circumstances.  The case studies also showed how 
these boundaries, along with the content of religion, shifted over time (and continue to do 
so), in response to socio-political realities on the ground.  Additionally, I showed how 
religion spanned far beyond the realm of belief in its development in these particular 
contexts, and thus argued that religious peacebuilding efforts that focus only or primarily 
                                                
591 Vasquez, More Than Belief, 8, emphasis mine.   
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on belief will fall short of making social change, a point I will unpack further throughout 
this chapter.    
 
Social Cohesion and Peace  
 As articulated in the introductory sections of this dissertation, peace is a vague 
concept in and of itself.  While some think of it as the absence of violent conflict, most 
would hope for much more than this.  The absence of violence is only the beginning of 
economic, social and political rebuilding processes.  Indeed, Barbara Walter has shown 
that, over the past half century, countries that have experienced civil war are more likely 
than not to return to civil war after a peace agreement, with over 50% of countries 
relapsing into war.592 This demonstrates that the move toward peace is not a smooth or 
single-track process, and in some cases, the lack of effective post-conflict rebuilding (and 
dealing with the underlying issues) keeps a country in a perpetual state of civil unrest. 
We thus need concrete mechanisms in order to conceptualize and measure 
sustainable peace in tangible and meaningful ways.  For the purpose of this dissertation, I 
employed the concept of social cohesion as a tool by which we can assess the state of 
peace in Lebanon and Bosnia.  I drew particularly on Joseph Chan, et. al., in assessing 
social cohesion by looking at both horizontal (across-society) relationships and vertical 
(state-society) relationships, combined with consideration of both formal and informal 
                                                
592 Barbara F. Walter, “Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace,” World 
Development Report 2011 Background Paper, September 13, 2010, accessed April 27, 2017,  
http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01306/web/conflict-relapse-and-sustainability-of-post-
conflict-peace.html  
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measures of these relationships.  This approach informed my assessment guide 
(Appendix A), which I used in my analysis of both case studies.   
 By utilizing this tool, I was able to analyze the state of social and political peace 
in a more concrete and measurable way. Beyond the importance of having a tangible 
assessment tool for thinking about peace, the social cohesion approach compels us to dig 
beyond a surface-level view of peace as consensus and relative calm, and into the deeper, 
underlying issues of justice and inequalities that are critical to maintaining peace in any 
context.  This informed how I analyzed the current state of religious engagement in 
peacebuilding in both contexts, and it can be used in other contexts to more deeply 
analyze how religion and religious actors impact peace by looking at religion in its 
interactive and malleable nature within socio-political contexts.   
 
Rethinking Religious Peacebuilding Theory  
 I argued in the beginning chapters of this dissertation that the current theoretical 
approaches to religious peacebuilding are limited and in need of further revision and 
development.  I draw on Atalia Omer’s critique of how Scott Appleby’s important 
ambivalence thesis has been applied, as she argues that, 
the preoccupation with theological retrieval and appropriation precludes a 
consideration of how historical contexts and interpretations of events from 
multiple perspectives might, and perhaps even should, challenge and transform 
religious traditions and political ideologies.593   
Omer is referring here to the ways in which religious peacebuilding approaches 
tend to prioritize and essentialize the internal and ideological aspects of religion.  Current 
                                                
593 Omer, “Religious Peacebuilding: The Exotic, the Good, and the Theatrical,” 4.   
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theoretical approaches to religious peacebuilding often focus on religion as a uni-
directional source, rather than something that is shaped by socio-political context.  
Additionally, current religious peacebuilding theory hones in on violent and non-violent 
teachings and actions, often leaving aside the ways in which justice and inequalities come 
into play.   
 In the last part of this chapter, I will argue for a particular theoretical shift in the 
ambivalence thesis that allows for a more holistic view of the way religion interacts with 
conflict and peace in various settings- a shift informed by my own case analyses in 
Bosnia and Lebanon. Specifically, I will argue that a full analysis of religious 
ambivalence must include careful attention to how religious expressions work to uphold 
or challenge the status quo.  This theoretical shift allows for a more complex analysis of 
how religion is interacting with other factors in a conflict scenario, thus identifying more 
useful entry points for practitioners seeking to impact how religious actors are 
contributing to peace for the long-term.   
 
Lebanon and Bosnia in Perspective   
 Bosnia and Lebanon are distinct contexts, which is part of what makes them 
interesting for comparison.  While they share several historical commonalities, outlined 
below, they also diverge from one another in important ways, contributing to different 
outcomes in the current relationship between religion and social cohesion in each context.  
In this section, I will unpack three key comparative areas that emerged from the study:  
the shift in both contexts of former neighbors becoming enemies, their experiences under 
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Ottoman control, and the state-society relationships when it comes to how religion is 
lived out and understood between private and public spheres.   
 
From Neighbors to Enemies  
 While certainly, as the historical surveys demonstrate, there were numerous 
moments of tension, boundary-hardening, and politicization of religious identities, in 
both Lebanon and Bosnia, people of different religious backgrounds lived in close 
proximity to one another and had generally positive “quotidian” relationships prior to the 
recent wars.  When the wars began, this quickly shifted, though not in hard-and-fast ways 
along religious lines.  In Bosnia, for example, recall that one respondent reported his own 
former neighbors as his captors in a war camp in his hometown.  Conflict “sides” were 
consistently shifting in both cases, with different militant groups aligning with one 
another in different places.  In Lebanon, this constant shifting of “sides” was even more 
prevalent, with mixed-sect neighborhoods fighting against other mixed-sect 
neighborhoods at various points during the course of the 15-year civil war.   
 These realities in both contexts challenge a vision of religious wars as somehow 
manifesting ancient or inevitable enmities between groups.  Group boundaries, and the 
socio-political meaning thereof, shifted over time, and it was only at particular historical 
junctures that these boundaries hardened and translated into conflictive factions.  
Religious identities came to mean something different when entrepreneurs of war 
manipulated them, but these “moments of groupness” contributed to a stickiness of these 
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boundaries (though still, and always, malleable in important ways), as they became 
institutionalized through political and social infrastructures.  
 The positive quotidian relationships that both Bosnians and Lebanese report from 
the pre-war days are now much more difficult to find, as the logic of war has been 
mapped onto society and politics in ways that perpetuate distance.  Thus, while both 
contexts are post-war, it is difficult to call either of them post-conflict.   
 
Ottoman Effects  
Both Lebanon and Bosnia were part of the Ottoman Empire, and thus, legacies 
from the Ottoman era carried into conflict dynamics, and I would argue, into the present 
socio-political dynamics in both contexts.  The millet system, as discussed in further 
depth in each case study chapter, made religious identities a key form of social 
organization under Ottoman rule, and thus contributed to the boundedness and socio-
political meaning of (primarily Abrahamic) religious communities in each context.  
Additionally, this system vested religious authorities and institutions with significant 
amounts of control over, and representation of, their people.  In both contexts, this laid 
important groundwork for the later politicization of ethno-religious identities, as they 
already had the experience of being a key unit of socio-political infrastructure. 
Lebanon was more geographically central to the Ottoman Empire than was 
Bosnia, although Mount Lebanon, like Bosnia, existed as a peripheral region during 
much of the Empire’s duration, meaning that Ottoman authorities granted local 
governance much autonomy, and there was less oversight over the lives (religious and 
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otherwise) of those living in these regions.  Bosnia was considered a trade crossroads, 
highly important economically for the Ottoman Empire, as well as symbolically, as a 
European front.  From a European perspective, both Bosnia and Lebanon were seen as 
“borderlands” of sorts, as meeting points between Christian Europe and the Muslim 
Ottoman Empire.  As borderlands, there was much interaction between different peoples 
and cultures, and less direct oversight from religious or government authorities, at least at 
certain times.   
Additionally, under the Ottomans, Christian institutions and elites in particular 
benefitted from being vested with certain amounts of control over their constituents, 
collecting taxes and speaking on behalf of their “flock.”  While lived religion often did 
not reflect these divisions or the boundedness by which the institutions were treated, the 
administrative treatment of the Christian minorities as bounded communities laid 
important groundwork in both contexts for communal identities and institutional religious 
representation.  
While the Ottoman experiences in Lebanon and Bosnia had a number of 
similarities, the post-Ottoman experiences were vastly different in these two contexts.  
Ottoman decline came with economic depression and new forms of class-based and 
nationalist mobilization.  While Lebanon came under the French Mandate, thus 
interacting with European powers while pursuing, and eventually achieving, 
independence, Bosnia was part of the multiple Yugoslav experiments. The French 
Mandate in Lebanon dealt with residents through religious and sectarian identities, while 
in Yugoslavia, religious and ethnic identities were played down by the state. The final 
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version of Yugoslavia, Socialist Yugoslavia, in particular shaped the way in which 
religion and state interacted, as well as the way religion was lived out in society.    
 
Religion Between Private and Public Spheres  
 A key difference between how religion in Bosnia and religion in Lebanon 
manifested just before and during the recent wars is the public and private ways it was 
lived out differently in each context.  Under Socialist Yugoslavia, Bosnia had freedom of 
religion, but public expressions of religion were strongly discouraged, and religion was 
not welcomed into the state infrastructure.  This differs from the Lebanese experience, 
where religious communities were built squarely into the political and social structures 
through the National Pact and the 1923 Constitution.   
 In present-day Lebanon and Bosnia, there are similarities in the ways that political 
appointments are allocated based on religio-ethnic or sectarian group, and the electoral 
system reflects that accordingly, but religious belonging is much more integrated into the 
social life of Lebanese than it is of Bosnians.  The Lebanese personal status legal system, 
controlled by religious courts, and the mandate to belong to a recognized sect and have it 
reflected on one’s ID card are two key examples of how religion is integrated more fully 
into the public life of Lebanese.  In both contexts, national identity is reflective of 
religious difference, with different ethno-religious groups (in the case of Bosnia) and 
sects (in the case of Lebanon) being clearly identified in the founding documents and 
peace accords, which is in turn reflected in the political infrastructures as mentioned 
above.  In each context, then, bonding cohesion (within sects or ethno-religious groups, 
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or within particular localities) outweighs bridging cohesion, reflecting the way in which 
the state supports in-group cohesion over making strides toward more inclusive national 
identities and modes of belonging. 
 The Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) data show that both Lebanon 
and Bosnia have fairly low levels of government regulation of religion (4.9/10 and 
3.7/10, respectively), although I would argue that the number here for Lebanon fails to 
take into account the ways in which government vests religious institutions with more 
control and thus does indeed exert control over religion, but not directly since the 
institutions act as a filter.  Both states determine what can and cannot be considered an 
official religion, exerting state control of religious institutions and representation in that 
way.  In both cases, the social regulation of religion (referring to the ways in which 
societal forces restrict and constrain free religious practice) are higher, with Bosnia 
coming it at 5.6/10 and Lebanon coming in at a very high 9.3/10, meaning that this 
measure shows that Lebanese society places very strong and restrictive constraints on the 
freedom of religion.     
 Overall, Lebanon and Bosnia share some important commonalities in their 
histories as mixed religious societies that were under Ottoman control, but they diverge in 
important ways, including the private-public treatment of religion in the post-Ottoman 
era.  The integrated findings from the case studies reflect both these shared and divergent 
socio-political and historical realities. The findings from these two cases, while specific 
to the particular contexts in certain ways, also point to broader issues that are shared by 
other cases of religiously-framed conflict. The malleable, process-theory approach to 
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understanding how and why religious identity becomes politically meaningful in 
particular ways at particular times is a finding that is true across a broad spectrum of 
cases. Additionally, the ways in which states, as well as social institutions, have asserted 
certain types of control over religious identity and expression, both historically and into 
the present, clearly factors into the political and social meanings of religious identities- a 
finding that crosses geographic boundaries as well, providing a more generalizable frame 
of analysis. Overall, the findings from Lebanon and Bosnia have implications well 
beyond the borders of these two nations.     
 
Integrated Findings  
In this section, I articulate the key findings drawn from examining the Bosnia and 
Lebanon case studies in comparative context.  Commonalities in the cases lead to some 
contingent generalizations that would likely apply in other conflict contexts, while certain 
case specificities are also noted.   
Both Bosnia and Lebanon illustrate how religion is a multi-dimensional and 
multi-directional conflict variable. It interacts with other aspects of social and political 
life, and it is indeed shaped by socio-political historical processes and events. It is thus 
not a static (if malleable) variable exerting effects on social and political life in a 
unidirectional way (with religion as the derivative, for instance, promoting either 
violence or peace in society). Instead, what it means to be religious in each of these 
contexts changed over time, particularly as religious symbols and institutions were 
strategically targeted and employed throughout times of conflict, and then these new 
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forms in turn affected the ways that social and political dynamics played out, including in 
conflict scenarios. This demonstrates the inherently socio-political nature of religion 
itself, as a reality shaped through context rather than existing in a space somehow apart 
from the political and social realities in which it is developed.  Thus, trying to “extract 
religion from politics” or find apolitical sources of religion is a futile exercise. Religion 
thus took on new meaning for identity, and itself gained new content, throughout times of 
war (and the lead up to conflict) in both contexts.  For example, as was seen in the case 
study chapters, the politics of institutional reforms at the end of the Ottoman era helped to 
shift the meaning of religious identity by prioritizing it within political and social 
institutions and structures.  Additionally, the emergence of a Muslim ethnic identity in 
Bosnia was part of this interactive process, as was the increased salience of Maronite 
identity under the French Mandate in Lebanon, and both processes reshaped the meaning 
of religious identity in the war and post-war phases.594   
Intra-religious dynamics are critical.  We see in both cases that tensions within 
religious communities often precede and exist simultaneously to tensions between 
religious communities.  These rivalries are apparent in both Lebanon and Bosnia now and 
historically, with numerous examples in both cases.  Group elites carefully curate 
boundaries and crack down on internal dissent (as was in the case of individual Serbs 
resisting extreme Serbian nationalism during the war).  This leads to a marginalization of 
fringe or border elements of religious identity and practice, prioritizing and curating the 
                                                
594 It’s important to note here that this re-shaping was not a process that ended with a static result, as 
religious identity and meaning continues to develop and reform within current socio-political dynamics as 
well.   
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“mainstream” way of being religious from both inside and outside perspectives.  This 
also has implications for who is seen as an appropriate or accurate representative of the 
religious community- again, often marginalizing voices of dissent or difference within 
religious communities themselves. Thus, paying attention to these internal diversities and 
conflicts is as critical, if not more so, than examining that of conflict between seemingly 
bounded groups.   
While religion is always lived and developed in local contexts, it is impossible to 
extract local experiences and understandings of religion from the broader global 
context.  A feature of religion, at least in the contexts of Lebanon and Bosnia, is that it 
has global connections and reach.  The dominant religious communities in each context, 
which primarily include sects of Christianity and Islam, have connections to the more 
broad global religious communities (as “world religions”) and also, most have 
connections with institutional sectarian structures that span beyond the borders of the 
state.  For instance, the Sunni community in Lebanon engages with regional Sunni 
institutions, while the Serbian Orthodox community in Bosnia answers to institutional 
elites in Belgrade.  The role that the French in particular played in supporting and 
influencing the Maronite community in Lebanon (seen as a “Christian enclave”) prior to 
and during the French Mandate had important implications for how this community 
understood itself in relation to religious Others in the region.  International responses and 
rhetoric shaped and reified the religious lenses through which conflict was articulated and 
carried out, most notable in the case of how international observers prioritized the 
Muslim identity of Bosnians during the war in that context.  Christian-Islamic 
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civilizational narratives were prevalent in describing conflict during the lead-up to wars 
in both Bosnia and Lebanon, and current regional and global narratives of religious 
conflict (between Sunni and Shia, between Christians and Muslims, etc.) have very real 
impacts on the way local relational dynamics are interpreted and lived out.  Thus, all 
religion may be local, but it is never only so.   
Despite the prevalence of religious and other peacebuilding work, social 
cohesion in each context remains dismal. In each context, there is a plethora of 
peacebuilding work underway, from top-down and bottom-up approaches, involving 
government, non-government and international/bilateral actors, and engaging religious 
institutions and identities in a variety of ways. There is no shortage of effort, and yet, 
both vertical and horizontal measures of social cohesion are highly negative.  Both 
Lebanon and Bosnia reveals a lack of social trust (horizontal), as well as widespread lack 
of trust in the government (vertical).  Successful programs, evaluated on small scales, are 
not leading to systemic change.  My case study analysis reveals some of the key barriers 
and the problematic approaches at work that keep things stagnant, all of which I will not 
repeat here, but the key finding that emerged in both cases is that religious institutional 
leadership is tied up with the state (more so in Lebanon than in Bosnia, but nevertheless, 
a reality in both) and thus have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.  In order to 
maintain the current national order, bonding cohesion is required, at the expense of 
bridging cohesion.  This is seen in the way the political and electoral infrastructure relies 
upon ethno-religious or sectarian group boundedness and identification.  
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Embodied separation, through geography, schooling, and the political system, 
works in both Bosnia and Lebanon against attempts to bring people together.  This 
includes the homogenization and decentralization of Lebanese social geography, a trend 
seen in Bosnia as well. Embodied separation goes hand in hand with the presence of 
stagnant peace agreements.  In both contexts, many have referred to the peace agreements 
as “frozen” and unfulfilled.  They put in place a status quo that, according to the 
agreements themselves, was supposed to change over time, but instead has become 
stagnant.  Several noted that the Ta’if established “peace” without dealing with the 
underlying causes of the war.  This has been accompanied by institutionalized and 
corporate/communal politics around religious identity, built into the national identity and 
into political institutions and structures.  In Lebanon in particular, sectarianism is 
inscribed into most aspects of life, and access to the state and to numerous services is 
filtered through communal belonging, rather than stemming from individual citizenship.  
Without addressing these institutional challenges, and without addressing persistent 
inequalities and injustices, peacebuilding limited in ability to have impact.   
In each context, different peacebuilding actors demonstrated commitments to 
different ultimate goals, revealing a diversity of approaches to what peace means and 
looks like. Both contexts revealed a plethora of initiatives and approaches to engaging 
religion in building peace.  While some approaches were complementary, others had 
competing goals. The main dividing line in both contexts was that some actors 
(particularly those coming from the grassroots) are working to change the system in some 
way (and emphasize equality and justice), while others (particularly those with state or 
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institutional ties) are working to maintain a sense of unity and consensus, which served to 
uphold the status quo.  This harkens back to the typology of religion that Bruce Lincoln 
offers, outlined in Chapter Two, including religions of resistance, status quo, and 
revolution.  Religious expression can certainly move between these types of engagement 
with the broader societal structures, but religious engagement in peacebuilding in both 
contexts demonstrated a divide between those seeking to uphold the status quo and those 
looking to dismantle it in some significant way, thus revealing an important fissure in 
work.      
There is a lack of connection between local and national efforts.  While both 
top-down, nationally focused efforts and bottom-up, locally centered efforts exist in large 
numbers in Bosnia and in Lebanon, there is a large disconnect between them.  Locally 
centered efforts are often more successful in creating cohesion at the local levels, but 
struggle to have any ripple-out effect, while national efforts may have the scale, but lack 
the rootedness in local contexts and thus often fail to have the desired effects.  Thus, we 
see a continuation of bonding cohesion but a lack of bridging cohesion that is widespread 
in any way.  Additionally, both case studies revealed some differences and tensions 
between top-down and bottom up approaches to building peace. Many working on the 
grassroots level expressed skepticism about the authenticity and impact of nationally-
driven efforts, particularly considering those led by international organizations like the 
United Nations.  Those involved in national peacebuilding platforms expressed a lack of 
confidence in locally-focused efforts, which might have the ability to make real change in 
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small localities, but this change will be eroded by national and systemic trends if they are 
not addressed.   
In Lebanon in particular, but in Bosnia in some instances as well, overt 
religious violence serves as a distraction from deeper, root-cause work.  Lebanese 
NGOs and peacebuilding actors reported that much of their work now focuses on dealing 
with the immediate and urgent threat of extremist violence, particularly on the border 
with Syria.  This tracks with a shift in international funding structures as well, which 
prioritize a focus on overt violence over other, less visible kinds (?).  While part of this is 
about urgency and scale, it reflects a general downfall in religious peacebuilding 
approaches, which on the whole tend to pay attention to the more obvious forms of 
violence (including extremism in particular), while glossing over some of the structural 
violence that lies below the surface.  This created a cycle of sorts, as overt violence 
continues cropping up, in part because the underlying issues of inequality and injustice 
are left untended. This is one of the key reasons I argue for a shift in our theoretical 
approach to religion and conflict analysis to include not only analysis of how religion is 
promoting violence or peace, but how it is- in various ways- upholding or challenging the 
socio-political status quo.   
Much of the work to explicitly engage religion in peacebuilding efforts takes a 
ideological approach.  Through inter-religious dialogues, the production of texts aimed 
at promoting peaceful interpretations of religion, and the work on sermons and public 
religious messaging, there is a very heavy emphasis in this field on religion in the realm 
of beliefs and ideas (ideology and theology).  Much of the actual programming of 
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religious peacebuilding initiatives involves curating or influencing sermons and religious 
texts, dialogues about beliefs between believers at various levels (institutional and 
grassroots; clergy and laity), and other similar efforts focused on engaging or influencing 
beliefs or ideas. This constrains the impact of these efforts, since they often fail to 
consider religion within the broader context of socio-political life. By limiting religion to 
ideology, the material ways in which religious identity and meaning in each context was 
produced, and thus the way it is now lived out in private and public life, are left to the 
side. This is intricately connected to the next point, as a focus on religious beliefs over 
other aspects of religious identity can lead to attempts to isolate or extract religion from 
the broader conflict arena.   
Paired with the ideological emphasis within religious peacebuilding work, there 
is also a tendency to try to extract religion from the conflict, treating it as a separate 
conflict factor that can be dealt with in isolation. This includes efforts to isolate and 
“extract” religion from the broader socio-political context to deal only with religious 
concepts and issues in religious peacebuilding settings.  Several respondents in both cases 
spoke about the need to protect religion from politicians, which for many, led to a desire 
to deal with religion outside of the political realm. This extraction of religion from 
politics in particular is seen in the efforts of the institutional and clerical leadership in 
both contexts.  Respondents from both the National Committee for Christian-Muslim 
Dialogue in Lebanon and the Interreligious Council in Bosnia spoke of the importance of 
staying away from politics in their engagements and work in order to not “rock the boat.”  
They noted the importance of staying on consensus issues and sending “messages of 
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peace” from their platforms without getting into controversial politics.  While certainly 
this makes sense if the goal is to maintain unity and consensus between these particular 
actors, it makes it very difficult for religious peacebuilding efforts to have any impact on 
the broader socio-political dynamics, particularly if we accept that systemic and 
institutional changes are needed for social cohesion to improve in both countries. As Ina 
Merdjanova argues in her assessment of religious peacebuilding in the Balkans, a 
repoliticization of interreligious dialogue for peacebuilding is needed if it is going to 
maintain a goal of attaining peace.595   
Religious leaders and institutions do indeed play important roles and have clout 
in these post-conflict settings.  However, we need to unpack and situate what those 
roles are- they’re not good at everything, and approaches to engaging religion in 
peacebuilding need to take nuance into account here.  Institutional religious actors have 
been very successful in helping to bring about peace agreements, in building consensus, 
and in quelling overt violence.  The Interreligious Council in Bosnia, for example, played 
a key role in helping to maintain peace initially and working to collaborate with the 
government to ensure inclusion of all religious communities in institutional structures.  
The high-level interreligious bodies in Lebanon also played and important role in the 
Ta’if, as well as continuing to help in quelling outbreaks of violence in the country.  
These efforts have been far less successful in these contexts at helping to cultivate social 
cohesion more broadly, particularly if they benefit from or have interest in maintaining 
the status quo.  This is both a reflection of the scope of their influence and impact, but it 
                                                
595 Merdjanova, “Overhauling Interreligious Dialogue for Peacebuilding,” 30. 
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also reflects the very real ways in which religious leaders and institutions in both Bosnia 
and Lebanon are benefitting from division between religious communities in a certain 
way, and thus prefer to stay in preservation mode.  The political posturing of religious 
leaders was a common theme in the case studies, and a sense that the religious leaders 
and institutions indeed reinforce the logic of ethno-nationalism (in Bosnia) or 
sectarianism (in Lebanon).  This reveals a key paradox for religious peacebuilding.  A 
certain level of bonding cohesion is needed to maintain control over these constituencies, 
and religious elites in these contexts benefit from moderate levels of boundary-
maintenance.  In Lebanon in particular, the financial benefits for religious elites are very 
real, and in both contexts, maintaining a national vision that gives rights to religious 
communities as such is of interest to religious institutional elites.   
An area for further study is the impact of peacebuilding efforts on resilience. 
There are many ways in which the plethora of peacebuilding efforts at the grassroots 
level in particular have more to do with community and individual resilience than they do 
with making a direct, measurable impact on social cohesion more broadly. This emerged 
as a key finding in both studies, as I spoke with numerous grassroots actors who do not 
necessarily believe they are making a broad impact, and some even assert that they are 
not trying to, but rather are concerned with helping themselves and those around them 
resist the status quo in small ways through their efforts. In Lebanon, there was a 
pronounced cynicism among religious peacebuilding actors in particular, but this was 
paired with a commitment to continue the work out of necessity- respondents spoke to a 
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lack of viable alternatives.  Thus, further research might examine the ways in which these 
efforts are sources of resilience for an otherwise frustrated and cynical population.    
 
Summary  
Religion is multi-dimensional, multi-directional conflict variable that is impacted 
by (and exerts impact on) external and internal factors and dynamics.  Social cohesion 
remains dismal, and this is in part because of continued stagnant peace accords that put in 
place what were meant to be temporary structures that have instead become permanent, 
crystalizing group belonging and difference into the fabric of state and society.  Across 
the board, those “engaging religion” in peacebuilding tend to prioritize ideology and treat 
religion as something that can and should be extracted from the political.  Religious elites 
and institutions in particular demonstrate a propensity toward preservation of the status 
quo.  Some of this is intentional, seen in religious elites jointly opposing certain moves to 
make institutional change.  Other modes of this are less overt, as elites articulate a desire 
to preserve consensus and to do so, must avoid controversial political and social issues, 
shielding their work from extensive engagement on injustice and inequalities.   
While grassroots work that engages religion in peacebuilding does not often take 
this same consensus-oriented approach, reach of this work is limited by the institutional 
structures, and there is still a tendency to treat religion in an ideological and extractive 
manner.  Additionally, extremism and overt violence serve as strong distractions across 
the board, consistently pulling funding and attention from root-cause issues.  Thus, while 
messages of peace from religious elites are helpful in quelling overt violence, underlying 
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injustices and inequalities often remain untouched, leading to low levels of social 
cohesion and an increased likelihood of violent responses to injustices.   
 
Shifting Religious Peacebuilding Theory  
In both Bosnia and Lebanon, as argued in the case studies and reiterated above, 
religious institutions and elites are often working to maintain consensus and, in turn, the 
socio-political status quo.  This is many times in conflict with grassroots peacebuilding 
actors, who are working for systemic or institutional change.  I am arguing that this 
reality on the ground in many places calls for a shift in how scholars and practitioners 
theorize religion, conflict and peace.  
The religious engagement in these contexts reflects a simplified application of the 
ambivalence thesis.  While the ambivalence thesis that anchors much religious 
peacebuilding theory is right when it comes to malleability of religion and the need to 
avoid essentializing (whether it be as violent or peaceful), it doesn’t account for the 
multidirectional ways in which religion is also shaped by socio-political context; it is not 
only itself a source factors.  Additionally, the current ambivalence thesis tends to be seen 
as one-dimensional and highly ideologically focused (Diagram 1).  
 
Diagram 1 
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The assumption, given this approach, is that moving religious expression along 
this spectrum (toward promoting peace) will result in better outcomes.  However, even in 
contexts like Lebanon and Bosnia where we do indeed see religious leaders and 
institutions often speaking up for peace and nonviolence, we still do not see social 
cohesion improve.  Of course, as asserted in this study, this is due to a multiplicity of 
factors.  However, I argue that adding another dimension to this theoretical approach can 
aid in a more holistic approach to theorizing religion in conflict and peacebuilding.  This 
added dimension is to consider whether religious actors are upholding or challenging the 
socio-political status quo (Diagram 2).  They can do this violently or peacefully, but 
regardless, it is a critical dimension of how religious actors are situated in various 
contexts.  
 
Diagram 2 
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 Adding this dimension (of upholding vs. challenging the status quo) complexities 
how we see religion showing up and exerting influence in conflict situations, and more 
fully accounts for how socio-political context is also shaping religious identities and 
expression.  Additionally, this adds the justice dimension, which helps in assessing if and 
how religion can contribute, or is contributing (or not), to improving social cohesion.  
This also accounts for religion beyond the ideological, looking at socio-political action 
and engagement in a more complete way.  Overall, this revised theoretical approach, the 
need for which I derive from my case study analysis, will aid in both theory and practice 
when it comes to engaging religion in order to advance peace.   
 
Conclusion 
 Examining the Lebanon and Bosnia cases in comparative context demonstrates 
the need to refine religious peacebuilding, in theory and practice, if it is going to make 
more progress in advancing social cohesion.  This study reveals a key paradox in 
religious institutional and elite involvement in peacebuilding efforts, as elites have 
developed a stake in preserving the status quo and prioritizing consensus, while often 
leaving aside issues of justice and inequality that continue to perpetuate horizontal and 
vertical distrust and, at times, lead to more overt violence.  A simplified ambivalence 
thesis approach to religious peacebuilding would likely miss this paradox, as the focus on 
ideology and the promotion of peace messages would lead one to believe that religious 
peacebuilding is doing its work effectively in these contexts.  However, the added 
dimension of whether or not a religious actor is working to uphold or challenge the status 
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quo allows for a fuller view of how socio-political contexts shape and are shaped by 
religion, and how justice and inequalities play into the context and the work of those 
engaging religion in peacebuilding efforts.   
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Chapter 8: Conclusion: Beyond Kumbaya- Materially Engagement of Religion in 
Peacebuilding for a Better Future 
This dissertation set out to utilize a material theory of religion in analyzing 
practices of engaging religion in peacebuilding efforts in Lebanon and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. By looking at religion, conflict and peacebuilding in these particular 
contexts through this lens, we are able to see how religion interacts with conflict in a 
dynamic fashion, as it shapes and is shaped by conflict situations. Religion is thus 
produced through these processes, as much as- or more than- it exerts influence on the 
nature of conflict itself. Religion is also ambivalent in a variety of ways- not only in 
terms of peaceful or violent interpretations of traditions, but also in how it seeks to either 
uphold or challenge certain status quos. Indeed, as I argued in the last chapter, this second 
form of ambivalence is critical to understanding and engaging religious actors in 
situations of conflict, if the goal is social cohesion.  
 Religious engagement, particularly in contexts where religious symbols and 
identities were heavily invoked within situations of violence, is critical, and yet, it has not 
to date produced the results one would like to see in either Bosnia-Herzegovina or in 
Lebanon. This does not mean, however, that religious engagement should therefore be 
abandoned. It is both essential to, and can be helpful in, situations of post-conflict 
rebuilding, if it is engaged thoughtfully and effectively. Rather than abandoning religious 
engagement for lack of desired results, scholars and practitioners alike need to instead 
 287 
rethink and refine how religion is imagined and invoked in conflict mitigation and 
peacebuilding scenarios.  
 This shift involves going beyond exclusively internal notions of religion, which 
drive highly belief-focused interventions, and also avoiding overstating group identities 
and boundaries, which as we have seen are highly malleable and contingent.  
 The findings specific to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon in this dissertation 
have important implications well beyond these contexts. In particular, these findings can 
speak into other deeply divided societies in which power-sharing arrangements are 
considered in bringing about political peace agreements. This field of research will only 
become more relevant, if the Pew numbers on religious conflict hold true and if we 
continue to see trends toward intra-state and non-state actors being the primary locus of 
conflicts into the middle and latter parts of the 21st century.  
 In deeply divided societies, which entail societies in which multiple religious, 
ethnic, or otherwise identified groups are vying for political and social representation, 
any resolutions or peace agreements will be followed by the large task of rebuilding 
social cohesion where it has been eroded. In situations where religion is a key factor, 
effective post-conflict engagement must pay careful attention to the ways that 
institutional structures can aid or inhibit social cohesion. This involves finding ways to 
incentivize cooperation and the public expression of multiple forms of identity. 
Additionally, it will comprise taking care not to over-prioritize stability at the expense of 
long-term cohesion, which entails socio-political justice and equality for both 
communities and individuals. Peace treaties, and the role of religious leaders or 
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communities therein, must be seen, then, as a first step, rather than expecting them to 
bear out long-term solutions on their own. Indeed, we have seen in the case studies at 
hand that this approach produces a stale status-quo, further entrenching a lack of social 
cohesion.  
 One might take Syria, for example: a conflict that has gone on for over six years, 
and in the course of this time, has produced new forms of religious identity and 
community affiliations that were not present or meaningful at the start of the uprisings. 
Any post-conflict peace-building efforts in Syria are going to have to take these new 
forms of religious identity and meaning into account. However, a narrow focus on 
peaceful versus violent understandings of religion will not be fruitful in producing a new 
and inclusive society. Simply focusing on the most overt forms of violence, while 
ignoring the structural violence that has been present throughout, will only seed future 
unrest. Power-sharing arrangements that see stability as the ultimate goal will not be 
sustainable long-term, and silencing the voices and grievances of those on the margins of 
any of the identity groups at play will only lead to more conflict down the road.  
 In the Syrian context, any attempts to extract religion from the political and to 
build peace by putting different religious groups in dialogue with one another- without 
engaging with the larger socio-political context and questions of justice- will produce the 
same stagnancy we have seen in Lebanon. Paying attention to the ways in which religious 
elites and institutions have been, or will become, tied up in the maintenance of certain 
unjust status quo realities, will be especially critical for those hoping to engage religion in 
promoting long-term peace.  
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 While the findings from this dissertation are most applicable in other deeply 
divided contexts, such as Syria, there is certainly also specific relevance for other 
contexts that do not fit this pattern. Indeed, this study has important implications for how 
religion is conceptualized and employed in global Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) 
policies. Many CVE policies focus nearly completely on Islamic extremism, often 
overlooking the other forms of extremism bearing religious credentials, and they tend to 
take up a one-dimensional approach to religion and violence, designing programs to 
“moderate” religious teachings and beliefs in order to combat the spread of violent 
extremism. They most often fail to look at the other dimension of religion & violence that 
I argue for in this study, namely, how religion is used to either challenge or uphold the 
status quo. CVE programs therefore prioritize the “moderate” elite religious voices, often 
ignoring the institutional baggage with which they come. Using the approach laid out in 
this dissertation, those engaged in CVE design can more fully situate the rise in violent 
extremism in certain contexts, and thus will be better equipped to address it at the root, 
rather than simply at the surface.  
 There are, of course, limitations to a study like this in and of itself, and to its 
implications for other contexts. For this study, there were, of course, many other 
respondents and programmatic efforts in each context that I was not able to include due 
to logistical constraints. This means that there are certainly perspectives and initiatives 
that were not taken into account in this research. Rather than being a comprehensive 
assessment of each context, this dissertation provides a snapshot, and analyzes this 
snapshot accordingly. Additionally, religion in each society develops in very context-
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specific ways, making it difficult to assess direct causal connections to certain similar 
outcomes in two different contexts. There are always a multiplicity of internal and 
external factors at work hindering or enabling social cohesion. Thus, this study is not able 
to make social scientific predictions as such, but rather, points to trends and tendencies 
within two different contexts with contingent generalizations.  
The battle at Maaloula detailed in the opening of this dissertation shows both the 
complexity of identifying and pulling out religious threads of a larger situation of socio-
political unrest, as well as the ways in which the narratives told- internally and 
externally- about the role of religion in any conflict has a strong impact on the way that 
conflict unfolds. The default assumption of religious or cultural wars or animosities 
pervades public opinion as well as global policy, and those engaged in conflict mitigation 
and peacebuilding work have an uphill battle to displace these default modes of thinking 
and reacting. However, the plethora of religiously-engaged peacebuilding work over the 
past decade and beyond has also produced a growing body of knowledge that, if we 
approach it thoughtfully and analytically, will aid in the development of more fruitful 
engagement into the future, where we are going to need it.  Rather than seeing religious 
peacebuilding as “supplemental,”596 bracketing religion as belief and extracting it from a 
historicized socio-political context, those in the business of religious peacebuilding 
should thus expand the scope of how religion can contribute in meaningful ways to the 
broader efforts of building peace. 
  
                                                
596 Omer, “Religious Peacebuilding,” 11.  
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Appendix: Religion & Social Cohesion Assessment Guide 
 
 
 This assessment framework guide assesses the various dimensions of religious 
engagement in national and social conflict dynamics and peacebuilding efforts.  
Additionally, the guide assesses factors that span beyond explicitly religious ones 
because religious factors necessarily overlap and interact with other socio-political 
conflict dynamics.  This guide, then, demonstrates these overlaps and interactions, 
shedding light on the specific ways in which religion impacts, and is impacted by, other 
socio-political dynamics related to conflict and peacebuilding.  
 
1.  Religion in National Identity  
n What is the nature of national identity, and how inclusive is it of various 
religious identities? Is it a particular ethno-religious identity?  What 
percentage of the state population fits this identity category? 
n Have past leaders instituted direct “nation building”597 policies and reforms? 
How far back?  And if so, were they successful in generating a more cohesive 
national identity, inclusive of religious identity groups?598   
n Is there a higher degree of ethnic nationalism or civic nationalism599 (are 
rights based on ethnicity or rights based on citizenship)? Or are identities 
                                                
597 Edward Miguel, “Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania,” 
World Politics 56 (April 2004), 327-62.  
598 Include an analysis of how I or others are defining success for the particular context.   
599 The “Barometers” are useful sources of data related to citizenship and identity. For example, see: 
http://www.afrobarometer-online-analysis.com/aj/AJBrowserAB.jsp  
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principally ethnic, religious or otherwise, with no real sense of nationalism?  
Does the national identity map onto the state’s borders? 
n Is political participation inclusive? That is, can all groups of society equally 
participate in elections and politics?  If not, which groups have restricted 
participation, and in what ways?  
n What is the official way in which religion is reflected in the national identity 
(established religion vs. passive or aggressive secular state identity, etc.)?600  
n What are the state’s policies vis-à-vis freedom of religious belief?601  
Religious expression in the public square or state-controlled spaces?  
n What is the state’s level of state control over religious practice, expression, or 
institutions?  Does it differ from religion to religion?  
n Are there constitutional restrictions on who can vote or run for office, based 
on religious identity? 602  
n How deeply are religious divisions institutionalized within the state 
apparatus?  
n To what degree have ethnic or religious identities become interrelated with a 
conceptualization of the “nation” and the state?603 Do religious and ethnic 
                                                
600 Drawing on typologies from Ahmet Kuru, Secularism and State Policy toward Religion:  The United 
States, France and Turkey, (Cambridge:  Columbia University Press, 2009); others.  
601 Freedom House indicators; Fox, Jonathan, and Yasemin Akbaba "Restrictions on the Religious Practices 
of Religious Minorities: A Global Survey." Political Studies (2014). 
602 Conflict dynamic: formal electoral rules shape how much it costs to vote or run in an election, which 
might exclude some groups from active participation in the political process. 
603 David Little, “Religion, Nationalism, and Intolerance,” in Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious 
Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking, ed. Timothy Sisk (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2011).  
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ideals in the country tend to inform more constructive or more destructive 
forms of nationalism?  
n Are religious groups highly concentrated within particular geographic areas, 
or are they dispersed across the state within various areas?  
n To what extent, and in what ways, do state institutions shape the actions of 
religious or sectarian elites?  To what extent do elites shape state institutions’ 
actions?604 To what extent do formal state institutions constrain or enable 
interactions that create exclusion or cohesion?  
n Do marginalized ethnic groups have venues605 through which to voice 
grievances? If so, to what extent are such grievances actually addressed?  
n What is the nature of the current political discourse606 around “social 
cohesion” and nationalism in the case? According to leaders and party 
rhetoric, who will and will not be part of the developing “nation”?  
 
2.  Religion in Social Dynamics  
n What can be said about the general nature of social cohesion in the country 
under consideration?  
n Are there spillover effects from other conflict or fragile environments in the 
region? Are there ameliorative effects from other strong environments?  
                                                
604 Include a mapping of who these elites are.   
605 Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
606 Vanessa Barolsky, “‘A Better Life for All’, Social Cohesion and the Governance of Life in Post-
Apartheid South Africa,” Social Dynamics 38, no. 1 (2012): 134–51. 
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n How do regional or international expressions of religion, or religious 
networks, impact articulation of religious identities or values in the local 
context at hand?  Are some bigger players in this process than others (i.e., are 
certain religions/communities are over- or underrepresented in this process, 
and if so, which ones and how)? 
n Is there evidence of a recent process through which there has been “invention 
of enmity” among competing ethnic or religious groups?607 Or, are there “long 
antagonisms” and “ancient hatreds” among ethno-religious groups? Or, are 
there new forms of “modern hatreds”608 emerging due to political or economic 
change? 
n How do the actors define stories of “historical injustice”609 among religious or 
ethnic groups? Are there particular historical injustices that groups believe 
have never been reconciled?  What narratives of the past do various groups 
tell: of better or worse intercommunal relations? 
n How significant is religious difference in relation to other identity-based 
cleavages in this particular context?   
n What are the dominant political narratives? Do they involve “hate speech,”610 
religious or ethnics stereotyping or propaganda?  
                                                
607 David Little, Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity (United States Institute of Peace, 1993). See also, E. J. 
Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition, Past and Present Publications (New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
608 Stuart Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, Cornell Studies in Security 
Affairs (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
609 David Carment, “The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and Theory,” 
Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 2 (May 1, 1993): 137–50. 
610 Glaeser, “The Political Economy of Hatred.” 
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n To what extent do religious groups active in the conflict or public space fit 
into a minimalist or maximalist expression of religious commitment?611 
n To what extent do religious groups active in the public space fit into Bruce 
Lincoln’s typology of Religions of the Status Quo, Religions of Resistance, or 
Religions of Revolution?612 
n To what extend do religious demographics overlap with economic disparities 
and other measures of inequality? To what extent is there a sense of “relative 
deprivation”613 among religious groups across the economic landscape? 
n To what extend are faith-based organizations or religious institutions engaged 
in providing social services, rather than the state?   
n What are the conclusions of social surveys or other attitudinal studies on 
measures such as social distance and social trust, particularly along religious 
identity lines?   
n Is there evidence of strong, voluntary civil society groups that cut across 
religious identity lines?614  
 
3.  Religious Actors in Conflict Dynamics   
                                                
611 Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion After September 11, (Chicago:  University of 
Chicago Press, 2006), 59. 
612 Lincoln, Holy Terrors, 79-86.   
613 Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton University Press, 1970). See also, Francesco Caselli and Wilbur 
John Coleman, On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict, Working Paper (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
March 2006). Cynthia Arnson and I. William Zartman, Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection 
of Need, Creed, And Greed (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005). 
614 Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2002). 
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n Do political elites have power over mechanisms that operate to “construct” 
religious identities such as the media or using political platforms to promote 
metaphors, myths that create “imagined communities,”615 or help shape an 
“enemy image”616 of other religious groups?  Do they control particular 
economic sectors?  Are some sectors the ‘province’ of particular groups?  
n Do “predatory elites” use extant religious divisions to mobilize political 
support, or, “direct public frustration away from their own exploitative 
behavior.”617  
n Do state leaders have “enemy perceptions”618 of other ethnic groups? 
n Do political elites use “religious” conflicts as reference points to mobilize 
support for particular purposes?  
n Do elites use power and institutions of the state to protect and promote the 
interests of their own group over the interests of others?  
n Are there religious elite “spoilers”619 in the peace process? (elites who view 
peace as preventing them from being able to achieve their primary aims, 
interests) Who? Has the state sought to incorporate “spoilers” into the state 
apparatus?  
                                                
615 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
616 Stuart J. Kaufman, “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War,” 
International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 108–38. See also, Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” 
Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 (1994): 44–76. Ross, Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict. Edward L. 
Glaeser, “The Political Economy of Hatred,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, no. 1 (February 1, 
2005): 45–86. 
617 Robert H. Bates, When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa, 1st ed. (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). See also, Larry Diamond, “Democratic Rollback - The Resurgence of the 
Predatory State,” Foreign Affairs 87 (2008): 298. 
618 N. Kaplowitz, “National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies: Psychopolitical 
Dimensions of International Relations,” Political Psychology, 1990, 39–82. 
619 Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 
5–53. 
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n How does the electoral system map – boundary demarcation and districting – 
relate to religious divisions?  Is the electoral system likely to promote 
“bridging” or “bonding strategies”620 in political parties to gain seats? 
n To what extent do incumbent political elites “play the religious card” in order 
to maintain power and garner political support from more extremist religious 
political groups? To what extent do elites employ religion as a means to 
maintain or gain political power? 
n What is the organizational structure of dominant religious institutions (e.g. 
hierarchical and bureaucratic versus localized)? 
n To what degree does clientalism or patronage shape the behavior of religious 
elites?   
 
4.  Description of Specific Interventions  
n What are the different types of initiatives that engage religion in 
peacebuilding in this context (elite-level dialogues, committees, or forums; 
civil society efforts; foreign entity-driven programs, etc.)?   
n How, precisely, do peacebuilding initiatives engage religion in addressing 
particular conflict dynamics?   
n What are the primary interventions that aim to directly improve social 
cohesion at the level of civil society (e.g. dialogue, local peacebuilding, etc.)? 
What are the primary interventions that aim to indirectly improve social 
                                                
620 Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior (Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
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cohesion at the level of the state (e.g. governance reforms, aid to marginalized 
groups, etc.)? 
i. How involved are local religious elites and organizations in these 
particular efforts?   
 
5. Conceptual Understandings of Religious Peacebuilding  
n How do actors involved in peacebuilding efforts that engage religion articulate 
the nature of religion in relation to conflict dynamics?  
n Are there differences in the way religious actors vs. “secular” actors articulate 
the religious dynamics at play?  
n How do civil society actors see the role of religious elites in peacebuilding 
efforts?  How do religious elites see their own roles in peacebuilding efforts?   
n How do peacebuilding and development actors not involved in religious 
peacebuilding efforts articulate the nature of religion in relation to conflict 
dynamics? The effectiveness of religious peacebuilding efforts? 
 
6.  Evidence of Efficacy of Religious Approaches to Peacebuilding   
n What lessons have peacebuilding practitioners learned on effective and 
ineffective forms of social cohesion programming that explicitly engages 
religion or religious groups? 
n What are the intervening factors that prohibit or facilitate effectively engaging 
religion in peacebuilding efforts?  
